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ITALIAN MODERNISM, SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS

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During the past year a prolonged stay in Italy gave me occasion to visit most of the larger cities between Naples and the Alps, and supplied the opportunity of personal contact with many of the men who are now at the helm of Italian social, religious, and philosophical movements, while at the same time I was able to obtain first-hand acquaintance with the thoughts and desires of the Italian laborer. I soon became aware of the variety, intensity, and complexity of the issues which are now agitating Italian public life. It is true that Latin blood warms more rapidly, and reaches a higher temperature in controversy, than that of the Anglo-Saxon. But no superficial grievances are those over which conflict now rages; both in politics and in religion the contending parties feel that the joust of the tournament-field has become a battle for existence.

To an outside observer the most significant thing in Italian life today is the widening breach between the Roman hierarchy and the proletariat. I was in Florence in the autumn of 1909, when the news was flashed over the continent that Professor Ferrer had been executed by the Spanish authorities. Repeated efforts had been made to secure the intervention of the Vatican on his behalf; while meantime the anticlerical press had industriously circulated the report that the activity of the Spanish Jesuits was responsible for the outcome of Ferrer's prosecution, and that his conviction had received the secret approval of the Holy See.[1] Ferrer had become a great favorite in Italy, especially

[1] It is but just to state that this charge was met by a denial from the Vatican, —with small effect, however, in allaying public feeling.

in masonic and socialistic circles, and the announcement of his execution aroused throughout the country extraordinary manifestations of popular indignation, which took the form of enormous parades and mass meetings of remonstrance. The Italian press, practically with one accord, described the death of Ferrer as another blow aimed by a mediaeval church at modern social and intellectual progress. Editorials glowed with passionate denunciation, and recalled the case of Giordano Bruno, from the pedestal of whose monument in Rome orators harangued the crowds that swarmed into the Piazza Campo di Fiore. In Florence every shop was closed, and the barred shutters bore the legend, "Closed on account of international mourning." Similarly in other cities, notably in Rome and Milan, all business came to a standstill; the people listened to inflammatory speeches, and paraded the streets in numbers estimated in some instances to have exceeded fifty thousand. In numerous places churches were set on fire, and priests beaten in the streets. In Florence press and people even demanded that the *Via dell' Arcivescovado* —"Archbishopric Street," between the bishop's palace and the Duomo—be rebaptized with the name of Francesco Ferrer! Most of the demonstrations took place under socialistic auspices, but the multitudes that participated in them far outreached the numbers that socialism can claim in Italy. The masses of the working-people in the Italian cities have developed a state of mind in which they are ready to believe the faintest assertion of the church's hostility to their interests.

Social phenomena of this nature are always significant. They can occur only where an influential part of the population has not merely grown aggressively independent of ecclesiastical authority, but has also lost fear and respect for the same. Still more significant, in this instance, is the fact that this revolutionary feeling is spreading among the working-classes—a stratum of society which has heretofore blindly submitted to the dictates of the church. It is true that in the country districts and in the small villages the common people still constitute the faithful who yield unquestioning obedience to the Roman hierarchy; but in the larger industrial centres, where a socialist propaganda has been carried on, the number of those who are either indiffer-

ent or hostile to the church is so great that it may well be a cause for alarm to the Vatican.

The effort to discover the antecedent causes of these phenomena leads to an inquiry into the general political and economic situation in Italy in its relation to the church. The Vatican's attitude during the past decade toward movements for the betterment of living conditions among Italian wage-earners is found to be no inconsiderable factor in the situation. For in Italy, as in other Latin countries, religious problems are much complicated by dominant political and economic tendencies.

But a word of caution is needed at this point. It is precarious to generalize on Italian social conditions and tendencies without taking into account the great regional differences which exist. "Italy is only a geographical expression," said Metternich in allusion to the great diversity of governments and interests that characterize the different parts of the Italian peninsula. Since the unification of Italy into a kingdom there has been a gradual growth of uniformity in national characteristics; but the inherited regional differences are still so great that it is all but impossible to make any general statements about internal conditions. Lombardy and Sicily represent the extremes; but Tuscany, which lies between them, is very different from either. Furthermore, each of the larger divisions has its own crop of local differences, such as it would be impossible to find within a given area in any other part of Europe. As Villari[2] pertinently observes, the various Italian schools of painting, sculpture, and architecture, some of them crowded into the restricted area that holds Pisa, Florence, and Siena, are but manifestations of differences that extend in each case to the whole life of the people. They are survivals of the communal particularism of the one-time city-states.

The greatest contrast, obviously, exists between the North and the South. The inhabitants of the former describe their region as *L' Alta Italia* and refer contemptuously to the Southerners as *Meridionali*. Lombardy and Piedmont are progressive, and have grown wealthy by a great variety of successful industries. In

[2] L. Villari, Italian Life in Town and Country, 1905.

the South agricultural occupations predominate, and the mass of the population is wretchedly poor. On the Sorrento peninsula once populous villages are almost entirely depopulated. Its half-starved inhabitants have heard the call of that new world of plenty toward which the Italian Columbus was the first to turn the daring prows of his Spanish caravels. Walking through streets of empty, forsaken houses, and cities once full of wealth and splendor, now left to a few squalid idlers, one realizes that Italy has a Southern question of critical importance. The usual baleful association of illiteracy and crime with destitution confronts one at every step. One report gives the percentage of illiterates among military recruits from the provinces of Piedmont and Naples as fourteen per cent and fifty-one per cent respectively, while in Sicily it rises to fifty-five per cent. The Mafia and Camorra are characteristic products of Southern Italy, where during two given years the number of murders per hundred thousand of the inhabitants ranged between twenty-four and twenty-eight, whereas in Lombardy and Venetia it was only two and three. The moral poverty of religion as practised in some of the southern provinces is sufficiently indicated by the fact that in some of the criminal associations formed among the *mafiosi* in Sicily images of saints are introduced as part of the initiation rites.

These regional differences serve to explain the contrast between the many beautiful examples of religious life which one meets among cultivated Roman Catholics of the North, and the degrading forms of superstition which religion has assumed in the South. One who has witnessed ritual functions connected with the pretended liquefaction of the blood of St. Januarius at Naples,[3] or has seen the loathsome spectacles afforded by some of the pilgrimages—that to Casalbordino, for instance—not to mention the numerous nodding saints and curtseying madonnas, can only wonder why the Roman hierarchy still maintains an attitude of acquiescence toward what Free Catholics and modernists are denouncing as palpable imposture. Certain it is that no severer critics of these practices have arisen than are now to be found among modernists in Italy. Apropos of the excommunication

[3] For a description see Renato Fucini, Napoli a occhio nudo. A brief translated extract is given in Arthur H. Norway, Naples, p. 140.

of Loisy and the case of a Camorrist priest of Naples whom the ecclesiastical authorities failed to punish, one of them takes occasion to observe that "something is seriously wrong in a church where the gates swing wide before a priest who has sinned openly against society, but close remorselessly before one who has dared to declare that St. Thomas did not set forth truth in its finality."

I

The history of economic class-struggles in Italy began early. In his *Communist Manifesto* F. Engels makes her the first of the capitalistic nations. In keeping with this finding is the fact that banks, the calculus, and modern forms of commerce all originated in Italy. There the mediaeval city-state reached its completest development. Florence, for instance, grew out of the successful struggle of the *bourgeoisie* with the nobility. In the modern struggle of the Italian proletariat for better conditions of living socialism is on the firing-line, and its attitude toward the church, as we have seen, is bitterly hostile. What has led to this hostility?

For the purpose of our inquiry it is not necessary to review the beginnings of socialism in Italy. It will suffice to call attention to a few progressive movements of recent years. Notable among them is that of the agricultural population in the valley of the Po. It requires no imagination to picture the lot of an Italian farm-laborer who out of paltry earnings averaging seventy-five dollars a year had to pay the living-expenses of his family, not to mention the extra tax imposed by sickness. Even more pitiable was the condition of the so-called *risaiole* (rice-girls) in Lombardy and Venetia. Bent over under a broiling sun, they stood up to their knees in a swamp all day. Thirteen hours they worked, and in many places walked ten miles daily to and from their places of employment. For this work, which exacts an awful toll of disease and death, they received as a rule not more than twenty cents a day. Since the law regulating the employment of children in factories did not apply to agricultural occupations, children were largely employed at ten cents a day, often displacing the poor women. It is a malarial region,

and the consequences are sufficiently indicated by the mortality statistics. In the summer of 1901 ninety-six deaths occurred in a certain community of forty-two hundred persons. There had been no epidemic, yet fifty-five of the ninety-six were children.

These conditions in the early nineties led to the organization of the Mantuan Federation of the Society of Workmen and Farmers.[4] But it did not succeed in achieving results until it went over to the socialist party, which gave it a coherent organization. The real struggle began in 1898. "Leagues for Betterment" sprang up like mushrooms in the rural districts, and "Leagues of Resistance" were formed to support the striking organizations during the period of unemployment. In three years they forced the landlords to a general increase of wages ranging from seven to twenty-four per cent. The *risaiole* secured an average increase of eighteen per cent, and the right of determining by contract the length of the day's labor.

During the struggle the strikers had to encounter the opposition of the "Catholic Leagues," composed mainly, according to Achille Loria,[5] of barons, tutors, and priests. The poor laborers felt that they should have had the assistance, not the opposition, of the clergy where the betterment of social and economic conditions was so urgently needed. Socialists were quick to come to their aid. Under the circumstances it is not surprising that laboring people in Italy feel friendly toward socialism, notwithstanding the uncompromising hostility of the Roman Catholic church. This new clash of interests helped to deepen the popular impression that the church is the defender of barons, capital, and inherited privileges, and consequently unfriendly to schemes for social betterment involving the reduction of the employer's profits. It probably would be fairer to say that the church, as a conservative institution, simply ranges itself on the side of things as they are. But the laborer does not regard the matter from this point of view.

Thus it appears that the conservatism of the clergy, resulting

[4] Roberto Michels, "Der italienische Sozialismus auf dem Lande," in Das freie Wort, 1902.

[5] Achille Loria, Problemi sociali contemporanei, Milan, 1895.

in part from papal dictation, in part from training, forms an element of our problem. In 1873 the opposition of the Roman Catholic church to the state led to the abolition of the theological faculties at the universities. The consequences have been gratifying to the clerical party but unfortunate for Italy. It inaugurated those anticultural tendencies which have placed the Roman hierarchy not only in declared antagonism to the state, but to modern social progress as well. It is the penalty which an institution pays for living a life of negations. The mass of the Italian clergy is saturated with anticultural ideas. Suppressed at the universities, the study of religion has been restricted to Roman Catholic theology. As such it has become a veiled science of the priests and has secluded itself in their seminaries. Of these Italy alone is reported to have about three hundred, of which hardly more than forty or fifty have teachers who deserve to be called professors.[6] Professor Minocchi tells of a visit he paid in 1903 to the present pope, who was then Cardinal Sarto.[7] During the interview conversation turned on the book of Abbé Loisy, *The Gospel and the Church.* Cardinal Sarto took occasion to say that there were many important and beautiful pages in it, and that Loisy had clearly proved that there was need of considerable overhauling in the current science of the church and its seminaries. When Professor Minocchi expressed surprise that he, as cardinal, did not exert his authority to improve the state of ecclesiastical studies in the seminaries, Sarto replied: "Alas! I should like to; it is not my will that is lacking; it is the men. For my own diocese I have scarcely anybody to whom I can intrust a curriculum conformable with modern requirements. The professors in the seminaries are in general old, badly educated, and with many prejudices, and one cannot remove them as easily as one would like." Parenthetically we may add here that the hospitable attitude toward modern ideas implied in this interview was apparent only. For, as Professor Minocchi adds, "six months later Cardinal Sarto was Pope Pius X, and was condemning Loisy."

[6] Süddeutsche Monatshefte, June, 1908. Cf. also Nos. 25 and 27 of Das zwanzigste Jahrhundert, 1908, on the Italian seminaries.

[7] In his "Autobiographical Notes of a Modernist," The New Age, June 2, 1910.

A book[8] said to have for its author a confidant of Pius X deplores the lack of energetic, high-minded men among the Italian clergy, and charges that even among the higher dignitaries of the church there are individuals who "unhesitatingly mount upon the shoulders of the devil in order to attain their ends." In the "*Encyclica ferox*," as the students of the *Collegium Germanicum* at Rome have nicknamed the antimodernist encyclical, the present pope has a word of implied praise for the qualities which give modernists distinction among the rank and file of the Italian clergy,—upright life, untiring energy, and devotion to study. But in the same encyclical he commands the directors of the seminaries to "seek with utmost diligence to know the youths who desire to enter the clergy; and if you find among them any one of proud disposition, with any resoluteness, bar him from the priesthood."

In an earlier communication to the Italian bishops on the subject of modernism and Christian democracy he directed them not to permit young clerics to attend the universities except for the weightiest reasons and with the utmost precautions; newspapers they must not be permitted to read at all, and periodicals only with episcopal permission. The seminary libraries, mere remnants of what was not confiscated by the state, have received few additions since 1800, and the books are in any case kept under lock and key.[9] "Is it not true," asks one writer, "that the library in ever so many seminaries is the most inaccessible part of the building, and full of dust and bad odors? There is no need of a reading-room, for the simple reason that no literary or scientific periodicals are kept.[10]

A clergy recruited in this way, mostly from the lower strata of society, and trained remote from all vital contact with modern life and thought, is not likely to exhibit power of initiative or to interest itself in social reform. If it produces leaders, it will be by accident, not by design. Nevertheless the clergy of this

[8] Pio X: Suoi atti ed intendimenti, 1905.

[9] Prezzolini, Il cattolicismo rosso, p. 31, "Le Biblioteche non contengono che i resti di quelle non incamerate dallo Stato, e in ogni caso non vi si trova nulla che passi il 1800, e anche quello e tenuto sotto chiave."

[10] Rivista di Cultura, October 16, 1906, p. 118; Studii religiosi, vol. i, p. 288.

small country has to provide about two hundred and ninety bishops. The result, as regards intellectual and administrative ability, can hardly be satisfactory. Yet they are the ones who exercise ecclesiastical surveillance over the rank and file of the young clergy to prevent them from becoming tainted with modern ideas and to keep them from straying beyond the bounds of the Thomistic theology. There is both truth and humor in the remark of a bright young modernist priest who found it necessary to rebel against the ruling of an obscurantist bishop. "Ill fortune," said he, "awaits the flock whose shepherd is himself a sheep."

The strength of prejudices implanted by early training and the bilboes of such discipline explain why the work of noted lay theologians like Mariano, Labanca, and Chiapelli remains without influence upon clerical education. To be caught reading theological books without the church's imprimatur is a serious matter for a young priest. Hence, in the words of an Italian writer, "Obedience has become the cardinal virtue of a good Catholic. From a religious society which fears above everything schism and heresy, from a body of priests whose watch-word is to close the eyes, to conceal differences, and to avoid personal initiative, no free and independent characters can arise." [11]

We have seen that the hostile attitude of the Vatican toward the state helped to inaugurate anticultural tendencies among the clergy. What was at first a political issue between ecclesiastical and lay authority developed on the part of the church into a settled disapproval of intellectual activities and nationalizing tendencies which the state endeavors to promote. It follows that the increase of national feeling in Italy involves in some measure the abstraction of allegiance from the Vatican. An Italian holding a high position said to me, "It is difficult for an Italian to be a good Catholic and a good patriot at the same time, owing to the uncompromising attitude of the Vatican, which tries to enforce its pretensions to temporal power as an essential dogma of religion."

The papal bull *Non expedit*, issued by Leo XIII, forbade faith-

[11] Prezzolini, op. cit. p. 15.

ful Catholics to participate in the general elections. It was intended to embarrass the government, which the Vatican considers illegitimate. In the minds of the faithful this intransigent attitude had the effect of handing over the state to atheism and irreligion.

The dilemma thus created is now resolving itself to the disadvantage of the church, for the present generation is occupying itself increasingly with national politics. Soon after his election Pius X appears to have realized that abstention from the general elections is a disastrous policy for the Vatican to pursue. When the question of divorce came up at the elections of 1904, the *Non expedit* was "integrated." This consisted in not renewing the prohibition, as on previous occasions, thus leaving the matter to the individual initiative of every Catholic citizen. At the same time an intimation was conveyed to certain bishops in northern Italy that by way of exception the Holy See would not be displeased if on this occasion the faithful should participate in the elections.[12] The result was that many socialistic candidates were defeated by clericals, and a Catholic party whose energy was chiefly directed against socialism made its appearance in politics. In other words, the *Non expedit* was intended to be a standing protest against a political revolution, but it was deemed expedient to sacrifice it in order to forestall an impending social revolution. The warfare between socialism and Roman Catholicism is now carried into politics.

It seems important to define at this point the fundamental issue between the Vatican and Italian socialism. To say that the church expressly ranges itself on the side of what would be called in this country "the interests" would be doing scant justice to Roman Catholicism, which in its own way has shown a real sympathy for the material well-being of the masses. Its ideal is that of a people well nourished, not too venturesome in its thinking, and submissive to theocratic rule. However, it founds the social redemption of the submerged not upon the demands of justice, but upon the moral obligation of charity. The laborer should appeal to the employer's sense of Christian duty,

[12] Cf. Roberto Michels, Proletariato e borghesia, pp. 219 ff.

and the latter should yield obedience to the Golden Rule. This view was taken by Leo XIII in his encyclical *Rerum novarum*, in which he deplored the misery of the laboring classes, but at the same time condemned socialism unreservedly.

Now this appeal to discretionary charity socialism rejects as unworthy of the laborer. It bases its programme of social reform, or revolution, upon the principle of justice, and uses the economic power of its associations to enforce what it regards as the laborer's rights. Along the line of these differences a mutual antipathy has widened what now seems an impassable gulf. The exigencies of the conflict, as in the case of the above-mentioned Mantuan movement, have forced the church to ally itself with the conservative elements of society, which are mainly represented by the wealthy and privileged classes.

On the other hand, socialism in Italy has accepted the charge of irreligion and abandoned itself, however needlessly, to atheistic and materialistic theories. Hence the statement of an Italian writer that "the theistic socialism of the middle of the nineteenth century has definitively disappeared. The emancipation of the laboring class is conceived as the outcome of historical determinism, not as an object of evangelistic propaganda." [13] Thus it is as true as it is tragic that the church, which by tradition and vocation should be the helper of the oppressed, supports the *habentes* against the *non habentes*, while socialism, which by virtue of its moral fervor in the pursuit of social betterment should be religious, declares itself not only anticlerical, but antireligious.

But since socialism is not inherently irreligious, nor Roman Catholicism incurably feudalistic, there was room here for a new movement which could mediate between the two. It started under the direction of an able young priest, Don Romolo Murri, and called itself Christian Democracy. The *democristi*, as they are popularly known, proposed to emancipate the proletariat, first, by elevating the sense of Christian duty among employers; secondly, by establishing associations founded through the effort of the wage-earning classes; thirdly, by raising the laborer to the dignity of a sharer in the profits, and thus transforming the exist-

[13] Prezzolini, op. cit. p. 58.

ing social order. Moralized capitalism was made equivalent to co-operativism.

If the philosophy of the movement was at many points weak, at least its purpose was meritorious and full of good promise. It set itself the task of reconquering for the church what the latter had lost by negligence and lack of intelligent sympathy. The movement grew with wonderful rapidity, attracting to itself the progressive element among the clergy together with such laymen as the late Senator Fogazzaro, whose famous modernist novel, *The Saint*, was appropriated almost as a campaign document by Christian Democracy. Indeed, it was in connection with this movement that modernism first showed its real strength in Italy. It should be observed that its interest there was primarily in social reform, rather than in intellectual problems. Murri had as a student won prizes in scholastic theology, and, strange as it may seem in a man of such ability, has never abandoned scholasticism. His philosophy would hardly bring upon him the disapproval of the Vatican.

Thoughtful defenders of the new social ideals, however, were not long in discovering that the mediaeval theology and philosophy of the church were the offspring of an aristocratic view of the world and could not furnish a suitable basis for a democratic movement. A new world-view was needed as a dynamic for this programme of social reform, and modernism came forward with enthusiasm, glad to find itself practically useful. Influential clerics, silently deprecating the quarrel between the Vatican and the Quirinal, fell into line. At one time it seemed as though Cardinal Svampa of Bologna and Cardinal Agliarda of Rome had joined the progressives. Bishop Bonomelli even made noteworthy concessions to socialism when he said that he saw in it "the approach of a profound economic transformation of society whose outcome no one can as yet foretell or foresee. It is inevitable, however, and will be good."[14]

But the apparent reliance of the movement upon an economic theory opposed to the traditions of the church, and the opposition of rank and wealth whose hostility the hierarchy could not

[14] Il secolo che nasce, p. 11.

afford to excite, brought upon Christian Democracy the disapproval of the Vatican. By the encyclical *Graves de communi re* of 1900 the new party was forbidden to engage in political activity. The following year the Sacred Congregation of Ecclesiastical Affairs declared its hostility. Still severer measures were adopted by the present pope in 1905 and 1907, including the suspension *a divinis* of Don Romolo Murri and the interdiction of Fogazzaro's lectures and his *Rinascimento*. *The Saint* was placed on the Index, thereby enlarging its already enormous circulation.

Since the Christian Democratic party had derived its strength from a Roman Catholic membership it could not withstand papal condemnation. There were some among the leaders who were ready to defy the Vatican. But an article attributed to Cardinal Svampa advised submission.[15] "The proposals of resistance," he wrote, "we must disapprove. Because superior authority which possesses light that we do not have has intervened, the sacrifice of individual opinion is an obligation and should be a glory."

But even among the clergy many submitted with ill-concealed reluctance. The more ambitious of the younger members of the priesthood had joined the movement because it brought them into contact with modern thought and social ideals. It was hard to check the enthusiasm with which they had welcomed this new outlet for their energies. The following, which I translate from an anonymous book by one who calls himself a modernist priest, shows what feelings of resentment are smouldering beneath the surface.[16]

"The progress of Christian Democracy," he writes, "was unable to do more than hurt the susceptibilities of the Italian episcopate; an episcopate of a sort ignorant and do-nothing, full of haughtiness and negligence, bound by a double cord to the rich classes of their respective dioceses, and often maintained by them; an episcopate which lives remote from every contact with the popular mind, and is indifferent to every sense of sympathy with the ideals of our society. . . . The young priests, guilty of sympathizing with the labor movement, have been persecuted,

[15] L' Avvenire d' Italia, March 20, 1905.

[16] Lettere di un prete modernista, Rome, 1908, p. 60.

expelled from the seminaries, and made to obey the rancorous whims of authority."

Elsewhere in the volume he speaks of the "sleepy theodicy" preached by the papacy, which "blesses the inequalities of earth with the mirage of a coming celestial paradise"; and says, "In a word, the Catholic church of today is a big insurance society for the blessed of the earth, for gluttons of every caste and country, and is destined to die incapable of initiative or reform."

Discussing the future, he expresses his conviction that in the minds of the younger clergy there is germinating something more vital than Christian Democracy, now dead and buried. This something he calls Christian Socialism, or Christianity socialized; a conception which affirms resolutely the inseparability of the religious sentiment and the hope of social redemption. The success of socialism in conquering the masses he ascribes to the fact that it kindles the hope and desire for a secure material happiness on earth. Hopeless to him is every scheme for the elevation of the proletariat that rests upon the good pleasure of the employer. Socialism, at least, knows "that economic progress and the uplifting of the downtrodden can be achieved only at the cost of a relentless warfare against opposing class selfishness."

The conclusion of the discussion is so significant that I quote it in full:—

> The ancient authority of the Vatican will hurl, as once did the Sanhedrim at the Rabbi of Nazareth, its anathema against the new hopes of its persecuted sons. But that anathema will fall back upon its own sterile dotage. In our social hopes with assurance we see reborn the better spirit of that evangel which is becoming the religion of humanity, offering the beauty of its hope to the hungering eyes of the oppressed. Perhaps we shall see a new Church, in the better meaning of this much abused word, rising beside the old. Whether my enthusiasm is giving me illusions I do not know, but I seem already to see a priesthood called to another mission than that humiliating one to which it is reduced today, with, for example, its cold ministry of the stereotyped word. I am dreaming of a priesthood that shall come to men with the mission of the Master and of comfort. I am dreaming of rites which shall symbolize to the eyes of a sane and virile society the beauty of life, and the light of progress unobstructible (p. 68).

In recent Italian literature no act of the Vatican has been more widely and severely criticised than its condemnation of Don Murri's movement. Everywhere in Italy men of thought and culture expressed to me their opinion that the fatal mistake of the Holy See has been its failure to understand the importance of this social movement. It was a life-preserver thrown out for the rescue of Italian Catholicism—only to be spurned. In the opinion of liberal minds in Italy the papacy has definitely committed itself by its own act to the maintenance not only of a mediaeval philosophy, but also of a mediaeval ideal of society. Italian socialists find in this further justification for their hostility to church and religion, and are using it to inculcate hatred of both in the minds of the wage-earning classes. The Ferrer riots only revealed, as by a lightning flash, the psychological changes which have been taking place there where ancient faith and goodwill toward the church seemed most deeply rooted—among the Italian proletariat.

In hierarchical circles the number and strength of those who are seeking a readjustment of the church to modern social conditions and needs are much underrated. A pamphlet, entitled "Why we are Christians as well as Socialists,"[17] expresses the feelings of many good Catholics who refuse to accept the Vatican's ruling that Christian and socialistic activities are incompatible with each other. Unfortunately prudential reasons prevent most of them from coming into the open. Their literary campaign, as a rule, is one of anonymity. This is an undeniable weakness. No moral reform has ever been achieved without the personal leadership of men who made fearless public avowal of responsibility for their convictions.

A noted Florentine journalist and editor has drawn an attractive picture of what might have happened if Don Murri had been given a cardinal's hat. Might not the Pope one day have descended the steps of the Vatican with Murri by his side, both on their way to give their salutation and benediction to one of those groups of socialists whose spirit and work find few parallels outside the annals of apostolic Christianity? It may seem the fancy of a dis-

[17] Perchè siamo cristiani e socialisti: a cura dei socialisti cristiani di Roma, Rome, 1908.

ordered brain; "but it well represents what should have been the papal attitude in order to save Roman Catholicism. It is now too late. The latter is dying, and a universal Catholicism is rising in its place." [18] Murri has become an active opponent of ecclesiasticism and the leader of the National Democratic League, a new name for what he has been able to save out of the wreck of Christian Democracy. He is the first priest who has been elected by socialists to a seat in the Italian parliament, where his fine ability is on the side of the Radicals.

II

Turning now to another phase of our subject, it behooves us to consider Italian modernism in its theological and philosophical rather than in its social relations. The discerning student will already have perceived that Italian modernism differs from that of France and England in the salient features of its public manifestations. The writings of Loisy, Blondel, and Tyrrell are concerned chiefly with doctrinal reform, with the readjustment of the church's teaching to modern thought. Italian modernism, in the person of its two leading representatives, Murri and Fogazzaro, has been chiefly identified with social reform and a vain endeavor to make peace between the Vatican and the Quirinal.

It is a well-known fact that the mass of the Italian people are utterly indifferent to matters of religious doctrine. The causes of this indifference have been convincingly set forth by Professor Labanca.[19] Survivals of the religious indifferentism created by the Roman Empire, the abolishment of the theological faculties at the universities, the repressive action of the Vatican, the long rule of dogmatism, and the settled habit of Italian men of science and philosophers to omit religion from their thinking, have all had a share in bringing about the present state of religious apathy. In any case there can be no doubt about the existence of a widespread religious indifference. Villari goes so far as to assert that the Italians who "know nothing and care nothing about religion"

[18] "Il cattolicismo romano muore, e ciò che vive è il cattolicismo umano."

[19] Difficoltà antiche e nuove degli studi religiosi in Italia. Translation by L. H. Jordan, in The Study of Religion in the Italian Universities, 1909.

constitute "the majority of the upper orders and of the people of culture, and probably of the whole population. The public services, the bar, the medical profession, the universities, the business world, literature and art, are filled with persons who believe in no religious principles." [20] It is no uncommon experience to find cultivated university students who have never read a page of the Bible. Books on religion are seldom met with outside of ecclesiastical establishments. The only part of the Scriptures which I ever saw prominently and generally exposed for sale in Italy was a translation of the Song of Songs.

A modernist propaganda in Italy conducted along theological lines is therefore foredoomed to slow progress. Being of an essentially non-theological cast of mind, the average Italian cares nothing about issues that would profoundly stir an American or an English public. But the improvement of social conditions in Italy is so imperative that the economic aspect of religion is a matter of deep concern to all the inhabitants of the peninsula. This explains Murri's dominant interest as a modernist and the great following which he speedily secured. It also throws light upon socialism's easy conquest of the proletariat, whose formal allegiance to the church is unable to withstand the assault of an anticlerical socialist propaganda based on economic considerations. Since adherence to the church in Italy means in most cases adherence only to the external forms of religion, it is not surprising that the resulting defection assumes the aspect of a lapse into irreligion. Professor Labanca doubts whether there is faith enough left in Italy for a real heresy trial. A public which does not possess deep religious convictions of a personal kind cannot be said to lose them when its indifference toward religion turns into active opposition to ecclesiasticism.

Another social phenomenon needs to be mentioned in this connection. Observers who are acquainted with freemasonry in England and America are often surprised to find it engaged in an antireligious propaganda in France and Italy. Needless to say, this is a purely adventitious characteristic of this order in these countries. English freemasonry separated from the freemasonry

[20] Op. cit. p. 121.

of France in 1877, when the latter declared that belief in God was not obligatory for membership.[21] In Latin countries this organization has since then played an increasing part in politics, and its democratic, or republican, tendencies have inevitably brought it into conflict with the political pretensions of the Vatican. In Italy it is a very powerful political factor and an uncompromising foe of clericalism. For a politician of radical tendencies to enroll himself among the freemasons is a common occurrence. Signor Nathan, the mayor of Rome, whose strong anticlerical speech last September gave great offence to the Vatican, is a mason of high rank. That the anticlericalism of freemasonry has in Italy developed largely into an antireligious propaganda is probably in no small part due to the long-continued and bitter hostility between the masonic fraternity and the Papacy,[22] for in the heat of their antagonisms most Italian masons have failed to distinguish between ecclesiasticism and religion.[23] It seems very unfortunate that the conditions and tendencies described should have produced indifference and antagonism to religion in so many spheres of public life; but this may ultimately prove another case in which the passage from one type of religion to another leads through negation—through irreligion, if you please. Signs are not wanting which tend to show that the present anticlerical reaction, with its accompaniment of irreligious tendencies, is but the trough of the wave. Italian social modernism is preparing the way for an inchoate, but vital, intellectual modernism, that will stand resolutely for the truth of facts and for an untraditionalized conscience.

It is well to remember that in Italy the modernist movement began as a philosophical attempt to bridge the chasm between mediaeval Catholicism and the spirit of the new age. Count Antonio Rosmini (1797–1855) and Vincenzo Gioberti (1801–1852)

[21] Solomon Reinach, Orpheus, p. 572.

[22] The Roman pontificate has condemned freemasonry since 1738; in the following year membership in the order was made punishable with death. In 1884 Leo XIII renewed the condemnation of freemasonry with particular solemnity and severity.

[23] The Italian public press is now discussing the interpenetration of socialism and masonry, with anticlericalism as the common bond. Cf. Sempre Avanti, July 15, 1910; "La massoneria nel socialismo," La Voce, no. 33, 1910.

were the forerunners of modernism, although they were called Reform Catholics. Both were devout adherents of the church, and, like their successors of the present time, were not in entire agreement with each other. Some writings of the former were placed on the Index during his lifetime, and forty of his propositions were censured in 1887. The Rosminians today form a considerable body within the Roman church, and many see in their opposition to the Jesuits the promise of a time when they will join hands with more aggressive modernist reformers. Gioberti's writings are proving an armory of keen weapons for the campaign of ecclesiastical reform. He was in his day a vigorous opponent of the Society of Jesus, in whose aims and activities he saw a grave danger for Roman Catholicism. Jesuitism, he declared, was willing "for the sake of heaven to slay the earth."

Many among the more intellectual leaders of reform do not hesitate to recognize kindred spirits in Dante, Giordano Bruno, Aonio Paleario, and Marsilio of Padua. Especially interesting is the part which Dante is made to play in the reform movement. It is pointed out that the Jesuits, with a few notable exceptions, have cordially hated the poet for three hundred years. His ideals, embodied in his poem, are not theirs. The popes in the simonists' circle of the Inferno are his undying answer to the doctrine of papal infallibility. A reformer of practice and political theory within the church, he did not hesitate to fling down the gauntlet to Boniface VIII; in doing so, he said he was "not interfering with the ark, but with the refractory oxen that were dragging it out of the path."[24]

It is at first sight surprising that the *Divina commedia* escaped a place on the Index beside the *De monarchia*. But a literary masterpiece that had created a language and opened a national literature, a poem that had sung itself into the hearts and lives of a people for three centuries, was beyond the power even of the Jesuits to condemn or dislodge. Only in Spain, in 1612, did the Inquisition dare to proscribe a few of the most obnoxious passages.

On the other hand, it must be recognized that Dante, though

[24] Ep. viii, 5; cf. Purgatorio, xvi, 109, 127 ff.

accusing individual popes of "trampling on the good and raising up the wicked," preserved a profound respect for the functions and power of the papal office. It is to be remembered, also, that Leo XIII was not only an enthusiastic student of Dante, but established in 1886 a permanent course of lectures on Dante at the *Istituto Leoniano* in Rome. Coming in connection with the Thomistic revival, this was an exceedingly wise move, for there is no more persuasive teacher of Thomistic theology and philosophy than the great Florentine. It has also tended to disarm modernists who are seeking to make capital out of Dante's courageous refusal to subordinate his opinions to papal authority. Nevertheless, the reformers appear to have the better reason in their claim that Dante's influence makes for tolerance and progress.

The particular views and aims of the men whose names are publicly associated with the modernist movement in Italy are not reducible to any definite formula. Many of them would refuse to be classified as modernists. In Italy, as elsewhere, modernism is a very complex phenomenon. But in all cases it means a revolt against absolutism in religion, and an attempt to adjust traditional doctrine and practice to a new intellectual world controlled by the conception of development. The static is in conflict with the dynamic. "The little fifteenth-century world of the Vatican," a phrase often in the mouth of modernists, discloses in a larger way the animus of the movement.

Among its foremost promoters is to be reckoned an able Old Testament scholar, Professor Salvatore Minocchi, formerly of the Royal Institute of Advanced Studies at Florence, now connected with the University of Pisa. He was a classmate of Murri, and studied under the noted Hebraist David Castelli. In 1901 he founded his bi-monthly *Review of Religious Studies*,[25] which soon became a recognized clearing-house of liberal thought among the Italian clergy. In 1907 he published, with the approbation and protection of Cardinal Svampa, a critical translation of the prophecies of Isaiah. This work and a Commentary on Genesis were condemned "by a device of the Bible Commission,"

[25] Rivista di studi religiosi, 7 vols., Florence, 1901–07.

which consisted in selecting for disapproval the theses he upheld. It was during the year 1907, also, that he travelled in Russia and the Orient "in order to visit, with a free moral and social aim, the Italian workmen who were employed on the Russian railways." "An article of a modernist tendency," he writes, "which I published on August 14th in the *Giornale d' Italia*, on the subject of my visit to Tolstoy and of our conversation on the great problem of the day, made a great stir in Italy, and was even noticed abroad. It brought me to the step of breaking with the Vatican."[26] He was suspended, and, like many others, submitted, stopping the publication of his review. He has since then withdrawn from the priesthood, but his modernist activity continues unabated.

One of Minocchi's collaborators in the *Religious Studies* was Umberto Fracassini, president of the Seminary at Perugia. After Pius X issued his famous encyclical *Pascendi* he dutifully submitted. His recently published book, "What is the Bible?"[27] evades those questions of critical scholarship which would bring him into conflict with the Vatican. In a review of the book contributed to *La Voce*[28] Minocchi, after praising the author's ability, says: "I only deplore that this man of knowledge, full of moral sentiment, should have to torture his thoughts so atrociously in order to remain united with a church that has no words of life for her own faithful sons. After the encyclical *Pascendi* Umberto Fracassini, it seems to me, should not have allowed the opportunity to escape him to bear noble testimony to conscience, science, and the open truth, against this moribund papal Catholicism."

More conservative and less aggressive, but widely known and respected in Italy as a thoughtful scholar is Padre Giovanni Semeria of Genoa. His particular field of inquiry is the early history of Christianity and the origins of dogma. His work, he declares, is the result of a sincere effort to combine devoutness with critical inquiry. "If," he writes, "I have not always been sufficiently exact or profound, it is not because I am a believer,

[26] The New Age, June 2, 1910.
[27] Che cos' è la Bibbia?
[28] "La Bibbia modernista," in La Voce, April 21, 1910.

but because I am ignorant. If I have not succeeded in giving to my work a high moral tone, or spiritual warmth, it is not because I am a critic, but because of my moral deficiency, because I am not sufficiently good." In another connection he says that he is serving not merely an historical interest in the pursuit of his studies, but also a practical purpose, in so far as the results help to shake up that traditionalism which "still is too much in honor among us; were it respect for tradition it would be just and proper, but being worship of tradition it is false and noxious."

The scope of this article does not permit me to discuss in detail the work of other interesting leaders who are working and waiting for the dawn of a better day in Italy. Paolo Savi, a Barnabite like his friend Semeria, has gone to his long account. Giovanni Gennocchi was deposed by Leo XIII from his professorship in the Seminary at Rome, but his translation of the gospels is reported to have had a sale of more than three hundred thousand copies. Ernesto Buonaiuti, formerly professor of church history at Rome, was denounced and deposed in 1906 for his article, "*Filosofia dell' azione*," in Minocchi's *Religious Studies*. He is now editor of the *Historico-Critical Review of the Theological Sciences*,[29] one of the ablest Italian publications with friendly leanings toward modernism. Gennaro Avolio, the able editor of the *Battaglie d' oggi* of Naples, is working for the abolition of compulsory celibacy of the priesthood, and has founded an institution in aid of priests who renounce clerical orders. The reforms advocated by Avolio find their explanation in the serious indictment which many well-informed writers are bringing against the morality of the clergy in southern Italy.[30] Avolio has been excommunicated for his pains.

It would be easy to increase the list of names which have been mentioned here and elsewhere in the article. But no good purpose would be served by furnishing information about men who desire to do their work quietly until the wind sits in another quarter at the Vatican. The traditionalists who in the *Civiltà Cattolica* make merry over the "conspiracy of three or four rationalists" are destined some time to have a great surprise.

[29] Rivista storico-critica delle scienze teologiche, Rome, 1905–.

[30] Cf. Prezzolini, op. cit. p. 74.

I do not know on what data Paul Sabatier [31] relies for his estimate that perhaps half of the younger clergy have already allied themselves with the modernist movement. But my observations and experiences in Italy lead me to think that it is not far from the truth. The social awakening of a large part of the clergy has aroused an uncommon amount of intellectual activity. What has been generally true of great religious movements, that reforms in doctrine originate in attempts to reform practice, may find a new illustration in Italy. But modernists will have to abandon their policy of advance and retreat, of making a courageous stand today and submitting again tomorrow, before they can win a large following among men who value truth above authority or comfort. A "domesticated modernism"—so Minocchi describes the attitude of those who have submitted—may buy peace at the expense of intellectual freedom, but will find that on those terms it is the peace of the dead, not of the living.

There is in Florence a group of independent thinkers to whom the late Professor William James once referred with warm appreciation. Their rallying-point is a remarkable Philosophical Library founded by an American woman. Under the auspices of its *Circolo di Filosofia* a notable convention met in Florence recently for the discussion of sexual problems. Courses of lectures by men of national reputation are provided annually. In 1908 the Italian philosopher Giovanni Papini delivered a lecture under the significant title, "The Religion of those who have left the Churches." [32] The lecturer pointed out that according to the last census there are in Italy about two hundred thousand persons who have declared themselves adherents of no religion whatsoever.[33] This number, he averred, was but a small fraction of those who have actually left the churches. After enumerating the various elements that make up this large number, he comes to a class of persons "who have left the church, but not religion; all those who by the strong contrast between their inward aspira-

[31] Modernism (Jowett Lectures), London, 1908; also an article with the same title in the Contemporary Review, March, 1908.

[32] Cf. Bollettino della biblioteca filosofica, no. 2, January, 1909.

[33] Censimento, vol. iv, p. 330. Papini groups together those who refuse to declare themselves adherents of any religion and those who claim to be "without religion."

tions and the outward reality, between the spiritual church for which they have lived and fought and the Vatican, have been forced to leave the bosom of the sacred mother church, though they have remained intimately and profoundly religious." These, he thinks, will have to seek the satisfaction of their religious needs outside of the church.

Within the socialist camp, also, there are far-sighted men who are beginning to reassert the claims of religion, independently of Roman Catholicism. Referring to the essentially materialistic Italian socialism of today, one writes: "Humanity is now moving toward a state of spiritual concentration. . . . Socialism is closing its eyes to this irresistible fact of the present time, and is, therefore, as conservative in its way as the church. But truth is stronger than any argument based upon facts which the present has emptied of reality. It is time for socialism to realize that humanity in spite of everything, even in contravention, if necessary, of its material interests, will resistlessly take the way of the spirit. Men have abandoned the papal church in order to make the most of the recent splendid period of material progress, but now they feel the necessity of a return to religion. . . . Nevertheless we are not for a moment thinking of going to Canossa. . . . Let *us* take the initiative of a reform more radical [than that proposed by the modernists], and, in order to do that, let us begin by recognizing above all the value and reality of man's religious needs. Then men will follow us and not the modernists, who at heart are priests even more completely than the irreconcilable pope." [34]

The actual place and prospects of Protestantism among these new tendencies challenge inquiry at this point. Many superficial students of modernism have seen in it a movement toward Protestantism. Not a few among Roman Catholics accuse modernists of being crypto-protestants. But it should be clearly recognized that modernism is neither a movement toward Protestantism, nor Protestantism in disguise. It is an independent movement, and has elements of originality and greatness which Protestants may profitably study. Minocchi's reply in the

[34] "Religione e socialismo," in L' Idea Moderna, April, 1910.

Coenobium,[35] denying the rumor that he was thinking of becoming a Protestant, describes the attitude of nearly all Italian modernists whom I know. "Not even in my dreams could I think of becoming a Protestant." The reason he gives, that Protestantism bases its conception of religion upon a static, and modernism upon a dynamic, foundation is completely true neither of the one nor of the other, both being engaged in the transition from a static to a dynamic basis. But the essential point is the fact that modernism is not a feeder of Protestantism.

Furthermore, Protestant denominations in Italy, so far as I have been able to observe, are not profiting by the wide-spread defection from Roman Catholicism. Whether this is because the alienated masses conceive Protestantism to stand for the same kind of mediaevalism from which they are reacting, or whether it is because of a tactless and ineffective propaganda, I am unable to say. Certain it is that the proportion of Protestants to Catholics in Italy is inconsiderable. According to the last census (1901) there were, in round numbers, of male inhabitants more than fifteen years old, 10,280,000 Roman Catholics, 26,000 Protestants, and 13,000 Jews. Considering that foreign residents and travellers are included among Protestants, their number is so small that it constitutes at present a negligible quantity among the social and religious forces of Italy.

The great outstanding fact of the present situation is the anticlerical movement which from various quarters is assailing Roman Catholicism. Socialism from without, and modernism from within, are weakening the absolutism and prestige of the Vatican. A canvass of the leading daily papers of Italy shows that more than half of them are anticlerical. Two of the oldest, *La Nazione* and *Corriere della Sera*, the former of Florence, the latter of Milan, have remained moderately conservative. But the very influential organ *Il Secolo*, over forty-five years old, and now the mouthpiece of the radical group of Lombardy, is strongly anticlerical. A number of very able reviews like the *Coenobium* and *Il Rinnovamento* are disseminating the knowledge and influence of modernism throughout the peninsula. Both have been put upon the Index, but they are continuing on their way undeterred.

[35] Coenobium, 1909, no. 1, p. 150.

No one who has watched of late the horizon of Italy's agitated public life can fail to see that ominous clouds are gathering above the Vatican. Will some Benedetto, as in Fogazzaro's impressive night-scene, succeed in slipping past the cabal of cardinals to carry warning of the coming storm to one who is in truth a prisoner?

In order to help those who may wish to make a more detailed study of modernism and social movements in Italy, I subjoin a list of the more important books and pamphlets. A special effort has been made to ascertain the existence of English translations. Few such are actually known to me, but I have noted the cases in which they are reported to have been made. Various writings by Alfred Loisy and the late George Tyrrell, which frequently bear on conditions in Italy, have been mentioned in the article by Professor McGiffert on "Modernism and Catholicism" (Harvard Theological Review, January, 1910) and have, therefore, not been included in the following bibliography. My thanks are due to a number of Italian friends for valuable suggestions.

André, Tony, Modernisme et modernistes en Italie, Paris, 1908.

[Anonymous], A Pio X: Quello che vogliamo: Lettera aperta di un gruppo di sacerdoti, 1907 (translated into English: To Pius X: What we Want: An Open Letter from a Group of Priests, London, 1907). A rejoinder to the Papal Allocution of April 17, 1907.

[Anonymous], Il programma dei modernisti: Risposta all' enciclica di Pio X, "Pascendi Dominici Gregis," Rome, 1907 (translated into English: The Programme of Modernism, London, 1908; German translation: Programm der italienischen Modernisten, Jena, 1908). A work of first importance.

[Anonymous], Lettere di un prete modernista, Rome, 1908. A remarkable book. Valuable for the light it throws on the social ideals of Italian modernism.

[Anonymous], "The Religious Conditions of Italy," Quarterly Review, October, 1902. Attributed to a Protestant pastor well known in Florence.

[Anonymous], Una crisi d'anime nel cattolicismo, Florence, 1907 (translated into English: A Soul-crisis in Catholicism, London, 1908). A startling arraignment of official Catholicism by a group of modernist priests.

Bonomelli, G., Il secolo che nasce (translated into German: Das neue Jahrhundert, Munich, 1905). The author, who is the Bishop of Cremona, has written with evident appreciation of the modern social awakening in Italy. In his Il culto religioso: difetti e abusi, Cremona, 1905, he exposes superstitious forms of worship. Very useful is another of his

books, translated into German: Religiös-soziale Tagesfragen, Munich, 1906. In 1889 his book, Roma, Italia, e la realtà delle cose, was placed on the Index.

Fogazzaro, Antonio, Il Santo, Milan, 1906 (translated into English: The Saint, London, 1906; into German: Der Heilige, by Gagliardi, Munich and Leipzig, 1906). This much-discussed novel portrays the religious psychology of the awakened Italian laity.

Gentile, Giovanni, Il modernismo e i rapporti tra religione e filosofia, Bari, 1909. The author is professor of the history of philosophy in the University of Palermo, and editor of Giordano Bruno's Dialoghi metafisici.

Grille, Giovanni, La renaissance religieuse dans l'Italie contemporaine, Paris, 1907 (translated into English: London, 1908).

Holl, Karl, Modernismus, Tübingen, 1908. A brief general discussion of modernism.

Holtzmann, Heinrich, Reformkatholisches aus Italien, Frankreich und England, Protestantische Monatshefte, 1908, pp. 41–74, 171–174. Gives full references to literature.

Jordan, L. H., and Labanca, B., The Study of Religion in the Italian Universities, London and New York, 1909. Contains an excellent survey of the modernist movement in Italy.

Kübel, Johannes, Geschichte des katholischen Modernismus, Tübingen, 1909. One chapter is specially devoted to Italian modernism. Full references to German publications.

Labanca, B., "I cattolici modernisti e i cattolici tradizionalisti," in Nuovo sillabo e l' ultima enciclica di Pio X, Rome, 1907.

Labriola, Arturo, Riforme e rivoluzione sociale, 2d ed., Lugano, 1906. The author is one of the foremost radical leaders of Italian socialism.

Luzzi, Giovanni, "The Roman Catholic Church in Italy at the Present Hour," in Hibbert Journal, February, 1910. Written by a Waldensian pastor who is not in sympathy with the critical wing of Italian modernism.

Michels, Roberto, Il proletariato e la borghesia nel movimento socialista italiano, Turin, 1908. One of the most important recent books on Italian labor and social movements. The author is professor of sociology in the University of Turin.

Murri, Don Romolo, La vita religiosa nel cristianesimo, Rome, 1908;

La filosofia nuova e l' enciclica contro il modernismo, Rome, 1907.

La politica clericale e la democrazia, Rome, 1908. Murri is the foremost modernist reform leader in Italy. His chief interest is in social reform. An interesting record of the struggle in which he was engaged will be found in his Battaglie d' oggi (Battles of Today), 4 vols., Rome, 1901–04. The fourth volume is devoted almost entirely to the Christian Democracy movement in Italy.

Nitti, Francesco, Il socialismo cattolico, Turin, 1891 (translated into English: Catholic Socialism). The author is connected with the University of Naples. It is the leading book on the subject.

Prezzolini, Giuseppe, Il cattolicismo rosso, Naples, 1908. Important for its keen and fearless discussion of needed reforms within Catholicism. The author, editor of the Florentine paper La Voce, is a man of philosophical training. Provides copious references to current literature on modernism. His bibliographical knowledge of the subject is probably unrivalled in the world. Declares himself a "non-cattolico." I cattolici rossi, 1909, by the same author. Discusses Newman, Tyrrell, von Hügel, Loisy, Blondel, Laberthonnière, Murri, and Fogazzaro.

Robertson, A., The Roman Catholic Church in Italy, London, 1903.

Sabatier, Paul, Modernism (The Jowett Lectures), London, 1908. Includes an estimate of conditions in Italy. See also an article with the same title in the Contemporary Review, March, 1908.

Salvadori, Count Guglielmo, "Die moderne religiöse Bewegung in Italien," in Religion und Geisteswissenschaft, 1908, iii, pp. 248–269. By a well-informed Protestant observer in Pisa.

Semeria, Giovanni, Scienza e fede e il loro preteso conflitto, Rome, 1903. Venticinque anni di storia del cristianesimo nascente, 1900. Semeria is one of the more conservative leaders of reform within Catholicism.

Thayer, William R., Italica, Boston, 1908. The two chapters, "Fogazzaro and his Masterpiece," and "Italy in 1907."

UNIVERSITY SETTLEMENTS IN GREAT BRITAIN.

PERCY ASHLEY

London

A quarter of a century has now elapsed since the foundation of Toynbee Hall in the east of London inaugurated the "University Settlement" movement in the vast and then almost inchoate capital of the British Empire; and the present time seems therefore appropriate for an attempt to form some estimate of the past results and future possibilities of the movement, which soon spread to other towns of England and Scotland. Yet such an undertaking is beset with serious difficulties. Throughout the whole history of the settlements there is indeed apparent an essential identity of purpose, an underlying uniformity of motive; but the individual institutions have been the outcome of the action of various bodies of persons whose aims, as formally expressed, seem often very diverse; different groups have laid the main emphasis on different objects and methods, and what has been counted as triumphant success by one group has been deemed of relatively small importance by another. Further, the wide range of the activities of the settlements, the multifarious nature of their interests and work, render it practically impossible for any one observer to comprehend the whole in his single survey; and the selection which he must needs make tends almost inevitably to be determined, and it may be even unfairly biassed, by his own personal predilections. Within this narrower range, moreover, there is no certain standard by which to measure success or failure; the value of the work accomplished by a settlement is not to be judged solely, or even chiefly, by the statistics of its classes and clubs. If it has realized its objects, however imperfectly, it has exercised upon the surrounding community, in conjunction with all other institutions that in any way and by any means make for good, a subtle and permeating influence which has resulted in a progressive amelioration of social life; but, for

the very reason that this achievement is the result of a number of co-operating forces, the share of the settlement therein cannot be isolated or defined with any exactitude.

Nevertheless, in spite of these difficulties, it seems worth while to endeavor to indicate some of the lines upon which the University Settlements in the United Kingdom have worked, to furnish some examples of their activities, and, subject to the limitations set forth above, to attain to some definite appreciation of their achievements; and, that being done, to face the more difficult task of attempting to form some judgment as to the problems which now beset them, and the extent to which their modes of organization and action may require modification if their career of social usefulness is to be continued.

I

The University Settlement movement originated in London with the establishment of Toynbee Hall in 1885, and although, as already remarked, it subsequently spread to a number of other towns in England and Scotland, London has witnessed its fullest development and most varied manifestations, and has furnished the severest test of its utility in the service of the community.[1] The reasons for the concentration upon London of by far the greater part of the energy and enthusiasm thrown into the movement are fairly obvious. The metropolis offered the most tempting field for the investigator of economic conditions and social

[1] It may be useful to give in this place the dates of the foundation of some of the settlements. In London: Toynbee Hall, 1885; Oxford House, 1887, with connected women's settlements later; the Women's University Settlement, Southwark, 1887; Mansfield House, 1890 (a women's settlement was established in 1892); Bermondsey Settlement (men and women), 1891; Newman House, 1891; Chalfont House, 1891; Browning Hall, 1894; Cambridge House, 1897 (following on a series of missions, with clubs and other societies, established by various Cambridge colleges and some public schools); and the Passmore Edwards Settlement (a new form of an older institution), 1897. Outside London: Chalmers (University) Settlement, Edinburgh, 1887; New College Settlement, Edinburgh, 1889; University Students' Settlement, Glasgow, 1889; Manchester University Settlement (men's and women's houses), 1895; Victoria Women's Settlement, Liverpool, 1897; the Birmingham Women's Settlement, 1899. The above list does not profess to be exhaustive; there are numerous other settlements, of various types, alike in London and elsewhere.

relationships, for its problems, while similar in kind to those presented by other great towns of the United Kingdom, were infinitely more varied, and were complicated by certain factors peculiar to London itself. The vastness of its geographical extent; the consequent segregation of rich and poor, and the intensity of contrasts in social conditions; the drab monotony of life throughout great stretches, especially of the east and south; the unorganized condition of vast numbers of its workers and the economic evils resulting therefrom; the extent and gravity of its problems of ignorance and poverty, and the need for cautious study and intelligent leadership in their solution; the almost total absence of any communal feeling or municipal enthusiasm such as other English and Scotch cities knew—it was in the period before the creation of the London County Council, and when the local administration of the metropolis had reached perhaps its lowest level; and, finally, the admitted failure of the majority of the religious organizations to maintain any real hold upon the mass of the people—all these things made an especial appeal to the leaders of the new movement, who saw in London opportunities, so vast and varied and urgent as to be almost overwhelming, of useful labor for every worker whom they could enlist, whatever his political and religious creeds and whatever the nature of his ability.

The avowed aims and methods of the settlements seemed almost as varied as the problems with which they were intended to cope. In an essay included in the volume entitled *University and Social Settlements*, published in 1898, Canon Barnett defined the original causes of the settlement movement as being (1) "a distrust of machinery," which led people to seek for some other way than that of institutions by which to reach their neighbors," and to welcome the idea of a settlement "where they might live their own lives and also make friends among the poor"; (2) the "demand for more information," inducing those who cared for social reform to live in the neighborhoods where the need for action seemed greatest, in order that they might acquire that accurate and detailed knowledge which can alone afford a sure basis for effective philanthropic and social work; and (3) "the growth of the human spirit," and the revulsion against the old methods,

due to "the recognition that old forms of benevolence were often patronizing in character, that charities and missions often assumed a superiority in their supporters, and that sectarian philanthropy often developed party bitterness." Consequently its founders intended Toynbee Hall to be, what it has in fact remained throughout its history, a "club-house in Whitechapel occupied by men who do citizen's duty in the neighborhood," but are not bound by allegiance to any common political, social, or religious creed. In regard to none of the questions of the day was there to be a "Toynbee Hall policy"; the settlement as such did not undertake any definite line of social action, and still less did it propose to identify itself with any particular branch of religious work, or indeed, as a settlement, to engage in such work; so long as a resident was prepared to work side by side with others of different views, so long could he determine freely the line which his own personal activity should take.

In this attitude Toynbee Hall has, however, found few imitators. The Passmore Edwards Settlement (which is due to the efforts of Mrs. Humphry Ward) was a reconstruction of an earlier work undertaken by her in 1890, with the support of a group who "wished to create in the poorer parts of St. Pancras a new centre for the action of certain social forces; to test thereby—within a small sphere—the action upon life and within life of certain forms of religious thought; and they pledged themselves to forward an improved study of the Bible and of religious history and tradition in general." But seven years later, when the Settlement in its present form was established, the policy underwent a change; the new settlement, as such, took no religious side and deliberately abstained from any religious work; and it has on the whole avoided the formulation of anything like a "settlement policy" even in social matters.

Certain of the provincial settlements are characterized by the same indefiniteness (as, for example, the Manchester Art Museum and University Settlement); but practically all the London settlements other than those mentioned, and some of those in other towns, represent the desire of one or other of the great religious denominations to remove the reproach which a generation ago was very generally levelled—and with some measure of justice

—against the churches, that the indifference of the masses of the workers was due in large measure to the failure of the churches to enter sufficiently into the daily life of the people and (save by an often indiscriminate charity) to alleviate the dull monotony of their existence or to aid in the solution of the pressing economic and social problems of modern life. The work of the settlement which comes next after Toynbee Hall in order of time—Oxford House—was the first manifestation of this revival of what may be described as home-missionary zeal, and may be added to the list of causes indicated by Canon Barnett; it was definitely associated with a particular Church of England parish, and was commenced "in order that Oxford men may take part in the social and religious work of the Church in East London; that they may learn something of the life of the poor; may try to better the conditions of the working classes as regards health and recreation, mental culture and spiritual teaching; and may offer an example, as far as in them lies, of a simple and religious life." Oxford House was rapidly followed by similar institutions, each supported mainly by a particular religious denomination, such as Mansfield House (Congregational), the Bermondsey Settlement (Wesleyan), Browning Hall (Congregational), and Cambridge House (Church of England)—to mention only a few conspicuous examples; and in some the definitely religious basis of the work was even more pronounced than in the case even of Oxford House. The warden of the Bermondsey Settlement (Dr. J. Scott Lidgett) writes in a recent annual report:—

> Mankind is saved, however, not merely or so much by practical work as by the ideals which are embodied in it. Unless a many-sided work is inspired and organized by such ideals, it is liable to suffer by confusion and distraction. What then are the ideals which give unity to our Settlement work? In the first place, the belief that true religion exists to transform all social life, and to direct every human faculty to its true goal and satisfaction. In the next place, the conviction that the supreme ends of Christianity and progress can only be carried out by seeking to rise above the differences of denominations or parties and to establish the wider comradeship of all who deeply care for the higher interests of the people. And, lastly, the recognition that the supremacy of the divine law of service is the only remedy for all forms of selfishness, with its inevitable hatred and class warfare.

Browning Hall, which, owing to the energy and devotion of its warden (Rev. F. Herbert Stead), has developed from an unimportant Congregational church into a settlement with far-reaching activities, has taken an even more distinctive attitude. "We stand," its warden wrote, "for the Labor Movement in religion. We stand for the endeavor to obtain for Labor not merely more of the good things in life, but most of the best things in life." In connection with this settlement, as with the Bermondsey Settlement, active evangelical work is a conspicuous feature.[2]

Cambridge House, in South London, was the result of a desire expressed by some of the high authorities of the Church of England for the establishment there of a university centre where laymen could live in order to assist the clergy of the various missions founded by Cambridge colleges and certain public schools in that district—which has been described as the largest area of unbroken poverty in the world; the assistance being chiefly in the formation and conduct of clubs and societies of divers kinds. Thus Cambridge House, while not itself engaged in religious work in the strict sense of the term, is a kind of lay centre and guide for the social work of a number of Church missions, and the connection between the two branches of the latter's work is very close.

Several of the settlements have departments for women workers, either under the same control as or working in co-operation with the men's departments, and almost all make use of the services of women helpers in one way or another. But there are also a number of independent women's settlements; and it is noteworthy that in most of these emphasis is laid upon systematic training for social work. Certainly in the case of the residents in and workers at the men's settlements the educative effect of the work is very considerable, but it is to a large extent

[2] The "institutional churches," as they are called,—the most conspicuous examples in London being Claremont and the Whitefield Tabernacle,—are carrying on work which in many respects closely resembles that of the settlements. They are churches around which have been built up a number of clubs and other societies for men, women, and children, the church remaining the centre and mainspring of the whole work. The tendency of such a church, as its work expands, to develop into something very akin to a regular settlement is exemplified by the history of Browning Hall; Claremont appears to be moving in the same direction.

unconscious; in the case of the women's settlements, doubtless because a much larger proportion of the residents intend to devote their whole time to social work, either voluntarily or as a profession, opportunities are afforded for organized training. The earliest independent women's settlement—the Women's University Settlement, Southwark—was founded "(*a*) to promote the welfare of the poorer people of the districts of London and especially of the women and children, by devising and promoting schemes which tend to elevate them physically, intellectually, or morally and by giving them additional opportunities for education and recreation; and (*b*) to maintain a house or houses for the residence of women engaged in or connected with philanthropic or educational work in the districts aforesaid"; and in connection with it there was early inaugurated a scheme of training, which has recently been combined with the work of the London School of Sociology. The Birmingham Women's Settlement, formed in 1899, definitely stated as its primary object the creation of "a centre for resident and non-resident workers for systematic study with reference to social work and industrial conditions." In this case, as also in that of the Victoria Settlement for Women at Liverpool, the courses of study have recently been placed upon a more stable footing as a result of the co-operation of the authorities of the Universities of Birmingham and Liverpool respectively.[3]

It will be apparent from what has already been said that, taking the movement as a whole, the predominant tendency has been for the settlements to engage, to a greater or smaller extent, in active religious work. The nature of that work is necessarily affected by the particular beliefs characteristic of the denomination with which any given settlement is mainly associated; but, for a number of obvious reasons, the stamp of denominationalism tends to be less conspicuous in the case of those settlements which are non-conformist in origin than in the case of those which have

[3] It is perhaps desirable to point out again that the present article does not profess to attempt a complete or detailed survey—such an attempt would require a volume. It is not possible to notice here all the various forms of settlements, and the omission of individual institutions or even of classes (such as the numerous small religious settlements of ladies working under ecclesiastical guidance) must not be taken to imply any failure to appreciate the value of their work.

been established under Church of England auspices and are (as Oxford House) regarded as social training schools for future clergy. It might be supposed that the mere fact of the religious work would repel many of those whom the settlements were intended to benefit, more particularly when the work took something of a denominational aspect; but experience points strongly in the opposite direction. In the first place, the settlements have rarely endeavored to make participation in their religious life a condition of admission to the social advantages which they offer; they have contented themselves with giving opportunities and examples.[4] Secondly, while it is true that association with a particular denomination probably tends to produce uniformity of type among those connected with any given institution, since the appeal for workers is made primarily to the denomination, and minds which share common beliefs in matters of religion and church organization will probably think alike on other questions also; yet there cannot be any doubt that what the work may lose in breadth of outlook it will as a rule more than recover in intensity. There is ample room for both classes of settlements—those with and those without a common religious basis and ideal; both can find abundant opportunities for useful labor; but to the present writer it appears certain that those whose workers draw their inspiration from a common religious creed (whatever it be) and find in it their guide in social work, are likely to exercise, not perhaps the widest, but certainly the deepest and most lasting influence. Settlements, if their work is to be enduring, must deal with the individual man and woman, as well as with mankind in the mass; the individual needs a faith, and to the ordinary man codes of morality or ethical teaching do not offer sufficient inspiration.

[4] The present Bishop of London, who achieved great success as the head of Oxford House, wrote: "On Sunday, have a Bible-class connected with the (boys') club; but if you take my advice, you will not make attendance at it a test for coming to the club. . . . I doubt the expediency of the test club, unless your rooms are so small that you can only take a small number, and definitely prefer to pick the boys who wish at once to be religious." And of men's clubs: "Here again, you must at once make up your mind whether you are going to cater for Jacob and Esau; if for Jacob, then make any rules you like; there ought not to be the slightest difficulty in working a quiet club for your church working-men. . . . The clubs I speak of are for Esau, and as a first step to making him religious, have no religious test."

One other conspicuous fact in connection with the London settlements is the absence of any central association for the discussion of the various problems encountered in the course of their work, or to serve as a clearing-house for ideas. An attempt was made to form such an association some ten years ago, but the result was only short-lived; and no effort seems to have been made to resuscitate it. The reasons of the failure are not very clear; and at a time like the present, when all the settlements are beset by a number of similar questions clamoring for solution, the absence of any arrangements for joint discussion would seem to be a distinct source of weakness. Some eight or nine years ago a Conference of Northern Settlements was formed under the leadership of the Manchester University Settlement; but that also languished, and though an attempt is now being made to revive it, its organization is so far very informal and undeveloped.

II

Turning now to a general survey of the principal branches of the settlements' activities, the first of these, *religious work*, may be dismissed briefly, not because it is slight or of small importance—sufficient has already been said to indicate that the very contrary is the case; but in its general lines it does not differ very appreciably from that carried on by other religious institutions of narrower scope, and the depth and breadth of the influence exercised by the settlements in this regard is peculiarly difficult to estimate. The variety of the creeds represented, and the impossibility of gauging in casual visits the strength and vigor of the spiritual life of the various settlements, would render it presumptuous for any single observer to offer a detailed judgment or criticism. Nevertheless it may be remarked that in all the references to this matter which are contained in the annual reports of the settlements there is the same note of success and optimism; and that this feeling is justified is beyond doubt. Amid so much work it would be invidious to single out particular examples; but attention may be directed to one recent event, because it seems to the present writer to possess especial significance. In May of the year 1910 there was held at Browning Hall a "Labor

Week"—that is to say, a special mission at which all the speakers were recognized leaders of the labor movement, several among them being labor members of Parliament. In several of the addresses emphasis was laid on the change which in recent years has come over the relations between the churches as organizations and the mass of the workers; the old feeling of estrangement (which was, however, probably never so great as it was represented to be) is passing away. One speaker, Mr. Arthur Henderson, M.P., a former chairman of the Labor Party, could declare his conviction that "happily there never was a time when organized Christianity was seeking as now to know exactly the mind of the mass of the people, and to apply the Master's teaching to the betterment of society"; while another, with a wide experience of London and her poor, affirmed that in his belief "in front of the Christian churches is the most glorious time they have ever experienced. At no time before have men longed for the message as they are longing for it today." Even when allowance be made for the strong personal leanings of the speakers, these utterances do represent substantial truth; and the fact is of vital importance for the future of social reform. It would be idle to claim for the settlements all the credit; they are only one of the agencies which have brought about the change in the outlook both of churches and people; but it may safely be asserted that they have contributed potently, partly by the practical demonstration which they have afforded of the application of religious principles in the solution of social problems, and partly by the training and experience which they have afforded to those who were destined to become priests and pastors and their consequent reaction upon the churches from which they draw their support.

Recreative. The central and dominant idea in the work of the settlements in the provision and organization of recreation has been that of the Club, for men, women, boys, or girls; and the general policy adopted has been to give the clubs so formed, especially those for men and boys, the fullest possible autonomy, subject of course to the ultimate control of the settlement authorities. Two extracts from recent reports will illustrate this. Oxford and Cambridge Houses are each the centre of a Federation of Working Men's Social Clubs, which are non-political and non-

alcoholic, and impose no religious test on their members. In a report on the clubs contained in a recent number of the *Cambridge House Magazine* there occurs the following passage:—

> One of the most interesting features of the year's work has been the success of two clubs which had re-constituted themselves on independent lines. These clubs are now entirely responsible for their own finances and management; and the keen interest which the members take in the affairs of their clubs and the excellent way in which those offices are conducted, are strong arguments in favor of the proposition (which is by no means universally held) that independent clubs are generally the healthiest and most efficient, and that the object to be aimed at by the promoters of such clubs as ours should be to render the members capable of managing their own affairs, and then to allow them to do so. This is particularly so with regard to finance; if members have to find the money for carrying on the various activities of the club, they take care to see that it is spent in a way they approve of, and are thus led to take a keen interest in the management of the affairs of the club.

With regard to boys' clubs, where the necessity for financial support and some measure of control from outside is clearly much greater, the following statement of policy appears in the Mansfield House Report for 1909:—

> The aim of a Boys' Club, as we understood it, is to supply means for the development of the character of the members on a side which is scarcely touched by the training provided by the state or municipality; the Club should, if it realized its ideal, be a practice-ground in the duties of citizenship. In some directions, at any rate, the sense of unity—the *esprit de corps*—which is rarely planted in a boy at the ordinary elementary school, ought to be taught in a well-organized club, and, arising out of this, the idea of collective responsibility of all members, not only to one another but to the outside public, should be trained up; above all, the Club should offer many chances for developing on right lines the powers of leadership which exist in a fair proportion of boys, and which, if undirected, may quickly result in far-reaching evil.

The provision of opportunities for social meeting and recreation under healthy and comfortable conditions is of tremendous importance in the densely crowded cities, and this fact had long been recognized in England, though many of the clubs formed to meet the needs of the men were not of a desirable kind. In this

regard the settlements have shown little originality;[5] all they have done is to endeavor to give to the clubs which they have formed a higher tone and to bring them into close touch with the other branches of the settlements' work. Their work has in this respect been decidedly successful on the whole—Cambridge House is the centre of fifteen associated clubs, Oxford House has several, and most of the other settlements have strong clubs connected with them—though the competition of the numerous local political clubs has to some extent checked their development. But in regard to boys' clubs the work of the settlements has been far more distinctive. All the men's settlements have been much occupied with the question of the town boy; all have formed clubs —in some instances, as at Oxford House, it has been found desirable to have different clubs for boys of different grades; and are contributing substantially to the solution of one of the most difficult of social problems—that of the city boy who at the time when he is most impressionable goes from the discipline of the elementary school to make his way in life amid conditions which often, if not positively evil, are at least unfavorable to the formation of sound character. The provision of opportunities for healthy recreation—not only in the clubs proper, but in the cricket, football, swimming, and other outdoor clubs, summer camps, and cadet corps of various kinds connected therewith—together with some amount of discipline and moral influence, is of incalculable importance; and, although progress is necessarily slow, the efforts made have already yielded substantial results. Nor is this all: the workers in the boys' clubs have opportunities of becoming acquainted with the actual conditions of boy life and labor, which not only enable them to advise and guide individual boys, and in some instances to secure apprenticeships for them, but places at the disposal of the State expert knowledge—the value of which is at last being realized—in the effort to deal comprehensively with the problems of industrial training and the wise utilization of the yearly supplies of boy workers, with a view to the de-

[5] The Working Men's Club and Institute Union, a very large federation of independent and self-supporting clubs in London and the provincial towns, has done valuable work in this direction, but its objects have been almost purely recreative.

casualization of labor and the reduction of the number of the unskilled.[6] A writer in a recent number of the *Toynbee Record* thus sums up the results of the efforts made:—

> Working lads' clubs have been in existence in London for many years. We are therefore in a position to see the results. Our boys are in all parts of the world, many in excellent positions both abroad and in London. We have trained up generations sprung from the poorest of the poor, who are now self-supporting, self-respecting, and useful citizens of the Empire. We hold that our work among lads is tending to stop eleemosynary relief in the future. It is largely preventive work. We see that our lads are apprenticed to good trades, we find them jobs with good masters, we advise them in all their difficulties, and we turn out useful men.

In the case of the numerous clubs for women and girls the lines of work are necessarily somewhat different. In particular the measure of autonomy accorded to the men's and boys' clubs is seldom practicable. The clubs for women take very generally the form of "women's meetings" held in the week-day afternoons, and having in connection therewith thrift societies, clothing societies, and similar associations. In some instances, however, there are club rooms for women which are open almost every evening; and this is generally so with the girls' clubs, whose primary purpose is much the same as that of the boys' clubs—the provision of opportunities for recreation free from the perils which beset girls in other places of amusement, but which feel also the imperative necessity of taking every possible step to promote by gymnasia, medical aid, country holidays, etc., the physical well-being of the girls, the conditions of whose life and work in factories and shops are so often inimical to the future of the race. In these respects much has been accomplished, but there is room, as with the boys' clubs, for almost infinite expansion.

Educational Work. One of the principal objects of the settlements in their early days was the supply of educational facilities —both in conjunction with the University Extension Societies and by the establishment of independent classes and courses of

[6] The formation of Advisory Committees on Juvenile Employment in connection with the new national system of Labor Exchanges is an important development which should afford many opportunities for the use of the knowledge and experience so acquired.

study; and educational work is still an important branch of their activities. Thus in the winter term of 1909–10 there were at Toynbee Hall courses of lectures or classes in such subjects as "The Evolution of British Society," "Napoleon the Great and his Times," nature study, Bible history, French, German, Italian, and English Literature, Shakspere, economics, German, French, and Esperanto, physiology, singing, and home nursing; the Bermondsey Settlement has classes in bookkeeping, shorthand, typewriting, arithmetic, German, French, Latin, Greek, English grammar and composition, art-needlework, music, photography, dressmaking, and ambulance work, and had recently University Extension courses on such subjects as Shakspere, and the architecture and history of London; and at other settlements, where the educational work is less extensive and varied, there are classes and courses of lectures (University Extension and others), and libraries for the use of their students and club members. Practically all the settlements have series of popular lectures on various subjects through the winter months, on Saturday or Sunday evenings; some, as the Passmore Edwards Settlement, pay especial attention to music, by the formation of choral and orchestral societies and the regular provision of good concerts, for which experience shows that there is a real demand; and all have around them societies for the study (less formal than in classes) of literature, economics, history, science, and art; while in a few cases co-operative holiday societies have been formed for continental travel. Regular debates are another important part of the educational work (the Manchester University Settlement has the unusual feature of a debating society for women). Finally, in this connection mention should be made of the Art Exhibitions arranged for a number of years at Toynbee Hall by Canon Barnett, which led finally to the erection of the Whitechapel Municipal Art Gallery with its annual exhibitions; the similar exhibitions which have been organized from time to time by other settlements; and the "Manchester Art Museum," not to be confounded with the municipal Art Gallery, founded in 1877 and incorporated with the University Settlement in 1901.

In regard to educational work generally, it must be pointed out that the position has undergone marked changes for the better

since the inauguration of the settlement movement. The great developments of technical education since the enactment of the law of 1889; the provision of evening continuation and higher grade schools by the educational authorities; the improvement of the curricula; the growth of the polytechnics; the spread of public libraries—have all contributed to render unnecessary much of the work in this direction which the settlements originally had in view. The following extract from a recent annual report of Toynbee Hall illustrates this:—

> The direct educational work of Toynbee Hall . . . claims less of the time and thought of present-day Residents than of their predecessors, but the various classes and lectures have been on the whole very well attended, and are stamped with an individuality which could not be mechanically reproduced elsewhere. This is largely due to the *esprit de corps* of the students, springing from the sense of co-partnership which is characteristic of all the best work of the Settlement. . . . Contrasting the present educational work of the Settlement with that of earlier years, one must feel that the pioneer work then undertaken has given way to greater and more systematic efforts on the part of the community. Such classes as were formerly held are no longer needed to the same extent within the buildings of Toynbee Hall itself.

But there remains much valuable work for the settlements to do, as the warden of the Bermondsey Settlement has pointed out, both in providing systematic courses for those who on account of age or other reasons would find the conditions in the evening schools established by the educational authorities somewhat irksome, and in providing those opportunities for cultural recreation to which reference has been made above; and also in stimulating in their surrounding neighborhoods "a deeper and more widespread desire for education in the broadest sense."[7] It is hoped that the settlements may perform a useful service in assisting in the work of the newly formed Workers' Educational Association, which aims at bringing about (with the co-operation of the trade unions) a closer relation between the universities and work-

[7] It is right to mention here the valuable educational work done by such other institutions as the Working Men's College, which led the way in the higher education of the working classes, the older Polytechnics, the Morley Memorial College, the People's Palace, and the University Extension Societies.

ing-men than has hitherto been attained and lays emphasis on tutorial and class work rather than on lectures.

Educational Work among Children. One branch of educational work which is of very great importance is that among children; and to the development of this the settlements have contributed largely. Their efforts have been directed mainly to (*a*) attempts to deal with special classes of children with which the education authorities were, or are still, unable to cope; (*b*) the organization of vacation schools; (*c*) the provision of organized recreation.

(*a*) Experiments in dealing with children who are seriously crippled, and for whom therefore transport to and from school and special attention during the hours of attendance are necessary, had been made by the Women's University Settlement, Southwark, and the Victoria Settlement, Liverpool; but the first fully equipped day school was established in connection with the Passmore Edwards Settlement in 1899, the education authority (then the London School Board) providing the trained teachers and school equipment, and the settlement undertaking to supply the necessary rooms and playground, to appoint and pay a nurse, to maintain a special ambulance for the conveyance of the children, and to arrange for dinners at a very small charge and a staff of voluntary helpers to assist during the dinner interval. The school speedily showed its value in the physical and mental progress of the children who came under its care; and the example thus set was speedily followed by private effort and by the public authorities in various parts of the country until it became an integral part of the national system (the powers of the education authorities in this regard having been enlarged).

(*b*) The vacation schools for children are so well known in the United States that it is unnecessary to describe them in this place. It will suffice to say that the first step in the direction of their establishment in the United Kingdom was taken by Mrs. Humphry Ward in conjunction with the Passmore Edwards Settlement in 1902. The attempt met with marked success; and the work has grown until in 1909 there were in London two large vacation schools, an organized playground (on the plan adopted by the Playground Association of America), and a small experimental school for especially "delicate and necessitous children." Similar

work is also being done elsewhere (for example, by Browning Hall and the Victoria Settlement at Liverpool); its moral and physical results are so beneficent that its extension is greatly to be desired, and it may be hoped that before long the public authorities will unite with private enterprise for its rapid extension.

(*c*) The belief that recreation, if properly guided, can exercise a powerful influence in the formation of character (a belief for which the experience of the settlements provides abundant justification), has found expression also in the provision and teaching of organized recreation for children. The most elaborate development has taken place out of the Children's Recreation School started, also by Mrs. Humphry Ward, at the Passmore Edwards Settlement in 1897: the school is now open five days a week for an hour and a quarter in the early evening, and also on Saturday mornings. Teaching is provided in numerous handwork occupations, and in combined games. The success of the work led to the formation in 1904 of a committee to develop similar schools elsewhere in the poorest and most crowded parts of London; and in the opening months of 1910 there were thirteen other centres controlled by the committee and working generally on the lines originally laid down at the Passmore Edwards Settlement. The work is carried on with the co-operation of the education authority for London (the County Council); it has been imitated elsewhere (for instance, by the authorities of the Jews' Free School in Whitechapel and of the People's Palace), and there are signs of further development. Here again a settlement provided a useful experimental ground.

Less elaborate efforts having the same general character and aims have been made by the Guilds of Play and other institutions for children which exist in connection with a number of settlements; in these less attention is paid to classes than to organized games.[8] One feature of especial interest has been the attempts to revive the English dances, and festivals such as that of the May Queen. The somewhat unfortunately named "Guild of the Brave Poor Things," an organization which originated at the Bermondsey

[8] Most useful work of this kind has also been done on a large scale by the Children's Happy Evenings Association.

Settlement, has met with a large measure of success in the effort to bring some light and color and interest into the dull and starved lives of the crippled children.

Public Service. We pass next to a class of activities which for want of a better term may conveniently be grouped under the general head of "Public Service," including thereunder both direct participation in the work of the various local authorities and services which are a substitute for, or an extension of, that work in various fields of administration. The general scope and nature of settlement action in this respect is indicated in the following extract from a recent Report of the Warden of the Bermondsey Settlement:—

> The general tendency in the present day is to increase the functions of local authorities, and to call upon them to discharge duties which concern most clearly the moral, mental, and physical well-being of the community. The ground thus being occupied by local authorities will profoundly affect in the near future the conditions of charitable enterprise. It becomes more than ever important to secure co-operation between public authorities and bodies of well-equipped voluntary workers. In the poorer districts such agencies as Settlements are absolutely necessary if such voluntary co-operation is to be forthcoming. At a hundred points the Public Health, Education, and Poor Law authorities need the assistance of such workers, if their best schemes are to succeed and if Acts of Parliament which affect the condition of the people are to be made effective. The same necessity exists in the case of the general philanthropies of the community. . . . All such work, while distinctly civic in its nature, cannot possibly be provided either by the State or by political parties. It can only be secured by the appeals which a Settlement makes to educated and leisured men and women to undertake heavy and often thankless tasks for the love of their fellows.

(*a*) *Membership of Local Authorities.* The fundamental idea underlying the British system of local administration is that there will be available a constant stream of citizens sufficiently public-spirited to undertake onerous work on the local councils without remuneration and without any idea of personal gain; and that this leisured and relatively well-to-do class will also be educated and intelligent enough to grasp the complex problems of administration. This class can generally be found in the towns outside London; it can be found in some parts of London; but there are

also great areas of London which are inhabited almost solely by a population of whom the vast majority live under economic conditions which make life a perpetual struggle for existence, with scanty leisure. In such areas there is serious danger, as the experience of London has shown, that a considerable proportion of the members of the local councils will be drawn from classes (the small house-property owners, contractors, licensed victuallers, etc.) whose control of local administration is undesirable, or at best that the outlook of the councillors will be narrow and their knowledge limited, with the result that either they will plunge into reckless outlay or confound parsimony with administrative efficiency. The settlements have the opportunity of bringing into a neighborhood and placing at its disposal workers who are educated, disinterested, and independent; and though it must always be difficult for them to provide anything more than a small proportion of the members of local councils and committees (elected or other), they can set an example of civic enthusiasm and service. The difficulty of course is that membership of local authorities involves a longer stay at the settlement than is possible for most residents; some time is required for the resident to become sufficiently well-known locally for him to stand a chance of election, and then it is idle for him to be nominated unless he is prepared to serve his full term (three years); so that the tendency is rather for work on local councils to be left to the permanent staffs of the settlements (the wardens and assistant-wardens, where the latter exist, and the professional or quasi-professional social workers in the case of the women's settlements). In the case of the non-elected bodies (that is, those nominated by local authorities for various purposes, mainly connected with education and poor relief) it is of course easier for non-residents to serve; and so, apart from actual residents, the settlements can be of great use in bringing outside workers into the service of a neighborhood. In both ways they have done much. Thus the Bermondsey Settlement was recently represented on the London County Council (its warden having been co-opted an alderman of that body), the Bermondsey Borough Council and Board of Guardians, local Boards of School Managers, and Children's Care Committees; while in the report of Toynbee

Hall for 1908–09 it is remarked that "we have seldom or never had so many of our members engaged in public work—one as a county councillor, two as borough councillors, one as a guardian, and two as members of the Central Unemployed Body, while the important but neglected office of school manager has been filled by eight residents, rather fewer than in former years. A number of residents and associates have also taken part in carrying out the duties of the Children's Care Committees." The Browning Hall Settlement has given a mayor to Southwark, and a number of borough councillors and members of the Board of Guardians; the Mansfield House Settlement has given a deputy-mayor to Canning Town and has also provided councillors and guardians; the head of Cambridge House is chairman of the Camberwell Borough Council Distress Committee, and the House is represented on the local Board of Guardians and among the managers of local schools; and practically all the settlements in London have furnished members for various councils, boards, and committees of the kind indicated.

It is of course difficult for settlements to avoid, under such circumstances as prevail in London, the appearance of taking sides with one or other of the local parties, and such a position is especially undesirable where, as generally happens, parties in local affairs tend to be identical with national political parties. Fortunately, however, in London there is a large part of the electorate which does not consider that its allegiance in national politics necessarily involves loyalty to the same party in London civic questions; settlement candidates of divergent political views often appear on the same municipal platform; and without taking sides the settlements can do much to influence the elections by themselves providing, and impressing on the electors the necessity of seeking, a higher type of candidate than that which frequently offers.

(*b*) *Councils of Public Welfare.* One development of considerable importance in recent years has been in the direction of the formation of Councils of Public Welfare, which aim at co-ordinating local charitable enterprise, at directing attention to defects of local administration and other evils which require local or State action, and at influencing public opinion towards reform.

Toynbee Hall is the centre for such a council for Stepney, which works through an industrial law committee, striving for a better enforcement of the Factory Acts, a public health committee, a social studies committee, and a public bodies committee—the last named "having the difficult task of following the doings of the various local authorities, with a view to stimulating their action in the direction of public welfare, and guarding against triumphs of private interest over the common good." Oxford House has promoted a similar association, which has recently devoted much attention to a campaign against Sunday trading, and to preparing those engaged in the box-making trade for the working of the Trade Boards Act of 1909, the purpose of which is the establishment of a minimum wage. Mansfield House has a Civic Union, whose objects are of the same general character, though membership is practically, but not intentionally, limited to those who are associated with that particular institution.

(*c*) *Public Health.* The interests of the settlements in the work of promoting public health are very numerous and varied, and it is only possible to enumerate them briefly. One of the most valuable pieces of work is the provision for instruction in the care of infant children; the most elaborate example of this is the St. Pancras School for Mothers, in which the Passmore Edwards Settlement has taken active interest, but somewhat similar institutions exist in connection with the Southwark Women's Settlement, the Birmingham Women's Settlement, and the Bermondsey Settlement. For the care of the sick Browning Hall has a large and successful medical mission; the Manchester Settlement has given much attention to work among physically defective children; the Bermondsey Settlement has organized a district nursing society, with a professional nursing staff; Cambridge House has a health society which is waging war against the spread of tuberculosis; the Southwark Women's Settlement has a health society for home visiting and advice; the Victoria Settlement at Liverpool is closely connected with the district-nursing association; and in general this is a matter to which practically all the women's settlements, or those which have women's departments, devote much attention. The settlements also take an active part in the work of the Invalid Children's Aid Associa-

tion, and the Children's Country Holiday Fund, which sends large numbers of town children away every year; and a new sphere of activity for them has been opened up by the establishment of the system of School Care Committees, which are intended to be "the centre of all work which affects the physical welfare and the future career of the children." The committees are to interest themselves in the general welfare of the children in the public elementary schools; "to endeavor to induce parents to obtain the advice and treatment recommended in the medical report book of the school, and to confer with the school nurses; to determine what children are necessitous," and therefore entitled to be fed out of funds raised by local voluntary contributions or supplied by the education authority; and "to advise and help parents in connection with the after-employment of children." The bulk of the work is evidently connected with public health administration; for it to be done thoroughly an army of workers will be required; the settlements have provided a considerable number, but the supply is at present still very insufficient.

Other manifestations of the practical interest of the settlements in the promotion of public health are the public baths established and maintained by Oxford House and the Claremont Mission; the provision for physical culture by means of gymnasia; the *crêches* for the children of working mothers conducted in connection with Claremont and other settlements; and the attempts to encourage the cultivation of small gardens. In this connection it may be mentioned that Browning Hall has taken an active part in the agitation for the provision of cheap and rapid transit as the best means of relieving the congestion of population in London and so contributing to the solution of the housing problem.

(*d*) *The Prevention and Relief of Destitution.* Scarcely any of the settlements engage to any appreciable extent in the distribution of charitable relief, but in other ways they have taken an active part in the campaign against destitution. Several of them have formed employment and apprenticeship bureaus, for the purpose of advising parents as to the choice of occupations for their boys and girls on leaving school, and to assist them in finding places, with a view especially to checking that recourse to

unskilled occupations which is so fruitful a cause of poverty. Successful work of this kind has been done by the Southwark Women's Settlement, the Victoria Settlement at Liverpool, the Birmingham Women's Settlement, and in connection with the boys' clubs of other settlements, and though the work has so far been on a very limited scale, it has resulted in the acquisition of knowledge and experience which should be of substantial use, now that the matter has been taken up by the State as part of the work of the Labor Exchanges and advisory committees therefor are being formed. In the case of physically defective children it is of course essential, if any lasting good is to be accomplished, that they should be given the opportunity of becoming independent (if only partially so) of the support of relatives and friends; much attention has therefore been given to their training in various handicrafts, and this branch of preventive work is capable of very great expansion. In this connection, and as illustrations only, reference may be made to the craft schools established by the Guild of the Brave Poor Things, to the St. Crispin's workshop at Southwark, now controlled by Cambridge House and the Southwark Women's Settlement, in which crippled boys, duly apprenticed, are trained in bootmaking, and the schemes for "after-training" which have been framed for the children dealt with by the "special schools."

Attention has already been drawn to the fact that officers and residents of a number of settlements have served on the various authorities established to deal with the unemployed, and the small success of these bodies is due not to the quality of their members but to the inherent difficulties of the problem with which they have been called upon to cope. Other lines of action have been the promotion of thrift societies and penny banks, work in connection with the provision of meals for school children (which is now coming to be a state undertaking, but for which much voluntary assistance, in respect of investigation, etc., will still be required), the supply of workers to the numerous local charitable and philanthropic agencies, and attempts at the co-ordination of charitable effort by the establishment of systems of registration (clearing-houses of relieved cases). Mansfield House has a lodging-house for men, while Browning Hall, which has long been associated

with an active agitation in favor of a national system of old-age pensions, and claims to have had a large share in bringing about its recent institution, has the peculiar distinction of having established, for some of the aged of its districts, a group of cottage homes in the heart of the country.

(*e*) *The "Poor Man's Lawyer."* Finally, attention may be drawn to one of the most striking developments of settlement activity, the provision of free legal advice to the poor. The system, originally established in the East London settlements, has spread with marked rapidity until it has become a normal and integral part of the work of almost every settlement. It is evident that the ignorance of the poor, even more than their lack of means, renders them frequently unable to protect themselves against the acts of unscrupulous landlords or employers; while on the other hand there is abundant evidence of a natural disposition to "go to law" with one's neighbor on the flimsiest pretext. There is abundant scope for the "poor man's lawyer," who usually limits himself to giving advice, and takes up cases where the lack of means is extreme and the hardship very pronounced, though even with these limitations the amount of useful work accomplished is very great. It is of positive utility, for a legally worded letter which the complainant is helped to write will often secure the attention hitherto refused, or the lawyer may be able to serve as a conciliator between parties (notably in the case of family disputes); and it is of negative utility, for it often discourages applicants from wasting their time and trouble in the pursuit of frivolous or hopeless claims. As examples of the extent of the work (which, it must be remembered, is carried on voluntarily by skilled lawyers), it may be stated that the Legal Department of the Manchester University Settlement dealt in 1908–09 with 2,189 cases, and Mansfield House with 2,154 cases in the same year. These are the highest totals recorded, but nearly all the other settlements show large figures: disputes between employer and employed (especially in regard to compensation for accidents and wrongful dismissal), landlord and tenant (the institution connected with Toynbee Hall bears the significant name of the "East London Tenant's and General Legal Protection Committee"), and husband and wife contribute a very large proportion

of the cases. It is particularly satisfactory to note that the importance and value of the system has received general recognition, as instanced by the invitations sent to some of the more experienced workers in this department to give evidence before the Royal Commission on the Divorce Laws, and the fact that the authorities of the solicitors' profession have co-operated in placing the work at Manchester, and more especially its recent establishment at Liverpool, on a sound basis, while naturally safeguarding the interests of the profession by taking steps to limit gratuitous advice to those who really cannot afford to pay for it.

III

The above rapid survey, imperfect though it is (for many isolated pieces of work of great interest have necessarily been omitted) will yet, it is hoped, have served to indicate the general nature and scope of the work which has been carried on by the British university and other settlements during the past quarter of a century. Clearly the sum total has been very great, and the effect far-reaching. The settlements have set an example of disinterested social service which is catholic in its sympathies and aims; they have provided a common rallying-ground for workers of divers political creeds and religious beliefs; and they have done something (though much more remains to be done) to co-ordinate charitable and philanthropic effort. They have helped to raise the standard of local government; they have served as experiment stations for many schemes—in regard to education, public health, and public assistance—which have become, or are now becoming, recognized and integral parts of a national system, and thus they have hastened the humanizing of administrative methods; they have done much to improve the present lot and future life-prospects of the children; by girls', boys', and men's clubs they have checked the demoralizing influence of the life of the great cities; and they have brightened the lives of great numbers of the poor. They have provided their residents and workers with opportunities for the close study of economic conditions and social problems, and given to many administrators and teachers their first knowledge and practical experience of the

conditions with which they have had afterwards to deal; they have mitigated class suspicion; and they have helped to carry home to the minds and hearts of men the true meaning of religion, and to bring about that awakening of the churches to their responsibility for social and economic reform which is one of the most striking signs of the times. There was never a time when so much earnest thought and effort was being expended as now upon the great questions of education (in the widest sense), national health, industrial organization, and economic well-being; the public conscience was never so aroused or so uneasy; philanthropic enterprise was never so great and varied or charity so large; schemes of reform were never more numerous, and the need for guidance derived from knowledge and experience more widely realized. This temper of the public mind is the result of a consensus of varied forces, economic, political, moral, and religious; it would be idle to attempt to claim for the settlements more than a share in bringing it about, but that share is far from being inconsiderable.

It is apparent, however, that much still remains to be done in the same directions as those hitherto followed; and there is no reason to suppose that the work of the settlements is approaching its completion, or their utility becoming exhausted. New social needs are constantly making themselves felt; old lines of work may be abandoned as the pressing need for them passes away, old efforts and enterprises may become absorbed in those of larger institutions or of the State itself; but fresh openings for voluntary energy and enthusiasm are certain to appear. The utility of the experimental work of the settlements will continue; so will the possibility of supplementing State or local action; and moreover the opportunities for the co-operation of voluntary agencies with the national administrative services are bound to be enlarged. The realization of many schemes for the humanizing of administration—in such matters as the feeding of school children, the reorganization and extension of public assistance on broader and wiser lines, the industrial training of boys and girls, the efforts to decasualize labor—will all depend for their success largely upon the co-operation of great numbers of unpaid, disinterested, and devoted workers of both sexes with the permanent offi-

cials of the State and local authorities. Herein lies one of the great opportunities of the settlements, and also one of their most difficult problems.

The settlements have already brought into the service of their respective neighborhoods a number of workers of better social position and wider outlook; they must bring a much larger number in the near future. While, however, all such workers are of use, if they are willing to act under experienced guidance, it is evident that the greatest value attaches to the services of those who can reside for a considerable length of time in the midst of the community which they are striving to assist. It is, however, often difficult for young men, of the classes from which the settlements draw their residents, to do so; and almost all the annual Reports show that it is difficult for the various institutions to get anything like a sufficient number of long-period residents—men are called away by the exigencies of their professions, even when their interest and zeal remain undiminished. Without a nucleus of residents who can stay at least three years the work of the settlements, as at present carried on, is bound to suffer; with such a nucleus it is possible to utilize, with fair effectiveness, the help of a changing set of short-term residents and of non-resident helpers. Often, however, this permanent nucleus comes to consist solely of the warden or other head of the settlement, and such other permanent officials as there may be; and if there is to be an increased call upon the settlements for public service of the nature indicated above—a call to which they must respond if they are to keep their influence and be true to their purpose—it appears almost inevitable that there will have to be a substantial increase in the "professional" element in the settlements. That element (that is, persons who devote their whole time, either voluntarily or for a livelihood, to the work of the settlements or to that of other charitable and philanthropic agencies with which the settlements are co-operating) has so far shown itself mainly in the women's settlements or the women's departments of other settlements; it has been absent, on the whole, from the men's settlements, where most of the residents pursue unconnected vocations—a fact to which these settlements owe a large measure of their virility; but, if present conditions continue, it seems likely

to make its appearance there also. Such an outcome, if the professional class predominated (even only in the permanent nucleus), might seriously diminish the spontaneity of the settlement work and reduce the scope for individual enterprise; it would probably, on the other hand, secure greater continuity and possibly greater efficiency.

Further, the settlement worker of the future will need to be more systematically trained. The permanent worker, whether he can give all or only part of his time to the service, and still more the man or woman who can go to the settlements in order to get some acquaintance with the conditions of the life and labor of the people, but cannot afford a long stay, can no more be content with knowledge acquired piecemeal and haphazard; what is needed is a systematic course of training and study. Reference has already been made to what is being done in this direction at Birmingham and Liverpool, by co-operation between the universities and the settlements, and in London, first in connection with the Women's University Settlements and now at the London School of Sociology; and it is noteworthy that in all these cases it is the women's settlements which have taken the matter up, mainly for the reason already indicated, that they contain a larger proportion of residents who are making settlement work (in the broadest sense of the term) a career than do the men's settlements. But that there is real need for the extension of this organized teaching (representing all schools of thought in regard to administrative and social problems) for *all* settlement workers there cannot be any doubt.

Again, it has been pointed out that so far there has been little common action upon the part of the settlements. There has been of course, and is, a certain amount of communication and exchange of ideas between the workers in the various settlements; but there has been singularly little joint discussion of methods even where all are working with identical purposes. It is conceivable that in some places this has meant a considerable waste of energy in the struggle with difficulties of which other settlements have found the solution. The settlements can no longer be regarded as isolated efforts; they are becoming more and more allied with other institutions and with the work of the local

authorities and the State; their varied outlook only gives their accumulated experience a greater value; it is time for them to consider the possibility of an organization which, without checking individuality, shall provide opportunities for the common discussion of common problems, and shall facilitate arrangements for placing their knowledge and experience at the disposal of the public administration.

Finally, then, in the judgment of the present writer, the chief problem for the settlements in the immediate future will be that of organization. Their moral and social value has been abundantly proved; their utility to the State is fully demonstrated; their general lines of future service are sufficiently clear. What is needed now is a greater definiteness of method; a clearer appreciation of the extent to which they can co-operate with the State, and, on the other hand, of the extent to which, without the waste of energy and financial resources which results from overlapping, they must continue to go their own way, supplementing public effort or trying new social experiments. Moreover, effective co-operation with State agencies especially, though it is true in regard to other agencies also, must in a large measure depend upon confidence in the permanency and uniformity of the assistance rendered by the settlements. The problem for the settlements is to become systematic without sacrificing their individuality, without checking spontaneity, and without losing that enthusiasm for the social and moral progress of humanity which, from whatever sources fed, has carried them through many doubts and trials to the achievement of so much of lasting good.

JESUS AS LORD

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In successive discussions of the title Son of God, which seems to have been Jesus' own self-designation, and Son of Man, which would seem to have been applied to him after his death by the primitive Aramaic-speaking community of believers in his second coming, we have sought to disentangle primitive from secondary tradition. We have particularly emphasized the fact that in its distinctive principles Jesus' own teaching attaches itself to the primitive form of the messianic ideal—Israel as Yahweh's son; not the later theocratic—the Davidic heir to the throne as Son of God; nor the still later apocalyptic—the supernatural deliverer coming on the clouds of heaven as the fulfilment of the promise. In agreement with this view of the teaching of Jesus, our earliest documents, the Pauline epistles, make sonship in the ethical and religious sense the essence of the glad tidings. Since the publication of our argument our conclusions have been confirmed by the important newly-discovered document, the *Odes of Solomon*. The confirmation is especially strong if the view of Harnack be taken, that the Odes in their original form are Jewish, rather than the view of their discoverer, J. Rendel Harris, who regards them as Christian. The Odes give irrefutable evidence of the existence in first-century Judaism, or at least in primitive Christian circles, of a doctrine of sonship in the ethical and religious sense closely in line with what we have urged as the distinctive element in the messianic consciousness of Jesus. The ideal of the odist for Israel is an ideal of spiritual sonship. By the knowledge and love of the Beloved, "the Most High and Merciful," Israel is guaranteed not only sonship to God, but immortality, an eternal dwelling in God's presence.

The point was also emphasized against those who regard the

title Son of Man as "the favorite self-designation of Jesus," and who in logical consistency make apocalyptic eschatology the dominant note in his message, that of three great sources of evidence, (1) the Pauline epistles, (2) Petrine tradition as embodied in Acts and the groundwork of Mark, (3) the Matthaean Precepts of the Lord, it is only the third which gives independent evidence of the currency of the title; and this source, corresponding to the Q-document of critics, is, if not the latest, certainly not the earliest of the three. To the Pauline gospel the title Son of Man is completely unknown. To the Petrine, so far as we are able to reproduce it, it is equally unknown. Its occurrence is strictly limited to the Aramaic source which circulated in that portion of the church which looked to James the Lord's brother as "the bishop of bishops," and to writings directly affected by this Judaean influence, such as our canonical gospels, including one occurrence in Acts. In early post-canonical literature we find it used only by Hegesippus in his report of the martyrdom of James,[1] by the Gospel according to the Hebrews,[2] and by the so-called Traditions of Matthias.[3]

It remains for us to show, as the final link in our chain of evidence for the priority of the ethical and religious form of Christian messianism, that there is no vacancy in the gospels of Peter and of Paul on this score; but that in their christology the doctrine that "Jesus is Lord" occupies the place taken in Matthaean tradition by the doctrine, "Jesus is the Son of Man."

In the Pauline epistles and the Petrine speeches of Acts we meet with many expressions which throw light upon the real origin of the worship of Jesus as a superhuman being. Occurring as they do in completely stereotyped form, and in documents some of which at least are much older than Q and none of which betrays any knowledge of the title Son of Man, they certainly justify the inference that the doctrine, "Jesus is Lord," is not a mere substitute for the Danielic form, "Jesus is the Son of Man," nor an outgrowth from it; but that the two represent rather parallel and independent types of christology. "Jesus is the Son

[1] Cf. Euseb., H. E. ii, 23 13.
[2] Cf. Jerome, De viris illustribus 2.
[3] Cf. Clem. Alex., Strom. iv, 6 35.

of Man" may be regarded, so to speak, as a translation into the dialect and phraseology of Palestine of the doctrine which Greek-speaking Christians expressed in the confession, "Jesus is Lord."

We have seen in the preceding discussion that Paul does not hesitate to employ such Aramaic terms as Abba, Maranatha, Amen; he certainly does not shrink from addressing gentile converts as "men that know the law." It is, therefore, not easy to suppose that he avoided the title, the Son of Man, the "favorite self-designation of Jesus," because it could not be understood in Greek without a reference to Daniel 7 12–14. No more could the Hebrew phrase *ben 'adam* in Aramaic; yet it found currency there in the form *bar 'enash*, and, having made the transition from Hebrew to Aramaic, it surely could, had there been occasion, have similarly passed over into Greek. In point of fact we know that it ultimately did. But not in Paul's day. It was quite a different term which he borrows from the Aramaic. In fact there lies an important clew to the actual beginnings of christology in that watchword, Maranatha, which comes down to Paul from a period so primitive that Aramaic is still the general language of the church. For the watchword of the church echoed by Paul is not *barnash atha*, "the Son of Man cometh," but *maran atha*, "our Lord cometh." It is in fact, as we shall see, the title κύριος, the Greek equivalent of the Aramaic *mar*, which is made prominent wherever the question concerns Jesus' divine authority. Only such a title as this, indicative of the holder's right to command obedience in all things, could be expressive of Christian fealty. Accordingly we find it in more than one passage where it is clearly chosen to express this sense of fealty.

First of all, the Pauline passage where this Aramaic watchword occurs (1 Cor. 16 22) is itself significant, not merely because First Corinthians is the best authenticated writing of the New Testament, and some twenty years older than our earliest gospel, but because on this occasion Paul coins a phrase intended to be distinctive of the genuine Christian. Side by side stand the Greek title and the Aramaic equivalent: "If any man loveth not *the Lord* (τὸν κύριον), let him be accursed. Maranatha." Paul's own dictum is here reinforced by the phrase caught up from

primitive assemblies, kindled to enthusiasm by "visions and revelations of the Lord," assemblies where,

> "with echoes long and loud,
> The mighty Maranatha smote the air."

Another passage from this same epistle is still more indicative of the part played by the word in primitive tests of loyalty. When it became necessary to distinguish real from pretended utterances of the Spirit, the test which Paul offered was this: "No man can say *Jesus is Lord* but by the Holy Spirit" (1 Cor. 12 3). This is surely intended not as an ordinary pious ejaculation, but as a solemn confession. The principle laid down is manifestly fallacious unless the utterance of the confession is understood as a pledge of fealty and obedience.

Or, if further evidence be required that the title Lord embodied —at least for the Pauline churches—the distinctive element of the Christian's faith, let us take the passage where Paul formulates the essential content of the common faith in writing to believers in Rome—and these were no mere converts of his own who might be supposed to represent only some special type. The form in which the confession is drawn is this: "If thou shalt confess with thy mouth *Jesus as Lord*, and shalt believe in thine heart that God hath raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved" (Rom. 10 9). Once more, outward expression of the common faith of believers takes the form of the confession, *Jesus is Lord.*

These passages are selected from the greater Pauline epistles because it is apparent from their nature that the author is not coining a new title, but purposely employing the one which has most universal acceptance, both in Greek-speaking and Aramaic-speaking churches, and which most fully expresses in a single word the full content of the common faith. That word is κύριος, the imperial title expressive of complete sovereignty, ownership, and dominion. When used absolutely, its reference could be to nothing less than supreme lordship over the created world. When used with the genitive of the pronoun ("my Lord," "our Lord," etc.), it expressed a relation of personal loyalty, for which the abstract "Son of Man" gave little opportunity. If anywhere, then, surely in the phrase, "Jesus is Lord," we have the very

phraseology of what was termed "confession of (or in) the Name." Yes; for this lordship, or sovereignty, of Jesus must not only be loyally maintained against the empire, but "angels and principalities and powers in the heavenly places" are to be made subject unto him.[4]

Turn for a moment to a later document. A writer who in the name of "Peter" encourages the Pauline churches of Asia Minor to steadfastness under persecution urges heroism to "glorify God in this name" (of Christ), but inwardly to "sanctify in their hearts *Christ as Lord*." This was after Paul's death, and against an imperial despot who had directed that his decrees be issued in the form "*dominus et deus noster*." But to Paul also this name, Lord, marked the prerogative of Christ against both earthly and heavenly potentates. Every knee must bow, of beings in heaven, or beings on earth, or beings under the earth, and every tongue must join in the supreme confession "that *Jesus Christ is Lord*, to the glory of God the Father." This, then, is "the name which is above every name" given to Jesus because of his supreme exemplification of the principle, "He that humbleth himself shall be exalted,"—the name of Lord.

It will not be without significance to our further inquiry into the origins of this primitive christological confession to ask where Paul finds the name of Lord so given. For answer we need only turn to the parallel passage on the exaltation of Jesus in 1 Cor. 15 25, where a few words, quoted from the scripture that Paul has in mind, reveal the fact that he is thinking of the famous messianic Psalm: "The Lord said unto *my Lord*, Sit thou at my right hand until I make thine enemies thy footstool."[5] And it needs only the further comparison of Rom. 14 10 f., where the same

[4] It is not within the province of the present discussion to point out the practical superiority of a formula expressive of the sentiment of personal loyalty over a formula expressive only of abstract belief. Nevertheless, in days like ours, when efforts are being made to find a watchword of union, one can hardly resist asking the question, Why not return to the earliest attested of all? Thousands who differ widely in their definitions of the person of Christ, and their theories of the nature of this redemption, stand ready to unite upon the principle of a common loyalty to a common Master. Why not unite on the confession of "Jesus as Lord"?

[5] Cf. also Rom. 8 34, Eph. 1 20, Col. 3 1.

fundamental passage (Is. 45 23) is used as in Phil. 2 11, to prove that this bowing of the knee and confession of the tongue are to be "before the judgment-seat of Christ." In other words, this is the Pauline form of the doctrine of Jesus as the Son of Man.

But herewith we begin a transition from passages which merely evidence the practice of the Pauline churches to another group which evidence both the practice and its origin, and which appear not in Pauline literature only, but in that which has best title to represent to us the Petrine type of doctrine.

This can hardly be said to be the case with First Peter, an epistle which even Zahn acknowledges to be Pauline in contents, though bearing—to his mind legitimately—the name of Peter. Because of this Pauline character of First Peter we have simply placed its exhortation to the Pauline churches to "sanctify in their hearts Jesus as Lord" in the group of Pauline evidences. Second Peter, on the other hand, is so generally recognized as both spurious and late as to merit no place in serious comparison of Petrine with Pauline tradition. The case is different, however, with the speeches placed in the mouth of Peter by the author of Acts. These are admitted to present, whether incorporated from earlier sources or composed by the evangelist, a peculiar and very primitive type of christology, easily distinguished from the Pauline because it has no trace whatever of the conception of the pre-existence of Jesus or of the atoning significance of his death. Here, then, is at least an early and independent type of christology, entitled to be designated "Petrine," if only because it is presented under the name and authority of Peter and is in reality different from the Matthaean on the one side and the Pauline on the other. It should not surprise us that the nearest affinity of this type of christology is with the Gospel of Mark in its more fundamental outlines, those least affected by accommodation to Pauline ideas or the influence of the Q-source; for the Markan, too, is a type credibly reported to rest upon the teaching of Peter. But the main point of our reference to the christology of Acts is that the author grounds the church's faith upon the same confessional basis as does Paul, and by appeal to the same scripture. The starting-point of "Luke's" story of the spread

of the gospel is Peter's demonstration to the multitudes assembled at Pentecost, partly on the basis of the phenomena of "spiritual gifts," and partly on the basis of the Psalm quoted in 1 Cor. 15 25, that God had given to Jesus *the name of Lord.*

For the author of the Petrine speeches of Acts one demonstration is vital, all else hangs upon it. It is the demonstration from the coincidence of prophetic scripture and present experience that God hath "made that same Jesus, whom ye [his countrymen] crucified, *both Lord and Christ.*" In the conception of "Luke" this marks the beginning of the Christian church. His preliminary chapter (Acts 1) merely recapitulates the ending of Jesus' earthly career, glorified as it had been by the promise of an enthronement soon to follow. Until Pentecost Jesus had not been Lord or Christ. He had been Yahweh's Servant sent to bless Israel by turning them away, every man from his iniquities (Acts 3 26). Pentecost is the Servant's coronation day. From henceforth as Lord he occupies "the throne of glory." "The heavens must receive him," says Peter in his next address, "until the times of restoration of all things." Then God in his mercy will send him *as the Christ.* For it is the nationalistic phase of christology, rather than the apocalyptic, or transcendental, which here appears as the distinctive trait supplementary to the Pauline. The new fulfilments of Scripture appealed to besides Ps. 110 1 are the promises of the outpouring of the spirit of prophecy (Joel 2 28–31), the promises of an heir to the throne of David (Ps. 132 11, 2 Sam. 7 12 f.), and the "prophet like unto Moses" (Deut. 18 15). True, the nationalistic christology shows the influence of apocalypse. It has been, so to speak, transcendentalized. But the only actual trace of the doctrine of the Son of Man "coming with clouds" is in the angels' promise to the witnesses of the ascension: "Ye shall see him in like manner coming again" (Acts 1 11). The real difference from Pauline christology is not that the author reverts toward the apocalyptic doctrine of a pre-existent or transcendental Son of Man. On the contrary, he does not even adopt Paul's doctrine of incarnation. As Pfleiderer has so justly and discriminatingly pointed out, the christology of the "Petrine" source of Acts is a doctrine of apotheosis, the apotheosis of the Suffering Servant. "Peter"

merely supplements the Pauline doctrine that "Jesus is Lord" by adding an expression of the national hope that he will soon reappear as "the Christ."

Peter's preaching to gentiles is represented in Acts 10 36–43, where the gospel message is summarized in a preliminary statement as the doctrine that Jesus Christ "is Lord of all" (*πάντων κύριος*).

Surely, if the dominant note in Jesus' teaching was the doctrine of the Danielic, transcendental Being to appear upon the clouds, and if Son of Man was his favorite self-designation, it is surprising that "Peter" should lay the very foundations of the church's faith in these successive speeches, and never once employ the title or allude to the predictions. The doctrine of the Lordship is here. It is supplemented now by the doctrine of a preliminary work of the Christ-to-be,—Jesus the Servant sent to effect the great Repentance, the prophet like unto Moses, mighty in deed and word before God and all the people, the son and heir of David—of which little or nothing appears in Paul. The doctrine of the coming Day of Judgment is present, as in Paul (compare Acts 10 42 and 17 31 with 1 Thess. 1 10). Only the phraseology employed, and the scriptures appealed to, give no more ground than in Paul to think of the title Son of Man, or indeed of any apocalyptic teaching of Jesus, as the starting-point of the Petrine christology.

To judge, then, by these two strands of primitive tradition, the Pauline and "Petrine," it was not a self-designation of Jesus, but the manifestation of him as Lord, which became the starting-point of the faith. This result is in complete conformity with the thorough and scholarly discussion of Professor S. J. Case on "ΚΥΡΙΟΣ as a Title for Christ,"[6] wherein he disproves the current idea that the deification of Jesus was a result of the use of *κύριος* in the Septuagint as a rendering of the Hebrew divine name, and the application to Jesus of Old Testament passages in which the term occurred. The practice existed, but it is not primitive; nor could the confusion have occurred in an Aramaic-speaking community or among those familiar with the Hebrew Scriptures.

[6] Journal of Biblical Literature, vol. xxvi (1907), pp. 151–161.

It is most conspicuous in writers, like the author of Hebrews,[7] whose only acquaintance with the Scriptures seems to be through the Greek. Neither the address of prayer to Jesus, nor the application to him of Scripture that originally referred to God, gives adequate warrant for the theory in question. As Case points out, prayer addressed to Jesus—always exceptional, and progressively rarer as we approach the earliest times—implies only "that God and Christ have similar positions *in relation to men*," not that Jesus is treated as God. In particular the one supreme messianic gift, potentially inclusive of all others, is the gift of "the Spirit." As a pledge of adoption to sonship and heirship, and as the "earnest" of immortality, it is naturally regarded as the all-inclusive object of prayer (compare Luke 11 13 with Mt. 7 11). But the Spirit, while ultimately "the gift of God" (Acts 8 19 f., Jn. 4 10), is in a special and peculiar way the gift of Christ. The "outpouring" of it is secured by his exaltation to the messianic throne (Acts 2 33, Eph. 4 7–12); it is conditioned by his going to the Father (Jn. 16 7 ff., 20 17, 22). Prayer in general, then, might well be "in the name" of Jesus; prayer for the Spirit particularly we might even expect would sometimes be addressed to the risen "Lord." If cases exist in early times of prayer so addressed, they certainly do not imply confusion between his person and that of the Supreme Deity. On this point the philological argument of Professor Case is conclusive.

In reality the attempt to account for the apotheosis of Jesus by literary causes falls little short of absurdity. The worship of Jesus did not originate in the scriptorium. It was a product of real experience among men most of whom had little to do with the scribes. After it had begun, Scriptural apologetic came into play, and exercised an important, perhaps a dominant, influence upon the form and mode of its development. And this is reflected in the philological phenomena. As Case has again pointed out, when Paul "writes μαραναθα to the Corinthians it is per-

[7] A notable instance is the quotation of Ps. 102 25 ff. in Heb. 1 10–12 as if applying to Christ as creator. See the present writer's discussion in Zeitschrift für neutestamentliche Wissenschaft, vol. iii, 1902. Here the doctrine is of course a Pauline doctrine.

fectly plain that he is passing along a phrase which originated with Aramaic-speaking Christians." Moreover, the title embodied, *mar* or *maran*, was not taken from Scripture, but from the ordinary usage of common life. It is the exact equivalent of the Greek κύριος, ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν, which Paul and "Peter" substitute for it. We certainly "may believe that Jesus was called 'Lord' even during his earthly life."[8] It was not this usage, however, which gave significance to the title, but the experience of those who after his death felt that they had received a manifestation of his God-given sovereignty. We may at first be tempted by the coincident appeal in so many different passages [9] to Ps. 110 1 to think of this Psalm itself, either in its original form, or as employed by Jesus, according to Mk. 12 35 f., as having given rise to the conviction. It is true that there is much to indicate that even Paul was not the first to hit upon this scripture as a proof-text in support of the Lordship. Its apologetic use no doubt reacted upon the doctrine it was used to support. But here, as elsewhere, the conviction came first, and the proof-text was discovered afterward. Case is certainly right in saying, "It was not any similarity of usage between *jhvh* and *mar* that led to the custom [of applying Old Testament language spoken of Yahweh to Christ], for in Aramaic this did not exist: but the practice was due to an apologetic necessity on the part of those who claimed that God had exalted their Messiah to a place of heavenly lordship."

Our real question accordingly is this: What was it which produced the conviction of the exaltation of Jesus to "the throne of glory" in the minds of the primitive disciples, an exaltation for which the suitable term to those of Aramaic speech seemed to be *maran* and to those of Greek speech ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν? To judge by the coincidence between Acts 2 32 f. and Eph. 4 7–11, it was the phenomena of Pentecost accepted as tokens of a sovereignty conferred upon Jesus. The spiritual gifts were proofs to his followers, who found themselves thus suddenly

[8] Case, ibid. p. 161.

[9] In addition to Acts 2 34 f. and 1 Cor. 15 25, see especially Rom. 8 34, Eph. 1 20, Col. 3 1. Pss. 110 and 8, combined in 1 Cor. 15 25–27, are made almost the entire Scripture substratum of the Epistle to the Hebrews.

"endued with power from on high," that he had been exalted and enthroned.[10] Fundamentally, the argument of Paul and of "Peter" is the same. The phenomenon of the gift of the Spirit is the datum to be explained. Both revert at once to the common scripture: "The Lord said unto my Lord, Sit thou at my right hand." Thereafter the apologetic varies. According to "Peter" this is that which was spoken by the prophet Joel concerning "the last days." According to Paul this is that which is referred to by the Psalmist when he describes the triumph of Yahweh over his enemies: "When he ascended on high he led captivity captive and gave gifts unto men." The exaltation, or ascension, is proved by the visible and audible phenomena. The Scripture citations are apologetic proof-texts. Latest of all comes the narrative of visible transportation of the glorified body of Jesus through the clouds, while angels explain the significance of the occurrence to astonished bystanders.[11]

It is among the Scripture proof-texts cited after the event, and not among the causes of the belief, that we must reckon the argument put in the mouth of Jesus by our oldest evangelist in Mk. 12 35–37. The reader will find in my comments on the passage in the volume entitled *Beginnings of Gospel Story* (pp. 160 f., 175) the reasons for regarding this fourth Colloquy in the Temple as an addition by the evangelist to the series which precedes introducing successively the moot questions of Pharisee, Sadducee, and Scribe. The appended colloquy introduces the distinctive tenet of the Christian, the Lordship of the Christ. Jesus debates with the unbelieving Jews the doctrine of his own ascension to "the right hand of God." And the passage by which he is represented as defending it is the same which at the time of Mark's writing had long been a *locus classicus* of Pauline tradition (and probably of Petrine as well) to prove the connection of the risen Jesus with the phenomena of "spiritual gifts."

Were it possible to invert the literary relation of Mark and the

[10] In the Gospel of Matthew, which was not followed by a record of the mighty works of the Spirit, the Lordship is expressed by a declaration of Jesus (Mt. 28 18; cf. Mk. 16 17).

[11] On the later and legendary character of Acts 1 6–14 as compared with Acts 2 15 ff., and still more with Acts 3 1–4 31, see Harnack, Acts, ad loc.

Pauline epistles, or even to look upon the appended colloquy of Mk. 12 35–37 as of equal antiquity with the series preceding in verses 13–34, there would be better ground for the traditional idea that Jesus himself was the originator of the apologetic based on Ps. 110 1. In reality the proof-text proves too much. Its true application is to the enthronement, the ascension, the seating "at the right hand of God." It is Paul and "Peter," then, who use it correctly, and Mark, together with his dependent fellow-evangelists, who introduces it *mal à propos*.

Our attempt to trace the history of the doctrine of Jesus as Lord indicates then that its origin was in no sense of the word literary. The conviction of the Lordship [12] was the most vital and fundamental one for every Christian, no matter what the special type of his belief. He could be known as a Christian because he confessed "Jesus as Lord." But the conviction did not rest upon wrong interpretation of the Greek Old Testament. That was a consequence rather than a cause. It did not rest primarily upon Old Testament passages at all; though it was affected by these. It did not even rest upon remembered expressions of, or titles applied to, Jesus; though the fact that he had been commonly called *mar* or κύριε (cf. Jn. 13 13) had doubtless its effect, as well as the fact that he had spoken of "the Coming," or "the Day," of the Son of Man. The belief rested upon a great experience, the occurrence of a single, definite day, an occurrence which all Christians from that time forward regarded as "a designation with power of Jesus as the Son of God," [13] a day ever memorable as the coronation-day of the risen Jesus. Can we point to such a day?

In a sense we have already pointed to it. Even if Acts did not make of Pentecost the occasion which it does, we should know from the allusions of Paul to an outpouring of the Spirit experienced by every believer in some degree, and by the church as a whole from the beginning, that some great manifestation of the kind had marked its origin. We should naturally think

[12] Whether the Lordship (κυριότης) despised by the heretics in Jude 8, 2 Pet. 2 10, is that of Christ is doubtful.

[13] Such, according to Sanday and Headlam, should be the rendering of Rom. 1 4.

of that day on which, as Paul relates, an assembled company of "more than five hundred brethren at once" had seen the Lord. But this is by no means all. Few things can furnish historical evidence so strong as an institution, observance, or rite, directly traceable to a given event. Such an observance, or institution, can in our judgment be surely traced to the day of Pentecost, and to this event. The institution exists today. Its existence is attested in the oldest documents of the New Testament; though it so happens that its distinctive name is not mentioned until the Revelation of John, written about 95 A.D. In Rev. 1 10 the day which in the Pauline epistles (1 Cor. 16 2), the travel-document of Acts (Acts 20 7), and the gospels is referred to simply as "the first day of the week" and appears merely as a weekly day of assembly, is called "the Lord's day" (ἡ κυριακὴ ἡμέρα). In our judgment a strictly critical analysis of the evidence will show that "the Lord's day" originally commemorated the day of Jesus' enthronement "at the right hand of God." It was the day when "God made him both Lord and Christ."

By the time our gospels were written the day had come to be regarded as commemorating Jesus' resurrection. In fact, Paul himself makes the "resurrection" (return from Sheol?) to have occurred "on the third day," which (the crucifixion having occurred on a Friday) would make it to have fallen on "the first day of the week." This, accordingly, is the date on which our gospels place the visit of the women to the sepulchre and the finding of it empty; and in common acceptance the weekly observance of "the Lord's day" is supposed to commemorate this event. Why it should be a weekly observance, when the celebration of the resurrection was annual, and why it should fall on the day when (according to later forms of tradition) the resurrection *manifestations* began, instead of the day of Christ's actual victory over "him that had the power of death," the common theory does not attempt to explain.

Is it, then, the fact that observance of "the Lord's day" began with a fixation of this "first day of the week" as that on which Jesus "rose from the dead," whether with Paul as an inference from "the Scriptures," or with the evangelists from the report of the women and other phenomena connected with the empty sepul-

chre? We venture to say that the objections to accepting this as the origin of the observance are absolutely insuperable. Such observance could only begin in commemoration of some great and joyous, but above all perfectly definite and undisputed, event. The experiences of the women and the inferences of Paul from Scripture were not occurrences of this kind. Even were it possible to know what "scripture" Paul has in mind when he reports it as the common faith that Jesus "rose again on the third day according to the Scriptures," we cannot imagine the primitive community sitting down in conference and saying: "Go to, now. We need a day on which to commemorate the triumph of Jesus over the gates of death; let it be, then, the first day of the week; for according to Hosea it must have been 'on the third day' (Hos. 6 (2). The crucifixion occurred on the sixth day of the week. Let us then substitute the 'first day of the week' for the Sabbath, and institute thus a weekly memorial of the resurrection." Equally unimaginable is the origin of such an observance from the report of "certain women which were early at the grave, and, when they found him not, reported that they had seen a vision of angels which said that he was alive." Granted even the trustworthiness of these late traditions ignored by Paul, why celebrate this day rather than the day when he "was seen of Cephas"? In point of fact the whole group of traditions which centres about the sepulchre, found empty by the women and others "on the third day," is absolutely excluded as accounting for the observance of "the Lord's day," because they manifestly come to light at a time long after the observance of the Lord's day had become well established. Had the early church wished to celebrate the beginning of the *manifestations* of the Lord, they would certainly have taken the day of the manifestation to Peter. But that, according to all we can learn about it, took place at the Sea of Galilee, the mere physical conditions making it practically certain that it was not so early as "the third day." Our only direct witness (Gospel of Peter 14 58–60) states, in fact, that Peter's return to Galilee did not take place until "the last day of Unleavened Bread," a full week after the crucifixion. In point of fact the early church did not attempt to date the resurrection by the discovery of the empty tomb, nor by the connected group of

appearances in Jerusalem, all of which concern themselves with the later disputes about the nature of the resurrection body. Two characteristics of Paul's recapitulation of the resurrection story, as proclaimed not by himself alone but by all authorities, are fatal to the supposition that the sepulchre-group of traditions had anything to do with the origin of the observance of the Lord's day: (1) the entire absence from his list of proofs of any one of these traditions; (2) the fact that the resurrection (that is, the return from Sheol "clothed upon" with the heavenly "body of glory") is dated "on the third day" because of certain "scriptures" and for no other reason assigned. It is hardly probable that the passages in Paul's mind included Hos. 6 2, natural as this might seem; for the New Testament writers never make use of this particular passage. It does not seem probable that Paul rested on Jonah 1 17 like the author of Mt. 12 40. But difficult though it is to say what particular passages of Scripture Paul had in mind, it is not impossible to say what he meant by "the third day," and that it had reference not to the succession of the days of the week at all, but to those of the month, or rather of the feast of Passover and Unleavened Bread.

First Corinthians is written from Ephesus, apparently in the midst of the celebration of a (Christian) Passover. In 5 7 the Corinthians are exhorted to "put away the old leaven, . . . for Christ our Passover hath been sacrificed for us." In like manner the chapter on the resurrection borrows the imagery of the temple service. Christ's death, burial, and resurrection are compared to the wheat buried in the ground but restored again at harvest. The first day of Passover—Mazzoth (Nisan 14) was the day when the lamb was slaughtered. "The third day" in the year of the crucifixion was the day of Firstfruits (ἀπαρχή, Nisan 16), when the first sheaf of the wheat-harvest was lifted up to God. When, in the midst of this comparison, Paul writes: "But now is Christ risen from the dead and become the firstfruits (ἀπαρχή) of them that slept," and in the same connection points to his burial, and to his having been raised "on the third day," the significance of the date can be no other than the fact of its coincidence with the ritual of Firstfruits, just as the crucifixion had coincided with the slaughtering of the passover lamb. The fact

that in the particular year in question this happened to be also a "first day of the week" was at the utmost a secondary consideration.[14]

We are led by this glimpse into Paul's commemoration of the death and resurrection to a realization of what event the early church actually did attempt to celebrate, and when they really dated it.

The crisis in the life of Peter referred to in the prayer of Jesus, "Simon, . . . when thou art turned again strengthen thy brethren," was worthy to be commemorated by the church, because it unquestionably was the crisis of its own birth. Had the church thought of celebrating the beginning of the resurrection *faith*, it must have noted and observed the day when in Galilee, some ten days or more after the crucifixion, so far as we can judge, the risen Lord "appeared to Cephas." It did not do so. Either because this humble beginning was overshadowed by the later, more spectacular triumph, or for some other reason, Pentecost was looked upon as the real birthday of the church, and Peter's experience was but vaguely connected with it. What the church was intent upon commemorating, even so early as the time of Paul's stay in Ephesus, was Jesus' victory over the gates of Sheol. This triumph of the Prince of Life (ὁ ἀρχηγὸς τῆς ζωῆς) over the prince of darkness and death was commemorated, however, in an *annual* festival, coincident with the Passover of the Jews, and in fact with the equinoctial feasts of the many cults which make the vernal new birth of nature a symbol of their resurrection hope. In Paul's time Jewish ritual was still adhered to with sufficient closeness to warrant the marking of a separate correspondence of the crucifixion with the slaughter of the lamb on Nisan 14, and the resurrection with the lifting up of the wave sheaf on Nisan 16. But a century later this refinement has disappeared. The quartodecimans are still celebrating the Christian Passover in Asia where Paul had celebrated it with them, but it is

[14] Clement of Alexandria shows precisely this point of view in arguing for the observance of the fourteenth of Nisan as the anniversary of the death and resurrection. "And the resurrection confirms this [argument for quartodeciman observance]. At all events [Jesus] rose on the third day, which is the first day of the weeks of wheat-harvest, on which it was prescribed that the priest should offer the sheaf [of firstfruits]. (Citation in Paschal Chronicle.)

only the single great Passover day which is remembered.[15] Death and resurrection are celebrated together on the fourteenth Nisan, "the day when the people [that is, the Jews] put away the leaven." Great controversy arises because at Rome and in the West, where the hebdomadal system has become supreme, men wish to insist that "the mystery of the resurrection" shall not be celebrated on any other but "the Lord's day." Asia and the East remain firm in the authority of apostolic precedent, and again and again reiterate the nature and meaning of their observance. "The fourteenth is the true Passover of the Lord, the one great sacrifice, the Servant of God slain instead of the [passover] lamb, he who was bound having bound the strong man [that is, Satan, who had the power of death; cf. Mt. 12 29 and Heb. 2 14 f.], and he who was judged judging quick and dead, . . . who was buried on the day of the Passover, a stone being set upon the tomb." [16]

But while we can be perfectly certain that it was the victory of Christ over the power of Sheol which was celebrated by quartodecimans in the annual breaking of fast on the fourteenth of Nisan, and while the greatest importance was attached to the exact determination of the true date of this single day, it is equally certain that the ancient Oriental observance did not attempt to determine from the traditions of manifestations, discoveries of the empty condition of the tomb, Scriptural predictions, or otherwise, just how long after the crucifixion this triumph known as the resurrection, or return from Sheol, had occurred. Indeed, a letter of Basilides, bishop of the parishes in Pentapolis, consults Dionysius of Alexandria as to the hour when the fast commemorative of the Lord's passion should be terminated by the feast of the resurrection, some of the brethren thinking they should do it at cock-crow, others "from the evening." "He was at a loss," says Drummond, "how to fix an exact hour; for while it would be 'acknowledged by all alike' that they ought to begin their festivities after the time of the resurrection of our Lord, and to humble their souls by fasting up to that time, the Gospels

[15] Epiphanius, Haer. ἅπαξ γὰρ τοῦ ἔτους μίαν ἡμέραν τοῦ πάσχα οἱ τοιοῦτοι (quartodecimans) φιλονείκως ἄγουσι.

[16] Apollinaris of Hierapolis in Paschal Chronicle.

contained no exact statement of the hour at which he rose." [17] Dionysius in his reply does not pretend that he can solve this question of the exact time of the resurrection, but recommends a latitudinarian tolerance of difference in mode of observance.

It is perfectly clear from this and other accounts of ancient commemoration of Jesus' death and resurrection that the two were celebrated together, and that no attempt was made to draw such inferences as moderns draw from the story of the women at the sepulchre regarding the day and hour when Jesus had been (in Pauline language) "clothed upon" with his "body of glory." If for a time memory lingered of the Pauline correspondence between Firstfruits on Nisan 16 and a scripture (Hos. 6 2?) predicting resurrection on "the third day," it soon disappeared. Clement's reference stands isolated. The second-century church, at least in the Orient, thought of, and celebrated, Jesus' death and resurrection as practically simultaneous. Indeed, the Gospel of Peter makes even the ascension take place from the cross itself immediately after the great cry.[18]

Dr. Erwin Preuschen even goes so far as to say:

> In the Orient Sunday was not known as the day of resurrection, and hence there was no weekly celebration of this day [but cf. Acts 20 7 and Rev. 1 10], but in the Occident Wednesday and Friday were regular fast-days, and Sunday was celebrated as the day of resurrection. It is doubtful whether the Occident possessed in addition a special day in the year for the commemoration of the death and of the resurrection of the Lord.[19]

We cannot agree with this scholar that the hebdomadal system of the church originated in the West and was unknown to the East. It is essentially Jewish in character, and would have been most pronounced among the earliest churches, where synagogue practice was taken over with least alteration. The very document on which Dr. Preuschen seems to base his statement regarding semi-weekly fasts [20] is almost certainly of Syrian origin, and

[17] Character and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel, p. 471. The italics are ours.

[18] "And the Lord cried out, saying, My Power, my Power, thou hast forsaken me. And as soon as he had spoken he was taken up" (καὶ εἰπὼν ἀνελήφθη).

[19] New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopaedia, Art. "Easter," vol. iv (1909), pp. 46 f.

[20] Didache, 8 1.

the fasts on the fourth day of the week and the Preparation (παρασκευή) are expressly set over against those of "the hypocrites" on "the second and fifth" (cf. Luke 18 12). The hebdomadal system of the church is certainly of synagogue origin, all the more because such pains are taken to distinguish its festal "first day" from the festal "seventh day" of "the hypocrites," and its fourth-day and sixth-day fasts from their fasts on the second and fifth days of the week. But Preuschen is entirely correct in saying that observance of "the Lord's day" had no such origin as we of the West, following the Roman tradition of Mark and the Synoptic Gospels,[21] have been accustomed to suppose. His appeal to the immemorial rite of quartodeciman observance on the part of all the more ancient churches, explicitly and rightly justified as it was by apostolic tradition and practice, is conclusive on this point. Preuschen's inference from the history of the long controversy is as follows:

> The Christians of Asia Minor must have celebrated the mystery of the resurrection on the day on which the fast [the annual fast commemorating the Passion] was broken, and this day was not Sunday but the fourteenth of Nisan, around which the controversy revolved. This conclusion is justified by the account of Epiphanius concerning the quartodecimans (that is, those who commemorated the Lord's death on the 14th), in which he relates that fasting and the celebration of the resurrection took place on the same day. . . . The Christians of Asia Minor appealed to an old apostolic tradition according to which Jesus rose on the evening of the day of his death, and the opposition of the Occidentals was directed mainly against the commemoration of death and resurrection on the same day.

In one respect this statement requires correction. It was not the "resurrection" of Jesus in our sense of the word that quartodecimans commemorated "on the same day" as the crucifixion (better, after a vigil corresponding to the vigil of Passover, which extended in many cases "until cock-crowing"), nor did they hold that he "rose" (that is, manifested his presence to his disciples on earth) on the fourteenth. They accepted the same gospels that we do, and were indignant at the charge of going counter to them. They probably held just as Paul did, and perhaps on the

[21] Even the quartodeciman Fourth Gospel is affected on this point by its predecessors (cf. Jn. 20).

basis of the same "scriptures," that "he was raised (ἠγέρθη) on the third day," that is, on the sixteenth, or day of Firstfruits.[22] What the quartodeciman festival commemorated was, as Apollinaris clearly (though somewhat rhetorically) states, the "binding of the strong man," that is, the church's victory over "the gates of Sheol," accomplished when Christ "through death overcame him that had the power of death, and delivered us who through fear of death were all our life-time subject to bondage." It is the true Oriental, pre-christian doctrine of the "Harrowing of Hell" which underlies it, and is reflected in unmistakable terms in the fifth of Hippolytus's *Heads against Caius:*

> The heretic Caius [*ca.* 180 A.D.] objects [to Rev. 20 2 f.] that "Satan had already been bound, according to what is written [in Mt. 12 29] that Christ entered the house of the strong man, and bound him, and despoiled him of us his vessels."

It thus becomes unmistakably clear that the celebration of the Passover among the Oriental churches, as taken over from the synagogue through the very hands of the apostles themselves, became in Christian interpretation a feast of redemption indeed as before, but—of redemption from the darkness and bondage of Sheol. The imagery is perfectly familiar to us from the epistles of Paul, and must have been at least equally familiar to every communicant in "the Supper of the Lord." The mere date when it became known that the tomb was empty, or when individuals were lifted out of their despairing unbelief, whether by "visions of angels" or "manifestations of the Lord," was to the Oriental Christian's mind a matter of quite secondary importance. He resented the attempt of Rome and the West to force upon him a delay in the breaking of his fast until "the Lord's day"; and denied the validity of their ground, namely, that the Jerusalem traditions regarding the sepulchre, which since the days of Mark's Roman gospel had begun to supersede the Galilean as given by Paul (1 Cor. 15 1–11), proved "that the mystery of the Lord's resurrection from the dead" had taken place at a specified day and hour and therefore "should be celebrated on no other day than the Lord's day."

[22] Cf. the statement of Clement cited above, p. 219, note.

Our protracted inquiry into the primitive apostolic celebration of the resurrection will be justified by the importance of the result. We need not prolong it by a consideration, however interesting historically, or strong in corroboration, of the later attempts at harmonization. We can only refer the reader to Preuschen's explanation of the curious calculation of the "three days" in the Syriac *Didascalia*, which treats the three hours' darkness on the crucifixion day as a "night." We must also pass over his analogous explanation of the equally curious phraseology of Mt. 28 1. In our judgment the inquiry already fully justifies the statement with which we began, that at least so far as the ancient Oriental churches or those of apostolic or Pauline foundation are concerned, "the whole group of traditions which centres about the sepulchre, found empty by the women and others 'on the third day,' is absolutely excluded as accounting for the observance of 'the Lord's day.'" Their dating on that particular day is a *consequence*, not a cause of the practice.

But this leaves the practice itself still to be accounted for. Moreover, as we have just seen, the hebdomadal system, so far from being a mere Western innovation, as Preuschen appears to hold, is rooted in the most ancient apostolic observance. The innovation of the West consists merely in a perversion of its significance.

The three characteristics which should guide us to a more trustworthy judgment of the origin of "the Lord's day" are (1) its Jewish derivation, (2) its hebdomadal observance, (3) its festival character. It unquestionably began as a commemoration of some signal event in the history of the church. But we have seen that the resurrection was otherwise commemorated, and the mere accounts of "manifestations," even that to Peter, which in the earliest times was by far the most important, were not understood as determining the date of the Lord's triumph over Sheol. One "manifestation," however, did remain fixed in the memory of the church, not only because of the significance which from the beginning appears to have been attached to it, but because, as tradition most credibly avers, it coincided in date with the annual Jewish "Feast of Weeks." If any one day could be pointed to in the whole history of the church worthy of perpetual

commemoration as "the Lord's day," it would be the day when according to apostolic belief he was enthroned "at the right hand of God." The phenomena which accompanied the first "outpouring of the Spirit" are appealed to in different ways by both "Peter" and Paul as proving the exaltation of Jesus to the supreme Lordship (Acts 2 33, Eph. 4 7–10). Both apostles see in it a fulfilment of the coronation ode, Ps. 110: "Yahweh said unto my Lord, Sit thou at my right hand, until I make thine enemies thy footstool." So vital was this conviction to the primitive church that it became incorporated in the earliest baptismal confession: "He ascended into heaven and sitteth on the right hand of God."

But is it capable of proof that this supreme day of the "demonstration of the Spirit and of power" was really a "first day of the week"; and, if so, was there any reason why it should be commemorated by weekly, instead of annual, observance? Both questions can be answered in the affirmative. Lev. 23 1–21 gives the "perpetual statute" of the feasts of wheat-harvest, introduced by the law of the Passover on Nisan 14 (ver. 5). Verses 9–14 give the "perpetual statute" of Firstfruits "on the morrow after the Sabbath" (Nisan 16). Next follows the "perpetual statute" of Pentecost, which celebrated the conclusion of the seven weeks of wheat-harvest:

> And ye shall count unto you from the morrow after the sabbath [of Passover week], from the day that ye brought the sheaf of the wave offering [Firstfruits]; seven sabbaths shall there be complete: even unto the morrow after the seventh sabbath shall ye number fifty days . . . and ye shall make proclamation on the selfsame day; there shall be an holy convocation unto you; ye shall do no servile work; it is a statute for ever in all your dwellings throughout your generations.

This law of Pentecost, or "the Feast of Weeks," is the foundation of the Jewish hebdomadal system. The new moon of Nisan fixed the annual calendar, whose first great feast was Passover at the full of the moon. Nisan 16 with its ritual of the sheaf of firstfruits was the starting-point for the seven-weeks' period of wheat-harvest, culminating in Pentecost, which would thus by

one interpretation always fall on "the first day of the week."[23] Moreover, it constituted a kind of second Sabbath, which, as we know, was the mode of observance of "the Lord's day" in the primitive Christian communities. Of these communities nothing is more certain than their assiduous devotion to the festal system of the Law. Passover and Pentecost, so far from being discontinued, were redoubled in significance. The redemption-feast, as we have seen, became the feast of the new and greater redemption through the death of Christ, a commemoration of his breaking of the bars of Sheol. Pentecost also continued in redoubled honor, observed even in the Pauline churches (1 Cor. 16 8, Acts 20 6, 16). And not only so, but the intervening period of the seven weeks of wheat-harvest long continued, as among the Jews, to be a period of continuous festivity, "the joy of harvest." Says Drummond, summarizing the statements of Eusebius:

> So full of joy was the time [of Easter] that they feasted for seven whole weeks, till "another great feast," Pentecost, came in.[24]

No doubt whatever exists as to the new meaning attached by Jewish believers of the earliest time to the festival of Pentecost as an annual observance. It was the day on which he who had "become the first fruits of them that slept" entered into the full possession of the inheritance; and of this fact had given the assurance by a showering of the Earnest (ἀρραβών) upon his followers. But what of the old-time significance of the day to pious Jews as the foundation of the hebdomadal system? Is it likely that for Christians there would be in succeeding years no special significance in the period of rejoicing, which was marked for them above their fellow Jews by the fact that it had been filled with successive manifestations of the risen Lord? According to the tradition these manifestations had followed in rapid succession from the time when, some ten days after the crucifixion, the Lord "appeared to Cephas" down to Pentecost itself. It was

[23] Orthodox rabbinic interpretation of the legal date "the morrow after the sabbath" seems to have given it the sense as early as New Testament times of Nisan 16, regardless of the day of the week. Samaritan and sectarian practice made Firstfruits (and consequently Pentecost) fall invariably on Sunday.

[24] Character and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel, p. 466.

the period during which "he presented himself alive after his passion by many proofs, appearing unto them by the space of forty days." And if early Christian observance of this festal period followed the same analogy as the other observances which they took over from the religion of their fathers, their kindred, and their own childhood, it would be almost inevitable that these "manifestations" should follow the hebdomadal order and begin to be dated uniformly on "the Lord's day."

If, then, we look to Paul, and not to the relatively late tradition of the Roman editor of our second canonical gospel, for an explanation of primitive observance of "the Lord's day," we shall find it in the wide-spread and primitive Oriental observance of a festival of corn-harvest, which among Jews at least covered a period of seven weeks, beginning and ending—in the year of the crucifixion—on "the first day of the week."

That inferences regarding the first Lord's day were based on Scripture rather than on tradition is clear from 1 Cor. 15 4. When at last tradition forsook the older Galilean narrative, and began to build on the Jerusalem form first known to us in the Roman Gospel of Mark, it was inevitable that the resurrection "on the third day" should be interpreted not with reference to Passover and Firstfruits, but with reference to "the Lord's day" of an established Christian hebdomadal system.

Our study of the primitive institution of "the Lord's day," intricate as the course of argument must be, leads to a conclusion thoroughly in harmony with that based upon literary and philological grounds. Primitive christology rested not so much upon Scripture, nor even upon phrases caught from the lips of Jesus, as upon the experience of the church. First had come the reawakened faith of Peter, then of the Twelve. Peter's brethren were "strengthened" in the conviction that God had raised Jesus from the dead. But the experience which created Christianity was the "baptism of the Spirit." In it was given the assurance of his exaltation to "the right hand of God." By it he was "manifested as the Son of God with power."

For believing Jew and Greek alike this implied that God would soon send Jesus back again to judgment as "the Christ." For it is Paul's teaching as well as Peter's that "we must all stand before

the judgment-seat of Christ." And so far as doctrinal content is concerned, no more was implied when Christians of Semitic mode of speech declared that Jesus had been manifested as "the Son of Man." It does, however, make a great difference to moderns whether by the strict canons of criticism we are obliged to hold that this christology of the apocalyptists, resting as it does upon the more morbid developments of later Judaism, has its ground in fundamental elements of the teaching of Jesus himself; or whether we may hold, in accordance with the argument now brought to its conclusion, that the doctrine of Jesus as "Son of Man," and the doctrine of Jesus as "Lord," are parallel developments of a common experience. That experience we believe to have been the gift of the Spirit of adoption which teaches us to cry Abba, Father. Historically speaking, there could be no other mediation of that Spirit to humanity than through him who has taught us, once and for all, by word and action, in his life and in his death, what it is to be a "Son of God."

BEYOND MORAL IDEALISM

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To an increasing number of people the idea that a religion which means to be something more than an heroic moral idealism has any significant place in the modern world seems open to grave doubts. Moreover, a large body of traditional metaphysical doctrines and systems are being subjected to much the same sort of criticism which religion is called upon to face. Three general arguments are used to show that both traditional religion and traditional metaphysics are no longer able to do what clear thinking and enlightened practice demand.

Both religion and metaphysical idealism—for this is usually the traditional philosophy that is in question—seem to concern themselves with more ultimate and absolute truths than ever arise in the actual world of scientific and moral judgments. Moral idealism, on the other hand, is content with the humbler task of the organization of our social experience, the relief of poverty, the freeing of human life everywhere from the obstructions which greed and ignorance impose,—with acting everywhere in the light of ideals wholly relative to the best we know and can do. Religion and metaphysical idealism purport to relate us to destinies so ultimate and so absolute that either we dare not trust in their efficacy for us in our present toil and labor, or else we scoff at them for their aloofness. To trust in absolute ideals and truths, and to suppose that in the blank contemplation of these deliverance will come, instead of setting to and winning those ideals which, because they are relative, can really serve us, is declared to be futile.

A second failure attributed to the older religion and metaphysics is their blurring of certain profound and unresolvable distinctions which common sense and practical life have found to be indispensable. The necessary and matter-of-fact differences between good and bad, between the real and the ideal, are blunted

and blurred, we are told, so that we are actually deceived about our world and our hopes. That which an enlightened judgment would regard as evil is taken up and "sublated" in the religious experience and in absolute idealism, and declared to be evil only because of our failure to see how good it really is. The result is, in Professor Perry's phrase, "a moral promiscuousness," where the all-goodness of the world "contradicts the moral distinction between good and evil." Or, again, the very essence of religion is supposed to consist in blurring the distinction between the actual and the ideal. The world, so religion is supposed to say, is in its true nature a perfect and complete system; the apparent separation for us between the real and the ideal is but illusory. Must not the moral consciousness judge such a religion to be utterly perverse? For morality, "the ideal is always something not as yet reached, and every apparent instance of its realization in an actual experience is an illusion which close inspection or more adequate analysis will dispel. For religion, on the other hand, the actualized ideal is not only real, but is the supreme and, in the full sense of the word, the only reality, and it is the apparent reality of that which conflicts with the ideal that is the illusion." [1] But why struggle for an ideal which is already real, why labor for a cause which already possesses the world?

A third way of stating the central defect of religion and of metaphysical idealism is to say that they involve ideals and values and entities which are transcendent with respect to those which experience shows us. The moral world, like the scientific world, is autonomous, in need of no external sanctions and standards such as religion is supposed to provide. The scientific and democratic motives demand this freedom from everything extrinsic and irrelevant. In the consciousness of this demand, the older religion and the older metaphysics have in substance perished.

These three counts in the indictment,—the three fallacies of absolutism, of the blurring of obvious distinctions, and of the transcendent,—are closely connected with each other. Any discussion of one implies some reckoning with the others. I shall here limit myself, however, to the third of these supposed fal-

[1] A. E. Taylor, The Problem of Conduct, p. 471.

lacies. I think it can be shown that no wholesale protest against all transcendence, as being futile and irrelevant, is quite to the point, least of all in the interests of moral idealism. I shall hope to make it clear that the motive—at any rate, one chief motive which has led to the belief in certain transcendent ideals and meanings—is a significant one, that it is the partial recognition of this motive which makes possible both morality and moral idealism, and that the difficulties which are found with traditional religion and metaphysics concern rather the form in which this motive has found expression than the motive itself. I mean that there is still reason in going somewhat beyond moral idealism, and recognizing that moral idealism, in order to do and to be what its best wishers might desire, must be something more than moral idealism. That this more than moral idealism will differ profoundly from traditional metaphysics and theology, ought to go without saying; the objections urged against the old habits of thought are valid. But let our care be that in bringing to light the ambiguities and failures of traditional systems, we do not neglect what of permanent value may be there.

Now the motive here referred to, a motive which has been the inner source of much of the enthusiasm generated by Christianity and by historic idealism, can be stated abstractly thus: Any moment of experience,—yes, any fact whatever,—has more meaning and more value than that fact itself discloses, or than the moment of experience itself verifies. The existence and meaning of things are in some measure incommensurable. When stated in terms of the moral experience, this principle means that the moral significance of a deed overflows the bare limits of the deed itself, that the deed means more than it simply is, that its influence and effects literally transcend its own meagre and brief life as a deed. When stated in terms of the religious experience, or better, of the religious attitude, it means that there are more significant and comprehensive meanings which attach to an act performed, or to a life lived, than belong to it as a merely human experience in a limited social environment. For the religious attitude the meaning possessed by an act is fraught with it knows not how much cosmic significance; the act or life is creative of something which adds to the total worth of things, and a worth

that will be conserved. But in whatever form this principle is stated, whether abstractly or as a principle of the moral or of the religious consciousness, it is throughout a principle of transcendence, the transcendence or disparity, namely, between what anything is and what it means. Morality and religion both live by just their recognition of this transcendence. A moral idealism which would save itself by setting up a barrier beyond which no meanings and values are to be sought, a moral idealism which limits its endeavors to the world of human and social activities in the interests of the supposedly modern abhorrence of everything transcendent, such an idealism is only half aware of its own significance and power.

With the whole modern demand for autonomy, the modern protest against any ideals so transcendent that they seem to be arbitrary and irrelevant, to be brought forcibly into our experience from some remote Beyond,—with this profound motive of modern reflective thought, both moral idealism and religion have to reckon. One may say, indeed, that this is the insight of all critical philosophy, that standards, ideals, truths, and values must grow out of and reflect the concrete situation in which they are to prove effective. If an ideal or value or plan of action is imposed from without, no matter with what transcendental and supernatural sanction, it is not the duty of any rational or moral being to recognize it save as it reflects his own interests and his own deepest purposes. Whether one calls this self-realization or autonomy, democracy or naturalism, it is this right and duty to form and express one's own interests, to let the concrete situation reflect itself in relevant ideals and values, that is to be prized above all else. "To set up 'ideals' of perfection which are other than the serious recognition of the possibilities of development resident in each concrete situation, is in the end to pay ourselves with sentimentalities, if not with words, and meanwhile it is to direct thought and energy away from the situations which need and which welcome the perfecting care of attention and affection." [2] It would thus seem to be the very life of moral idealism to protest against all metaphysical ideals and transcendent values which religion seems obviously to insist upon.

[2] Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, p. 422.

A return to the naturalism and sanity of Greek ethics is urged in behalf of a sound moral idealism. Greek ethics at its best, we are told, at any rate conceived the problem in the right way. The Greek moralists undertook the definition of a natural Good, consonant with the interests which struggle to assert themselves in the natural world of a cultivated and eager society. How much more human and moral was this than the striving after remote, transcendental duties, supposed to have their origin in a non-natural or supernatural realm, with which Christianity and absolute idealism have concerned themselves. The return to the Greek definition of morality in terms of natural interest rather than duty, but reinforced by the wealth of modern biology and psychology, with their rooting of all interests in the one continuous world of nature,—this is the programme of a pure moral idealism. The subjection of natural interests to transcendent standards, the dominance of religion and metaphysical idealism in the modern world, has served but to confuse men, to withdraw them from devotion to the common task; morality, single-minded and pure of heart, proceeds with its task of discipline and organization untroubled by the thought of those vague and remote issues in the presence of which all thought and action seem vain and hopeless.

When, however, we come to closer quarters with religion and historical idealism, when we look for the actual motives which inwardly seek expression in something beyond moral idealism, when we ask for the main use which the ethical religions and historical idealisms have made of this concept of transcendent norms, we find indeed that they are but endeavoring to express in their own way and more explicitly, just that motive which lies at the heart of the moral consciousness and of moral idealism. I shall consider very briefly four concepts, found both in the higher ethical religions and in historical idealisms, which illustrate this fundamental motive,—the concepts of symbolism, of revelation, of loyalty, and of mysticism. The fundamental principle here involved is, once more, the insight that things and acts which are taken up into either a moral or a religious interest actually possess more meaning than seems to belong to them as empirical things or acts.

First, symbolism. The history of religion is, in large part, the history of man's attempt to provide symbols for values with which he feels himself vitally concerned, and which he thinks of as requiring symbols just because they are more comprehensive and potent than any fact which he ever verifies empirically. The fetich, the totem, the idol, the sacrificial meal, the sacraments, are symbolic of meanings which are incommensurable with any given fact or given thing. The inveterate tendency to pantheism in all the higher religions is the outcome of regarding *all* facts as symbolic of some mysterious and divine Whole. John Smith, the Cambridge Platonist, gives a typical expression of this motive in the following words: "True religion never finds itself out of the infinite sphere of the Divinity. A good man finds every place he treads upon holy ground. To him the world is God's temple; he is ready to say with Jacob, How dreadful is this place! this is none other than the house of God, this is the gate of heaven."[3]

Here would seem to be the bond between the aesthetic and the religious consciousness. Art is merely an artificial and consciously controlled attempt to construct and appreciate objects whose function it is to symbolize meanings which transcend the object as a mere thing. Thus the belief that the things of experience mean more than we ever adequately verify, that our experience is symbolic of a meaning which cannot be exhausted, but which at best we can only symbolize,—this it is which makes the concept of symbolism so central a one in the higher religions. Philosophy, too, has in its own way expressed this motive, when it has spoken of the incommensurability between experience and things-in-themselves, when it has said that our experience can only symbolize, and but partially express, the real nature of things. "You seek the meaning and the end of your action; you ask for some sufficient reason for living; do you not feel that it is contradictory to address yourself to the science of phenomena, seeing that, from the strictly scientific point of view, phenomena have not in themselves their own *raison d'être?* That which you seek is beyond phenomena, and it is symbols alone that can, not make you comprehend it, but reveal it to you."[4]

[3] Quoted by W. R. Inge in Contentio Veritatis, p. 309.

[4] Sabatier, Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion, p. 325.

Secondly, revelation. The concept of revelation, which seems remote enough from common sense and concrete experience, is nevertheless an essential ingredient of all religion. For the religious attitude, once more, things mean more than they are, and what is this but to say that the "more" which anything means is revealed through the object. The object is a symbol of that which it but imperfectly reveals. To say with the pious that God reveals himself to man is to say that what man possesses in his experience is a symbol of what he might possess, of a Good which is not yet made completely his own. For naturalism or factualism, facts are just what they are experienced as being, and nothing more. "Everything is what it is, and not another thing," as Bishop Butler tersely expressed it, not meaning, however, to state the principle of naturalism. For religion, as for idealism, there is in the least and most unworthy fact a prophecy of that greater wealth of meaning but partially revealed in the fact as it appears. The religious attitude is then necessarily one of faith in the unseen potentialities and meanings of things.

Thirdly, loyalty. At no point does religion seem more to conflict with reflective thought than in its demand that a man shall serve causes and purposes which are given him to serve, rather than those purposes which are continuous with his own interests. For, as we have seen, reflective thought is convinced that no ideals are significant unless they are projected from the spontaneous, natural interests of man. His interests, his desires, his impulses are but to be clarified and organized in his ideals. He is to form his ideals. They are to be the ministers of his natural wants and interests.

Well and good; but religion asks of a man that he *serve* the ideal, that he use his energies and his life as an instrument not as an end, that he regard himself with his natural interests as a loyal subject of purposes which he does not create, of plans to which he in no wise contributes, but which are given him to serve and to further. "The essence of religion is that man is *not* shut up in himself as an individual, but able to escape into a wider consciousness, of which his mind and will may become the organ."[5] Not as a free maker of ideals, but as a loyal servant of the Most High,

[5] Caird, The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant, vol. ii, p. 620.

does the religious attitude find its worthiest expression. Is there any solution of this antinomy between morality with its freedom to make ideals, and religion with its insistence on the service of ideals which are already there inviting loyal service? Yes, if one is willing to confess that one's interests and desires, one's very self indeed, has more meaning and really is more than one himself ever verifies. One may then say, "This which I now wish to do or to be, this present ideal of mine which expresses my interests as I now know them, and which I have accordingly framed,—this is no worthy ideal, because my interests, my desires, my self, are more than they now show themselves to be. I do not and cannot completely experience the whole meaning of myself. Hence it may be that in devoting myself to an ideal which demands more than my present interests, as I know them, would of themselves freely give,—it may be that in truth I am actually fulfilling the real requirements of my interests." The ideal which seems so remote and so transcendent would, so the religious attitude believes, be freely chosen, could one determine the whole of what his self means.

Fourthly, mysticism. From various quarters it has come to be recognized that in some sense mysticism occupies a central position in all religion. One need not go to the extreme of saying, with Boutroux, that the essence and foundation of all intense religion is mysticism. But mysticism,—in the sense of a profound discontent with the obvious, a search for those more remote meanings which overflow the barriers of the common presuppositions and discourse of men,—this indeed, with the sense of symbolism, of some sort of revelation, and of inclusive purposes which demand the loyal devotion of men's energies, probably accounts for most of the attitudes which we call religious.

Is not, now, the distinctively moral attitude and moral experience remote enough from all this? Is this all fancy and myth, with which stern duty has nothing to do? What has the religious attitude with its search for the meanings of things which overlap their existence as things,—what has this to do with doing one's duty and obeying the moral law? How is the religious attitude related to the moral attitude, to a purified moral idealism? The answer is that the moral experience also is vitally

concerned with the truth of the doctrine that one's decisions, one's deeds, have meanings which extend far beyond the brief life of those deeds and decisions as such. To act morally means precisely to act with conscious reference to the more ultimate meaning of one's acts, and not to limit one's vision to the act as satisfying isolated impulses or demands. The only moral argument one can address to the wrong-doer is, "Your deed really is more, and means more, than your present contracted self is aware of. Open your eyes to the thousand unseen implications and influences of this your deed, see it in its context, and see the havoc that it makes."

There is one application of this general principle which is deserving of special notice from the point of view of both ethics and religion. We have seen that for both the religious and the moral attitudes certain facts or deeds are fringed with a network of meanings and values, which the mere facts taken by themselves never exhaust but only symbolize or reveal. Morality consists in seeing something of this real context of meanings and acting with conscious reference to it. But morality has to do with the deeds of conscious selves, and hence the central problem for any reflective morality is, Who, then, is the self whose actions enter into the moral world? Is the self in reality anything more than it seems to itself to be? Does the self mean more than it is? Is there any common-sense view, any patent fact about the self, which needs to be revised and transcended if one would consciously act with reference to what the self means and really is? Now the enlightened moral consciousness and the higher ethical religions have made very much depend on one's insight into the fact that one's self is not the peculiarly private and severed thing that it appears to be, especially when the self is identified with the body. The self, the organized totality of one's interests, really is, and means, much more than such a self at any one moment is able to verify. The moral self is more than the private self, means more than anything that the private self, as just this single being, is ever aware of. Here, if anywhere, morality must transcend the obvious, must see things which are not real, if by real one means things most accessible and immediate. For what is more obvious than just this impervious and thoroughly individual

character of the self, and what seems more remote from sound common sense than the doctrine which declares that these apparently impervious selves have more meanings than they are now aware of, and that in order to realize what these meanings are the illusion of their sundered individuality must be overcome. "The universal will of the moral insight must aim at the destruction of all which separates us into a heap of different selves, and at the attainment of some higher positive aim. The 'one undivided soul' we are bound to make our ideal."[6]

Morality and religion have ever to face the charge of being perverse and paradoxical, mere artifice and exaggeration rather than wholesome, sane contentment with the wiser provisions of nature. Their truths sound strange and hard to common sense with its acceptance of the obvious, its reluctance to go from what a thing is to the more that it means. The paradox of self-sacrifice, of dying to live, of losing one's life to save it, is a paradox as long as one sees only the obvious; perchance it will seem true when one sees through and beyond the obvious to the transcendent meaning of it.

I have tried to indicate that in their radical discontent with the merely apparent, in their search for more meanings than are ever verified, in keeping their vision fixed on the implied meanings of things, both morality and religion have a common root. But does not the distinction and even enmity between morality and religion still remain, even after we have recognized that both share this mental attitude of radical discontent with things as they are, and that both desire to live and act with reference to the more that things always mean? Does not morality always say to religion,

> "My paths are in the fields I know,
> And thine in undiscover'd lands"?

Morality seems to concern itself with social facts, with making clashing interests compatible, with the control of impulses in the light of certain social principles,—in short, with the organization of life, and all of life's concrete interests. Religion seems transcendent, it seems to bring in unreal agents and sanctions.

[6] Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, p. 193.

From the point of view of religion, the moral experience is no mere social fact, to be taken merely for what it appears to be; it is endowed with cosmic and ultimate significance, it relates man to a realm over and above the given world of social experience.

Yes, one must answer, religious idealism is beyond moral idealism. The meanings with which religion invests life are more than the meanings which morality and moral idealism give to the deeds brought within its field of vision. But the more than morality which religion and historical idealisms have tried to express,—perhaps all too unsuccessfully—has been just what we should expect if our analysis of the moral consciousness is true. Morality itself, the discontent with the obvious, the search for the final implications of an act, does not all of this, does not even morality itself mean something beyond itself? Is the mental habit of looking for meanings,—this mental habit which has generated morality, which is but another name for reflection,—is this to rest content with morality itself as a mere fact, or is it to ask for the meaning of morality too? Psychologically, I doubt not, it is this habit of looking beyond any datum for the meanings that it involves,—for the system that renders it intelligible,—which accounts for the persistence of a religious idealism transcending moral idealism. For the religious attitude, as distinct from the moral, God is a name for the ultimate something which makes morality and the moral search for meanings both possible and significant. Whether it is legitimate to put to the whole of the moral world a question which in the first instance we ask only within that world, is a logical and metaphysical problem, which it would be beyond the scope of this paper to discuss. But whether logically justifiable or not, it has its psychological roots in the habit for which morality itself is responsible, the habit of believing that things have more meanings than, of themselves, they disclose. Once become conscious of what you do, as a moral agent, in putting the question as to what a contemplated act really means for the larger system to which it belongs, and you will find yourself asking for the meaning of this whole moral world itself. You will have advanced from moral idealism to a religious idealism.

I have more than once spoken of religion and historical idealisms together, as if they were inwardly connected. Historical idealisms are those systems of thought which have regarded as legitimate this question as to the total or cosmic significance of the world of moral activity. In this respect they have been the reflective expressions of religion. Both religion and historical idealisms have tried to say something about a larger system, or setting, which "makes experience possible," or which makes morality possible. Experience, and the facts of experience, are not for either religion or metaphysical idealism mere data, to be described just as they are,—they are regarded as the expressions of something which transcends experience simply in the sense of making it possible and giving it meaning. For opposite ways of thinking, notably for positivism, definite barriers are set beyond which one must not ask, What does it mean? One must "describe the facts of experience," and not raise the question as to any ultimate meaning which these facts may have, or any more basic principles which make experience possible. It is not without reason that Kant with his transcendental problem as to "what makes experience possible," is the chiefest foe of positivism and factualism.

It has perhaps been the mistake of historical idealisms, as of religion, that they have believed themselves able to answer this question about the more ultimate meanings in terms of a final, absolute, and all-inclusive system. It may be that such a solution is not for us now. The concepts of evolution and development, the dynamic concepts, have entered too deeply into our habits of thought to permit us to remain content with older expressions of the religious motive. The motive itself, however, endures; although religious idealism, which is more than moral idealism because it asks for the more ultimate and cosmic meanings of morality and of all human activity, must ever be dissatisfied with its old expressions, and ever seek more adequate formulation.

THE TYPES OF AUTHORITY IN CHRISTIAN BELIEF

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This presentation is limited to an exposition and estimate of the chief types in which authority has appeared in the church, to which are added one or two fundamental suggestions.

The first type is naturally that of the Roman Catholic church. Authority here was a gradual growth. At the outset no one could have foreseen the ultimate result, yet the claims of a series of bishops of the early church of Rome, not seldom men of the greatest administrative ability, whose assumptions were favored by circumstances, grew at length into the acknowledged supremacy of the Roman see. This supremacy gradually took the place of the state and subordinated every government to its own law and end, and this claim now extends to every interest of every individual whenever and wherever the church sees fit to exercise its prerogative. Naturally it centres in the ideas and beliefs which concern religion. Its essential peculiarity is that between the hierarchy and the laity a great gulf is fixed across which the laity as such cannot pass. The hierarchy has means of knowledge of which the laity is deprived; it alone can interpret the Scriptures; to it alone has the deposit of tradition been committed; it alone has the right to enforce its judgments of truth and duty. Thus the hierarchy is in possession of a secret which it can share with no other, which it is a sacrilege for that other to seek for itself. The claim contains two further assumptions, that of infallibility and that of concentration in one official person. Infallibility means that authority covers every single relation of life where the church wills to exert it. Concentration in one person means that authority has to find some individual in whom it completely dwells and through whom it may be perfectly exercised. The distinctive quality must not be overlooked: to all save the hierarchy the authority is external, absolute, and final.

When Protestantism was organized in distinction from the Roman Catholic church, it became marked by three different attitudes toward the principle of authority, as found in experience, in the Scriptures, and in the reason.

Luther and those who were immediately associated with him found in their experience of the grace of God in Jesus Christ the immediate authentication of all their religious convictions. Whatever did not square with that experience, no matter whence arising, could not be true. Luther did indeed find in Paul's doctrine of justification by faith alone, and in the gracious and forgiving words of Jesus, that which spoke with sweet and convincing power; but not everything in the Scriptures was of equal authority over either his conscience or his thought. Calvin knew of no Scriptures which could be appealed to if the mind was not quickened by the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit. In the hidden court of the individual consciousness was heard that divine voice to which nothing external, such as church or creed or both, could add either truth or cogency. The authority was that of God or Christ or of the living Spirit, and not that of man. Luther with his great confession at the Diet of Worms stands with Socrates before his judges at Athens, with Jesus before Pilate, with Savonarola before his enemies at Florence, obedient to the inner voice of his experience. That, and that alone, which had created the experience of the Christian man and was essential to that experience was of paramount authority. Naturally, whatever was grounded on individual experience was liable to the danger of particularism and undue subjectivity, was too much at the mercy of emotion, lacking in universal applicability.

It was precisely this liability which led the Scholastic Reformers to assume another attitude toward authority. Feeling the need of some common standard to which to appeal, recourse was had to the Scriptures. They had renounced the authority of the church as such, and, confused by the differences which seemed irreconcilable in individual experience, they turned to the Scriptures as that which lay back of both church and experience, by which both were to be tested. Thus the oft-cited words of Chillingworth fairly represent the Protestant position: "The Bible and the Bible alone the religion of Protestants." This

position was, and has continued to be, one of grave difficulty; it centred in two questions, first, as to just what the Bible is, and secondly, as to the interpretation of it. To meet the difficulty concerning the Scriptures various expedients were resorted to. It came at length to be asserted that the vowel points of the Hebrew text were directly inspired by God and hence were trustworthy and authoritative. This proving inadequate, it was affirmed that not the Scriptures as we have them in any extant text but only the original autographs, when interpreted in the sense intended, were inerrant and infallible. But though this claim were allowed to be true, yet since the original autographs are hopelessly inaccessible, it is not worth while to attempt to disprove the position. Still further, though the Scriptures were admitted thus to be inerrant, yet this view would require an interpreter equally inerrant and infallible, and also the universal recognition of such an interpreter as inerrant and infallible. But such an interpreter has not appeared in the Protestant church, or, if he has, neither Lutheran nor Reformed nor Arminian nor any other branch of the church has acknowledged him. The attempt to set the Scriptures over against the church as an ultimate authority on the basis named is therefore futile. If the Scriptures are authoritative, the authority is relative and consistent with such incompleteness as actually characterizes both the Scriptures and all interpretations of them.

The third attitude of Protestantism is that which finds the source of authority in the human reason. Rationalism proposes, first, to test the historical documents and all alleged facts of Christianity by the same criteria which are applied to other so-called historical and literary phenomena; secondly, to interpret the Scriptures by the same standards which are valid for other books; thirdly, to verify traditional beliefs by the same canons which are suitable to other beliefs. The fundamental position here is that all documents and all existing beliefs have had their origin not in a supernatural sphere but in the mind of man, that they contain therefore nothing extra-human, and that they are amenable to human reason. Only that is revelation in which truth is actually disclosed. If there is mystery, this signifies that revelation has not yet taken place or is only partial. Whenever

revelation occurs, it is marked by these signs: it is the "revelation of something which can be construed by the mind, which is conveyed to it in terms of human thought, which can be expressed in coherent propositions." Thus the revelation is not external but internal, not absolute but relative, not complete but progressive, to, because in, the mind of man. No dogmatic propositions which involve a supposed truth above or contrary to the reason can coerce or bind the intelligence. The authority lies therefore in the truth, and in the truth only so far as known.

These, then, are the four chief historical types under which authority has presented itself: the authority of the church, the authority of experience, the authority of the Scriptures, and the authority of the reason or truth. Each has occupied a large place in the development of religious belief, and probably each has never been more sharply defined or more widely influential than now. Even in the Roman Catholic church, where one would least expect it, authority of immediate experience, authority of the Scriptures, and authority of the reason contest the field with the absolute authority of the church, and the strength of the Modernist movement shows that the end is not yet. On the other hand, among Protestants one sees that the authority of the church is in many circles becoming more effective in the determination of belief.

A further analysis of the forms of authority here sketched shows that it is of two kinds: that which attaches itself to the church and the Scriptures is external; that which belongs to experience and the reason is internal. The authority of the church and the Scriptures is complete and final, while that of the reason and experience is more or less partial and progressive.

In addition to the forms of authority already indicated is yet another which is destined to play a large part in the immediate future, the view advocated by Professor Rudolf Seeberg in Germany and Principal P. T. Forsyth and D. S. Cairns in Great Britain. This characterizes the so-called "Positive Theology," the starting-point of which is the "primacy of the given." Revelation is marked by an objective content. In and by means of the cross of Christ God's personal redemptive relation to the world

was changed once for all. In this fact Christian experience finds its creative source. Yet we come to this neither by the Scriptures as infallible nor by historical criticism but by present-day experience. Since this implies that the supernatural exists today, it lays a foundation for the supernatural in both the New Testament period and in the New Testament itself. Our faith is not something which we share with Christ as directed to God, but it is directed to Christ in whom God reconciled himself to men. The authoritative element in Christian belief is thus the changed attitude of God toward the sinner, which authenticates itself in the sinner's experience of God's grace or reconciliation traced to the deed of Christ. Not dogma, therefore, but a deed, not the Scriptures as such, but a fact enshrined in the Scriptures, not a truth offered to intelligence nor a mystery offered to faith, but an experience of God offered to man for acceptance and verification.

The theories thus outlined serve to indicate the large place which authority has made for itself in Christian belief. We may now seek to evaluate these in part in the order in which they have been presented. That no one of these theories has been able to hold its own to the exclusion of all others does not prove the falsity of all of them, but possibly only that while each contains a partial truth, it requires to be supplemented by the rest and perhaps by still other conceptions. No idea held for so long a time and by so many people is wholly false. While neither age nor common consent is a sufficient criterion of truth, yet, on the other hand, no belief is wholly wrong which has been cherished by large bodies of men and over long periods of time. Not alone in the present has the Spirit of Truth been active, guiding men into all the truth. Our business here is a sympathetic inquiry into the deeper meaning of these attitudes of mind.

The Roman Catholic theory of authority at its best embodies two principles of permanent value. One is that of the social unity of believers. The individuality of the Christian life is a priceless truth. Each man shall bear his own burden, and every one of us shall give account of himself to God. But this is only half the truth; we are also members one of another. The church long ago made this an article of its faith, but only in our day have

both psychology and ethics shown why it is that self-consciousness and personality are possible only in the social group. Secondly, this unity does not mean identity of function. On the contrary, the functions of the church are, as the apostle declared, of the greatest diversity. The more highly organized the community, the more diverse the functions. Yet all functions are not equal, although all may be equally necessary. By virtue of wisdom or power or goodness, some men are, and indeed must be, leaders. Some must teach, some must care for the common interests, some must minister to the needy out of hearts of love. And the correlate of this is also true; some must be taught, some must accept and obey the rule of leaders, some must welcome the good which others bring. This is evident in every stage of historical human life and appears to lie in the nature of things. So far as one can see, there is no possibility of this condition being outgrown. Wherever there is leadership of any kind, there must be some degree of assumption, of responsibility, of authority. Nowhere is this more clearly evident than in the case of Jesus. He spoke with authority because *he* could speak in no other way. The apostle Paul issued serious and urgent commands to the Corinthian church, but he had no alternative. The great bishops of the early church had to assume, and to execute, great tasks for which they were set. In the mediaeval period among untrained and unorganized peoples the church had to teach and rule with authority often rigorous and exacting. In her claim of infallibility which finds a voice in the Pope of Rome, and in the impassable gulf opened between the hierarchy and the laity, the Roman church has fatally overstepped the rightful bound of authority. Yet even this does not militate against the idea that with her present constituency it would both impair her high ministry and threaten her very existence, were she in a day to renounce all her singular claims and proceed to establish a pure democracy among her adherents. And this has its measure of truth in the Protestant church.

The Protestant theory which found the source of authority in the Scriptures was a position of great strength. It singled out from among the three sources affirmed by the Catholic church—the Scriptures, tradition, and the interpretation of the church—

the fountain-head of all doctrine and belief. If Protestantism had to choose any book as the source of authority, it was fortunate in its selection of the Scriptures. Moreover, we who preach still find here an inexhaustible mine of texts, religious, ethical, social. Still in our theological seminaries exegesis and Biblical theology are studied seriously with the aim of ascertaining the thought of God. Still the prophets illumine the pathway into the deepest problems of the personal life; still the psalmists reveal to us the divine secret of struggle, aspiration, triumph, and peace; still the letters of the apostle to the gentiles are unique and unsurpassed in great thoughts, tender sympathy, profound insight, and Christian judgment called out by the exigencies of experience. Here, too, is our most authentic description of our Saviour's life and deeds, our most authentic account of his words and his self-revelation of the Father. And if he is what our faith postulates and our love responds to, then the documents in which he is enshrined cannot fail to speak to us with a finality found nowhere else. It is still true, as Coleridge said, that the Bible "finds" us at greater depths than any other book. After historical criticism has done its legitimate work—and no impediment must be placed in its path—the Scriptures will continue to offer the supreme revelation of God and his purpose of redemption, of Jesus Christ as his Son, and of man's ideal destination to individual and social redemption.

The reason why many have sought the source of authority in experience is not far to seek. Authority derived from the church or from the Scriptures is necessarily external; it has therefore an element of remoteness. At best it is at the outset second-hand. It may be valid for others; how can I know that it is valid for me? But of that which arises in individual experience one has not the same doubt. There is such a vividness, an immediateness, a cogency, a convincing and compelling power, that no argument is required to persuade nor external measure to enforce it. The mystic asks for no outer proofs; all his evidence is within. Prophets upon whom the Lord's hand was heavy, or who beheld the Lord on a throne high and lifted up, needed no council of men to substantiate their message. One key to the entire theology of the apostle Paul is his experience on the Damascus road.

No one can understand Augustine's theology who is not familiar with his *Confessions*. Large portions of the Christian church ask for no other proof that Christ is the living and all-sufficient Saviour than the fact that he has saved them from their sins. Any theory of authority which ignores experience as at least a proximate source of belief is lacking in one essential element of reality. There may be danger of subjectivity, individualism, even fanaticism and separatism, but the danger must be accepted and met by suitable means.

Authority as grounded in reason has its rightful advocates. "Truth" is here the watchword; truth is the ultimate authority. It requires no validation; its force is neither derived from nor enhanced by decrees of councils; it is not more true because found in the Scriptures, and its authentication does not depend on the fluctuating fervency of experience. It shines by its own clear light. It points the way and there is no alternative but to follow. The position has been taken that every man, even the Roman Catholic, is ultimately a rationalist, that is, that the final court of appeal as to whether there is a God, or a revelation, or an infallible church is the private judgment of each individual. This would be true if as a matter of fact every man exercised his private judgment, if every man had arrived at his belief concerning God, revelation, and the church by a process of reasoning, leading from a state of indifference or doubt to positive conviction. But this is no more true than that the foundation of the empirical state is the "social contract." Even among Protestants not one man in a thousand has the idea of God or revelation or his particular church as result of a course of reasoning. Nor is one man in ten thousand a Protestant even because he has balanced the arguments pro and con for Protestantism as against Roman Catholicism or the Greek church. Partly by imitation, partly by custom, partly by acquisition of a self-unconscious habit, we grow into the beliefs by which we live. We find ourselves possessed by these, and then perchance look round for the authority by which to justify them. On the other hand, those who discover their final authority in the rational principle, or truth, occupy a perfectly impregnable position, so long as they deal with the abstract. The moment, however, they push into

the concrete, trouble begins. Pilate's question without its despairing sneer asks itself afresh, "What is truth?" And the answers, instead of a rational unity, are a medley of confused voices. If one may refer to the actual positions of those who maintain that truth is the final authority, instead of coming upon agreement in their ranks, one is distracted by the most conflicting and even mutually exclusive declarations as to what truth is. There is no unanimity as to the historical and literary phenomena on which Christianity is based, nor as to the interpretation of these phenomena; rather is there a wide and contradictory divergence of view. While, therefore, as a principle the statement that truth is the final authority remains unchallenged, its application is subject to well-nigh insuperable difficulties. At best it is an ideal toward which we strive rather than a goal already reached.

The position that authority resides in something "given" in Christianity deserves serious consideration. Its two chief excellences are, first, that the ultimate reality of Christianity is not conceived apart from experience, since present-day experience involves the supernatural and hence guarantees the truth of God's redemptive action; and, secondly, experience is not divorced from the historic deed of God in Christ, since experience is explicable only with reference to this deed. Thus authority is grounded partly in experience and partly in that by which it is created, namely, the data of the gospel. It is safe to say that no notion of authority can ever be adequate which ignores its relation to a living experience, for only in experience does its full value emerge. On the other hand, the theory under consideration answers to the demand that authority have an objective basis also. Moreover, it is not indifferent to the New Testament as containing the authoritative record of the objective basis or divine deed, although it is not necessary to interpret this divine deed in the way proposed by the advocates of this theory. The essential claim of Protestantism is thus preserved, that the New Testament is the supreme depository of God's purpose of grace in Jesus Christ, and therefore the ultimate authoritative source of our knowledge of redemption. It is, however, to be noted that the "datum," or the "given," in Christianity does not stand over

against the human mind as something contrary to the reason, or as above the reason, or as mystery insoluble yet accredited by the reason and therefore to be received. It is indeed a mystery, but only in the Pauline sense—a reality once hidden but now become manifest and therefore known. Accordingly authority attaches itself not to an inscrutable secret but to a divine deed, which evinces its essential nature in every man's experience of the forgiveness of sins, and becomes ever more luminous with the unfolding of that experience.

One or two further aspects of authority require consideration. The first is its bearing on personality. The earliest form of this arises in the relation of children to parents and contains all the elements which emerge later in more explicit diverse forms. From the first unreflecting response of the child to the natural and inevitable authority of the parents on through his submission to the sovereignty of the state in the whole circle of civic relations embodied in school and other spheres of action, the influence received by him from the church in its Bible instruction and varied ministries, his acquiescence in the indeterminate social conventions (the more effective the less they are codified), his beliefs and judgments, which he has in great part uncritically reproduced from the beliefs and judgments of others—in all these experiences are to be seen the operation of authority, and that too wholly in the region of personal relations. This reliance upon personal authority is universal and shows that it is partly instinctive and partly self-conscious. Its psychological basis is twofold: imitation, and the impossibility of any one's verifying for himself all the contents of his knowledge. Most of our fundamental and cherished beliefs have already become an integral part of our consciousness before we come to reflect upon them, and these abide with us, revealing their presence and power in the great moments of our experience. We have, moreover, to depend upon others for the larger portion of our more ultimate conceptions of the physical world and the facts of practical life. Reasons why we accept testimony of particular persons vary with each of us; temperament, sex, general habits of thought and feeling, groups of interest in which one has continually lived, special past experiences, family and social traditions, more in-

timate associations, indeed numberless influences to which one yields but of which one is self-unconscious. We have thus a deep, ineradicable tendency to believe other persons and to believe most in those who, other things being equal, are good. We believe what they say, and, more than this, we believe in them. They create confidence in us, and we are content that it should be so, even if we cannot fully explain to ourselves the final ground of our confidence or wholly vindicate its content to others. How it is that Jesus effects his unmeasured power of teaching and of redemption in the souls of men I but partly understand, but this I know, that to those who freely open their consciousness to him there is no limit to his revelation of God or of the ideals of individual and social life which he makes and will make to them. There is a secret here, but it is the secret of personality. Ultimately the highest authority resides in the highest person.

Another aspect of authority lies in its teleological import. We believe, not because we have proved and not because any one else has proved. We often believe in spite of proof, although not in spite of all proof. Nor does our belief depend upon Bishop Butler's balance of probability. Our great beliefs are the answer of our entire personality to the total reality of things. The particular belief may be fragmentary but it is not thereby discredited. If we are to live, some things must be true. Paradoxical as it is, we do not create our deepest beliefs, rather are they created for us. Augustine's position is forever true, "Faith precedes knowledge." We are, for instance, theists not because, but one may say in spite of, or at least irrespective of, the common theistic proofs. One after another these have been shown at the bar of pure reason to be baseless, yet theism as a conviction was never so vital or deeply rooted as today. This only means that because our great beliefs cannot completely justify themselves in logic, they are not therefore discredited. As they have arisen from the necessities of life, so life will justify them. There is in belief and in experience a prophetic element. Partial it may seem to be, but it is an integral part of an infinite whole which is indestructibly immanent in it. In the ideal and not in the actual, in the future and not completely in the past or the present, in the whole and not in any fragment, in the inevitable outcome of

the moral order and not in any momentary stage of it, in God and not in man, lies the ultimate authority for our belief in virtue, redemption, and the immortal certainty of conquest in the divine struggle for existence.

From this point of view light is cast in various directions. First, it discloses why, if authority begins as dogmatic assertion, external coercion if need be, it cannot remain such; it exists not for itself but that later it may renounce itself as "might." It disappears as force that it may reappear as impulse and obedience of the free spirit to the divine ideal. In other words, authority is not external and static, but developmental and functional. This is possibly the severest criticism to be passed on the notion of authority in the Roman Catholic church. If, moreover, one seeks in the Christian experience of any man or age the authority for his belief, one must not separate this from its teleological significance. "That apart from us," said the ancient writer, "they should not be made perfect." The Scriptures are authoritative not simply as a book with a revelation closed and sealed, but as the living word of God interpreted in the light of God's unfolding purpose of grace resplendent with the promise of consummation. There is indeed authority in the reason, not as an isolated notion or idea, but in so far as it partakes of the eternal Logos which permeates and enlightens the whole world. There is a "given" element in Christianity which is authoritative, but its ultimate meaning is found not in itself but in that to which it points—an earnest or pledge of a completed redemption.

The ultimate source of authority in Christian belief is the personal consciousness of Jesus Christ in his disclosure of the character and redemptive purpose of God, which is the creative and informing spirit of the Christian church, the central element and all-determining principle of the Scriptures, the organizer and ideal of Christian experience, the divine light which illumines the reason, the datum without which Christianity would not be.

REVERENCE AS THE HEART OF CHRISTIANITY

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When we stand by the sea and watch a storm dash huge waves on the rocks with furious roar and tumult, the power of the ocean fills us with awe. When the storm passes by and the night comes on and the stars shine out, at first one by one and then in throngs, till the great dome is all aflame and infinite spaces open above us, lighted with innumerable fires,—while the grandeur of the scene awakens awe, the mystery and boundlessness of these evening skies awaken wonder also. But when the day dawns and we look around us and see some lovely landscape, we no longer feel either awe or wonder; both have disappeared with the shadows of the night and the mystery of the stars; we feel only admiration. Then, if we enter some home where sons and daughters gather around the chair of an aged mother, we see that they feel no awe, for she is feeble and they are strong; and perhaps there is no admiration, for her form may be bent and her features wrinkled; but when her children think of what her sweet goodness has been to them through many years, they feel a nobler sentiment. It is not mere respect, however, such as we always render to age; it is not mere gratitude and love; it is reverence.

In these pictures from nature and life we find suggestions of the differences between four distinct sentiments of human nature, each of which is the heart of a different type of religion. When they are thus vividly pictured, any one can see the differences. Yet they are often confused, and the consequences of this confusion are mischievous. For if we fail to note the difference between the lower and the higher sentiment, it is easy for us to live content with the lower type of religion, because we do not feel or understand the higher type. Thus we may content ourselves with a religion of mere awe or wonder, or with

a mere respect for certain ceremonies and edifices and sacred days, and may never rise to the religion of reverence because "reverence" means to us only awe or wonder or respect. It is a common mistake of those who are interested in religious organizations to think that they are very religious because they believe in the miraculous powers of certain relics with a kind of awe or rest their Christian faith upon the traditions of certain wonderful happenings in the past or are regular churchgoers and have great respect for the places and customs of worship, even though they seldom or never seem to appreciate the divine glory of goodness in men and women around them. Such a type of religious feeling is often hardly to be distinguished from paganism, however much it makes Christian professions and takes the Christian name.

In the religions of the Bible the appeal to reverence is characteristic; and in Christianity we find a distinctive type of reverence, which recognizes a divine presence, not only in saints and prophets, but in all human nature, in even the most degraded, and therefore feels the infinite value of every soul.

We may clearly discriminate between these sentiments by observing, as I have suggested above in certain pictures from nature and life, that they accompany different perceptions. Awe, for instance, usually accompanies a sense-perception of the stupendous power and magnitude of nature; wonder, a recognition of the limitations of our knowledge; admiration, mainly an aesthetic perception; reverence, always a moral perception. Awe can never be modified into admiration or reverence, any more than the feeling of weight can be transformed into a perception of colors. But awe can be followed by the higher sentiments or be felt simultaneously with them, while each retains its distinctive character, just as our absorbed attention to some objects of sight, in which we are heedless of all sounds, may be followed by a similar attention to certain sounds, or the eyes and ears may simultaneously observe their appropriate objects.

Therefore, we find that a careful writer like Professor Momerie defines reverence as "the surrender of the spirit to the attractive influence of goodness," and James Kidd says that it "is excited by nobility of character," and Martineau, that "rever-

ence" is "devotion to goodness," that "a religion of reverence bows before the authority of goodness," and that "a being manifestly under the influence of principles higher than our own awakens our reverence; a being with evident force of resolve to execute, more unfailingly than ourselves, what is simply on our level excites our admiration." Martineau elsewhere says of "wonder, admiration, and reverence," that "in the gaining of knowledge we have the first; in the perception of beauty, the second; in the presence of higher character, the third." But, as Goethe has said, Christianity teaches us to reverence what is beneath us, as well as what is above us,—which can be true in no other sense than Channing's, namely, that reverence recognizes moral goodness as divine, not only in the saint and in God, but also in the lowliest human soul; for the least germ of goodness is God's "real presence," and in reverencing even the possibilities of goodness we are reverencing "God in man." Thus, as Channing says, "Christianity lays the foundation of a universal love by inspiring reverence for the human soul, be that soul lodged wherever it may."

But the higher forms of religion are constantly tending to slip and slide into the lower forms, because most men feel the higher sentiments so faintly; and therefore a religion which centres in reverence may easily become some kind of paganism, without changing its name or disowning its saints, by merely substituting some lower religious feeling for reverence.

In the Middle Ages Christianity was apprehended very gradually by converts from paganism, in whose religious life awe and wonder and similar sentiments were predominant and reverence was seldom felt. The appeal to which they could most readily respond was, therefore, the appeal to awe and wonder; and the teaching of the Church was "subdued to what it worked in, like the dyer's hand." Awe for its great saints, for instance, was compelled by tales of their miracle-working power. Thus the memory of Francis of Assisi was glorified by legends of miracles, which awakened awe in those who could but dimly appreciate and reverence his saintliness.

A similar appeal to a lower sentiment we find today in the tendency of some minds to return to a nature-worship which appeals

to awe and admiration and wonder, but not at all to reverence, because such minds have ceased to believe in an Infinite Person whom they can really worship. In the strict sense of the word, there is no religion in nature-worship; for nature-worship is either mere superstition or else mere aesthetic enjoyment [1]; the sentiment of it can be nothing nobler than mere awe or wonder or admiration, whereas, as Martineau observes, "the transcendent form of reverence," that is, our reverence for the Supremely Good, "constitutes proper religion." Similarly Professor Upton says, "Religion proper does not clearly show itself in human nature till reverence for an authority manifested in the conscience presents the soul with a supreme ideal, in which the presence and the authority of the Eternal One are felt to be revealed." [2]

In the strictest sense, the essence of religion is not reverence, but loyalty to God. Nevertheless Martineau is right in saying that "the ascendency of the greater soul over the lesser," which creates loyalty, "is won by touching the springs of reverence"; and, therefore, whatever appeal may be made to our awe or wonder or admiration can never for a moment control us, if the appeal to reverence calls us to our true allegiance,—as, for instance, when the awe or wonder or admiration that created the pagan religions of ancient times, and even the reverence for the divine justice and beneficence which was sometimes felt, came into contact with the reverence for the divine holiness and for the moral possibilities of human nature which Christianity taught

[1] For even the most intense feeling of a Divine Presence in the beauty of the universe does not involve any feeling of self-surrender to a higher goodness. Therefore the aesthetic recognition of God is a mere admiration which we welcome on account of the pleasure it gives us; yet simultaneously with this aesthetic feeling the feeling of self-surrender to goodness may be awakened by some moral ideal, in which we recognize a revelation of God which commands our reverence and obedience.

[2] So Edward Caird says, "The natural man [that is, the savage] is capable of fear and presumption, but never of reverence; he can be superstitious or profane but never religious. In other words, he does not really look *up* to the power before which he trembles, or, in any sense, conceive it as a better self, with which he can identify himself, even while he bends before it. And this means that he does not in the proper sense worship at all; for he does not rise to the idea of any being who deserves the name of God, as being higher than the self and yet not a mere object or not-self" (The Evolution of Religion, vol. i, p. 179).

the world. It was the profound and powerful appeal of Christianity to the latent reverence of earnest men for the highest goodness, when this goodness was revealed to them in the gospel-story, and the intense faith in the divine redeeming love which it awakened, that, more than everything else, account for the wonderful spread of Christianity in the first centuries of its history, and are the evident reasons why some branches of the Christian church today show much more vitality than others.

Martineau would also say that our feeling toward *ideals* of goodness is not reverence and therefore cannot be proper religion, if these ideals do not represent realities of character in man or in God, but are only thoughts in our own minds; for "a conception which reports itself as empty of reality can no more receive our reverent embrace than the shade of a departed ancestor or guide. . . . We cannot venerate our own idea." And therefore "the posture of a *religious* nature is reverence for character above us," and "to paralyze these [personal] relations" by substituting awe or wonder or admiration for reverence, "is to relapse into paganism."

But the method of Jesus was very unlike the pagan method. So far from trying to excite awe and wonder by his marvellous healing power and resting upon it his appeal for loyalty, he even tried to suppress these feelings of awe and wonder because they might dull the souls of his hearers to higher feelings. His "works" were works of compassion and love, and he appealed to them as expressing his philanthropy. We see this in his reply to the Baptist's disciples, when he points to these works and mentions last, as if it were the most important, although it involved no wonderful power to control natural processes, that "the poor have the gospel preached to them"; for this was the supreme expression of his philanthropy. But his healing power he seems to have found a perplexity and an embarrassment. After his first day of preaching and healing, when he had cured the demoniac in the synagogue of Capernaum and multitudes came to him in the evening, bringing "all that were sick," he fled from the city early the next morning; and when the apostles followed him, begging him to return and continue these wonderful cures, he refused, for he would rather go to other places, where the awe

and wonder of the people and their eagerness to be cured of bodily diseases had not been so aroused as to stifle the nobler feelings. He made no appeal to these wonderful cures to establish his authority as a teacher. His aim was, rather, by his preaching to appeal directly to men's hearts and awaken in them penitence and reverence and spiritual hunger and thirst and by this nobler appeal to win their deference and loyalty. "Let us go elsewhere into the next towns, that I may preach there also; for to this end came I forth." They who did not respond to this nobler appeal were not the kind of disciples that he wished to win. Nicodemus professed to be convinced by the miracles; but Jesus refused to accept him as a disciple, and required of him to be "born from above" of a nobler spirit than mere awe and wonder; whereas they who found a higher life awakened within them by the appeal of Jesus needed no other evidence that his words were the truth of God.

The same is implied in the account of the coming of Jesus at night to his disciples, when he walked on the boisterous sea and entered their boat. They fell down in marvel and awe, exclaiming, "Truly, thou art the Son of God"; but he received their homage in silence and gave them no blessing,—such as he afterwards gave to Peter, when, moved not by awe but by reverence, he confessed his Master to be the true Christ and Jesus saw that Peter for the first time in some degree understood that He was becoming the true fulfiller of ancient prophecy, the true deliverer of his nation, not because of any wonderful power to control nature and to cure disease or any hope of re-establishing David's throne by military strength, but because of the exalted ideal to which he had consecrated himself and by which he pointed out the way of true salvation,—the ideal of a greatness which is glorified by humility and by self-forgetful devotion to the highest welfare of humanity. He thus suppressed in his disciples the feelings of awe and wonder so that he might awaken nobler feelings.

Therefore we must discriminate between these sentiments. For, as I have said, they accompany our perceptions of certain realities in nature and life; and, because these realities are so different from one another, the names for the sentiments should

be carefully distinguished. To confound these words makes it hard to distinguish the realities. No authority of great writers or of popular usage can justify such carelessness. For, as Martineau says, "words are made mischievous by indeterminate use." Yet some writers of the highest repute have been careless in this respect. Thus Emerson says that "the stars awaken a certain reverence, because, though always present, they are inaccessible," —where he really means awe and wonder at the majesty and mystery of the stars. The author of *Ecce Homo* defines religion as an "habitual and permanent admiration,"—forgetting that admiration is merely one of the lower sentiments of religion (in the most general sense of the word "religion") and is lacking in some very religious people, as in many of the Puritans, who were indifferent to the beauty of nature and art, but profoundly reverenced righteousness. Another writer[3] defines reverence as "the feeling of admiration which instinctively goes with the thought of the divine power, wisdom, beauty, and goodness." He does not discriminate the admiration that wisdom and beauty and strength of will arouse from the awe that power excites and the reverence that goodness awakens. By using "admiration" in this vague and general way as including every feeling that nature and life excite in us, and by taking "reverence" to mean the kind of admiration excited by "the divine power, wisdom, beauty, and goodness," he deprives himself of any exact and specific terms for the feeling awakened by beauty and wisdom and for the feeling awakened by goodness, thus limiting his vocabulary and confusing in his readers' minds these different feelings and making it impossible for them to understand what Christianity really is. Lecky remarks that "reverence diminishes as civilization advances," that "great evils have grown out of it," such as "religious superstition and political servitude," and that "nearly all the social and political spheres in which reverence was fostered have passed away," where he evidently means a dread of unseen powers or a spirit of mere deference and dependence in both social and religious relations, thus confounding the highest type of religion with the lowest by this amazing misuse of a word. When thus

[3] A Catechism of Liberal Faith (Unitarian Sunday School Society, 1895), p. 67.

misused, words become mere tricks and frauds, so that people are led to think that reverence is only a kind of admiration or is quite the same as awe or dread or wonder, and then easily content themselves with mere admiration or awe or dread or wonder, and never clearly understand what it is to reverence either man or God, and so lose the habit of reverence and lapse from Christian faith into paganism.

This reverence has characterized all distinctively Christian institutions. It is, for instance, the mutual reverence of husband and wife as immortal souls that hallows the wedded tie in Christendom, as it is hallowed nowhere else,—a reverence that teaches patience, tenderness, forgivingness, and created the Christian home. It is the mutual reverence of fellow-citizens, of the rich and the poor, of the wise and the weak, as all alike children of God, that is, to use the words of Stopford Brooke, "the foundation of all noble and enduring democracy," and created the ideal of the Christian state,—an ideal never yet fully realized, but which is gradually transforming our modern world. It is reverence for the most degraded human being, because, to quote Martineau once more, "the meanest is but the highest in the germ," that created our Christian philanthropy, the noblest of all philanthropies; for even Buddhist philanthropy lacks just this reverence, does not see the infinite possibilities of human nature and the divine ministry of suffering and sorrow for the spiritual training of mankind, and therefore is more intent on removing the sufferings of human life than on promoting the spiritual growth of human souls.

Judaism did not teach this enthusiastic reverence for the human nature of all men as alike children of God and brothers in a common humanity. But Christianity reverenced even the slave and the savage, the felon and the outcast, demanded the abolition of all distinctions of race and caste, protected womanhood and childhood with special tenderness, and made the bondman and his master feel their essential equality before God. Neither did Judaism teach the highest reverence for God, such as Christianity taught when it interpreted his holiness, not as a mere separateness from sinners, but as a hatred of sin that longs to save every sinner from his sin and to communicate to him the divine holi-

ness, and therefore is forever seeking to "save that which is lost." It is with this distinctive Christian meaning of the word that Martineau says: "There can be no holiness [in God] that is not affectionate."

Stoicism, indeed, said something about human brotherhood, but in a feeble and half-hearted way as the mere academic talk of philosophers; for it was inspired by no reverence for human nature (even though a Seneca may have spoken some fine words about the sacredness of man), because, with its philosophy, it could feel no reverence for God. Therefore it created no great philanthropies, such as Christianity created, and no great popular movements of social regeneration and reform, such as Christianity has often inspired. For Christianity was unique, not in merely teaching a *doctrine* of human brotherhood, but in creating and widely disseminating a *faith* in the infinite value of every soul and the nobler feeling of brotherhood which this faith awakened. There is a sharp contrast between the spirit of Epictetus or of Marcus Aurelius, of whom Lecky says, "seldom has such active and unrelaxing virtue been united with so little enthusiasm," and, on the other hand, the magnificently enthusiastic spirit of Paul and Francis of Assisi, a fervent, self-sacrificing, profoundly reverent love of all mankind. Therefore, as the author of *Ecce Homo* says, "in every age the Christian temper has shivered at the touch of Stoic apathy." And whenever religion lapses into Stoicism, as there is a tendency in some Unitarianism today, the same chill benumbs its enthusiasm.

Reverence is capable of cultivation; but it can be cultivated and taught by personal influence only. There is a grave mistake in Emerson's words, "the soul knows no persons," if these words are taken in their usual sense; and Martineau is wiser when he says: "In matters of devout faith reverence for persons gives perception of truth in ideas." For, while the mere intellect, dealing with things and thoughts, knows only the impersonal, the soul, on the other hand, knows only persons, because its life is fed by those truths and sentiments of which we are made conscious by the influence of persons upon us, that is, by the influence of character; and, as Emerson himself sees, "character is higher than intellect." Therefore the "Over-Soul" must be personal, in

the sense of having moral character; otherwise we cannot reverence him; and, if we cannot reverence him, our religion can have no moral power over us, for we can have no feeling of loyalty to him. Then, further, the fellow-men whose goodness we reverence are our spiritual helpers, because "the light of the knowledge of the glory of God" shines through them into our own souls and wins us to aspire to the divine goodness that they reveal. Even the innocence and humility and trust of childhood are revelations of holy ideals; even the prodigal son in his repentance helps us to believe in the possibilities of human nature and in God's forgiving love; and the sinful woman at Simon's feast, whose many sins were forgiven because she had loved much, reveals to us the redeeming power of a generous love. Thus the personal influence of goodness in every form, even when it is but a faint spark in a sinful soul, awakens our reverence and teaches us the holiest truth.

It is the transcendent power of Jesus in all the ages since his time, that in him the supreme word of true religion was made flesh, and that by his life the distinctive truth of his religion, the faith in a divine love which is forever seeking to "save that which is lost," became an intense conviction in multitudes of souls.

It was a distinctive truth, because no saint or sage had ever taught it in any land, but the deep experiences of his own soul gradually revealed it to him. For in the Sermon on the Mount we find no teaching of such a divine love as is taught in the fifteenth chapter of Luke, and there is not the least expression of interest in the publicans and sinners. It speaks of God's *benevolent* love only, which sends the bounties of nature impartially to the evil as well as to the good, and forgives our trespasses, when we ourselves are in a forgiving spirit toward our fellowmen. Reconciliation must begin with our own seeking after God, —a doctrine which is distinctively Jewish. But early in the ministry of Jesus the love which healed those who were sick and suffering in body began to reach out to those who were in spiritual need; and a little later he was called "a friend of publicans and sinners," because his kindness drew these outcasts to him and wakened aspirations for a better life in men and women whom

respectable people abhorred. When, at length, he began with heavy forebodings that last journey to Jerusalem, his love became more tender for those who, like him, were "despised and rejected," —they because they were so evil, he because he was so good. It was then that he told the three exquisite parables of the Lost Sheep, the Lost Coin, and the Lost Son, to justify the ever-deepening humanity of his ministry by proclaiming a novel truth about God's relations to mankind and our own duties to one another. Thus in the discipline of trouble and disappointment his heart was taught what no saint or sage had ever learned, that man is always God's child, still having divine possibilities of goodness within him and still dear to the Infinite Heart, though apparently lost like the sheep and the coin and the wayward boy, and that, therefore, these degraded men and women have an imperative and holy claim upon us for reverent pity, trust, and love; for God has always been seeking them, even when they seemed to be far away from him, as the shepherd sought his wandering sheep. And this is the distinctively Christian doctrine of "grace."

Still, while reverence is thus exalted as the heart of Christianity, awe and wonder and admiration have their place in true religion; but we must insist that they should be always subordinated to reverence. For goodness is supreme in this universe. It is, for instance, the great saints and prophets who rule the hearts of the generations that come after them, and thus guide with power the course of human events. And there is no beauty or mystery comparable to that which flows into a human form when it is glorified by simple goodness and the Eternal God seems to make it his shrine. Ruskin says that there never was a really beautiful woman whose beauty was not the expression of the lovely character of either herself or some immediate ancestor. But, on the other hand, if we make reverence a mere Cinderella and clothe her sisters with the queenly robes,—if we exalt power or mystery or beauty as more divine than goodness,—then all the highest power and mystery and beauty of human life disappear. The fine arts, for instance, when in admiring loveliness of form and color they forget ethical ideals and are willing to glorify the sensuous beauty of that which is ethically base, be-

come themselves degraded and lose the vision of the highest beauty. But when admiration and awe and wonder become the handmaids of reverence, then they are transfigured into their grandest and fairest forms, and we recognize that there is no beauty so lovely as the beauty of holiness and no power so mighty as the power of unselfish, reverent love.

We do not truly worship God when we bow before him as the Almighty merely, for power is only his throne; or when we admire the beauty of creation, for this beauty is only his royal robe; or when we admire the intelligence with which all things are made and governed, for this is only his sceptre; or even when we wonder at the inscrutable mystery of his nature and providence. If we do not see that goodness alone makes him truly divine, then the throne is empty or some being of cruelty and malice may sit there whom we cannot worship, and the robe and sceptre tell us nothing of God himself, and the mystery makes him merely the Unknowable Existence. But when we adore the Eternal Goodness, we come into the presence of the living God, who sits on his throne of power, and wears his robe of beauty, and wields his sceptre of intelligence, and illuminates all the mysteries of the universe with the light of his love.

Then, when the moral revelation of God, that comes to us in our own hearts by the influence of saintly human lives, has given us faith in the Eternal Goodness, we can believe in the presence of this goodness in the most terrific manifestations of power in nature around us, even though nature gives us no assurances of an overruling goodness. Thus the awe with which we look upon these manifestations of power may be blended with reverence for the Unseen Love. Then we can also look upon the stars with reverence, not, as Emerson thinks, because they are "inaccessible," but because they testify of a Divine Presence, which the heart of Christian faith, enlightened by the influence of saintly lives, recognizes and reverences as the Eternal Goodness.

In his lectures on *Belief in God*, President Schurman speaks of "the faith of the modern scientist," who looks upon the world "with awe and wonder and a deep sense of mystery"; and he adds that "this attitude towards the universe is much more reverential than is too often found in those who have learned that the heart

of things is also infinitely good and loving. . . . To the scientist God is the principle of order, to the artist the soul of beauty, to the man of virtue the will that is absolutely holy. . . . Modern culture protests against the Puritan enthronement of goodness above truth and beauty. It regards them as co-equal graces."

President Schurman's vague use of "reverential" as covering awe, wonder, and admiration, confuses his thought. Undoubtedly Puritanism undervalued beauty and scientific truth in order to emphasize the supreme importance of goodness and of that spiritual truth which is revealed to us "through the human experiences of the conscience and affections." But in this emphasis Puritanism, even when it became fanatical in consequence of its bitter hatred of the moral corruption which at that time had often been blended with the artist's love of beauty, was yet intensely Christian and very noble. And the Puritan narrowness which is offensive to modern culture does not justify any lowering of moral ideals to an equality of honor with aesthetic ideals.

It is the great practical problem of true religion at all times, how to lift the world out of paganism, the worship of mere power or mystery or intelligence or beauty. We find an answer to this problem by cultivating reverence, by recognizing the supreme divineness of moral goodness, though it be in some homely form or feeble frame or lowly lot or narrow intelligence, and above all by adoring every manifestation of self-sacrificing and holy love, as when the dying Bunsen said to his devoted wife, "In thy face I have seen the Eternal One." But when we think to honor God or to exalt man by our mere awe or wonder or admiration, thus putting mere power or beauty or mystery or intellectual strength and skill on a level with moral goodness, as modern culture does, we sink into paganism.

The test of any Christian profession is not its dogma or ritual or history, but the practical expression it gives of reverence by its self-sacrificing enthusiasm of faithful service for the highest welfare of humanity. In surrendering itself to this spirit and to all the generous activities that this reverence creates, the church is surrendering itself to Christ in true discipleship. And in this

true discipleship which is "the unity of the Spirit," all controversies will be silenced and all Christians will co-operate in resisting the paganism of much of our nominally Christian civilization.

The innermost secret of Christianity, then, is a distinctive type of reverence. As a reverence for the Eternal Goodness who is ever seeking to save that which is lost, it is true worship. As a self-reverence which aspires to the noblest ideals because each of us is a temple of a Holy Spirit whose goodness we must ever more and more apprehend and emulate, it is true saintliness. And as a reverence for the divine image in even the most degraded of men and for the possibilities of goodness there, it is enthusiastic philanthropy.

The statement urged in this article that the Christian faith in human nature is distinctive of Christianity, has been often contradicted. A few quotations from eminent authorities in support of this statement will be interesting.

"He who has never looked through men's outward conditions to the naked soul and there seen God's image commanding reverence, is a stranger to the distinctive love of Christianity." Channing, in Life, Centenary Edition, 1880, p. 458. "The true Christianity,—a faith like Christ's in the infinitude of man." "Alone in all history, he estimated the greatness of man." "Thus is he, as I think, the only soul in history who has appreciated the worth of man." Emerson, Divinity School Address. In Christianity, "the individual has an infinite worth, as being the aim and object of the love of God." Hegel (quoted in J. H. Stirling's Philosophy of Law, 1873, p. 27). "The true meaning of the Christian faith," is its "reverential estimate of the human soul," its "sense of the infinite worth there is in man." Martineau, Hours of Thought, vol. ii, pp. 286, 258. "It [Christianity] assumed, for the first time in history, the infinite worth of the human soul." Dr. Hatch, Hibbert Lectures, p. 334. "The Christian doctrine of the inestimable value of each immortal soul is the distinguishing and transcendent characteristic of every society into which the spirit of Christianity has passed." Christianity "displays an anxiety for the *moral* well-being of the castaways of society, such as the most humane nations of antiquity had never reached," "wholly foreign to the genius of Paganism." Lecky, European Morals, 1887, vol. ii, p. 34. "The special work which awaited Christianity was the transfusion into the mind of the world of its own distinctive principle, the value of a human soul." Dr. Matheson, Spirit of Christianity, vol. i, p. 297. "Christ saw man at his true value and died to give expression to his estimate; he is man rightly weighing man. The struggle of Christ in history is to bring men up to the point of duly valuing their fellow-men." Dr. Munger, The Appeal to Life, p. 18. "Faith in the infinite worth of the human personality in the sight of God,—if there was anything new in the thought of Jesus, it was this." Professor G. B. Foster, Finality of the Christian Religion, 1906, p. 481.

NOTE ON THE OSTRACA FROM SAMARIA

In the account published in this REVIEW for January, 1911, of the discovery of Hebrew ostraca at Samaria in 1910, it was suggested by me that these seemed to be of the nature of labels indicating ownership, in some cases joint ownership. A more detailed examination has led me to modify this view in favor of that held by the discoverer, Professor Reisner. In his view the ostraca were memoranda sent from the country with jars of oil and wine. The name preceded by *lamed*, "to," "for," would then be that of the consignee, who was not necessarily the owner, and the names following would not indicate joint owners, but would be variously understood according to circumstances. In some cases the consignee's name is followed by that of his father, in others by that of the messenger, or of the messenger and the messenger's father, etc. Thus No. 49 would read: "In the 11th (?) year. From Kheleq. For Asâ [son of] Akhimelek. Baʿalâ [son of] Baʿalmeʿonî," Baʿalâ being the name of the messenger or porter.

In view of the importance of the ostraca, and of the wide-spread interest excited by their discovery, it is proposed to publish them in advance of the other results of the excavations.

The newspaper reports, that there have been found an Assyrian letter addressed to Ahab and a tablet containing the inventory of the furniture in his palace, are without foundation.

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